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Abstract
This thesis contributes to the study of the use of auctions in the allocation of contracts of
payments for environmental services. The focus of the research is on the role of social interac-
tion as a learning source for bidders in repeated auctions. Bidders learn over time and adapt
their bidding strategies accordingly in order to increase their rents. Two different payments
schemes are considered; payments for biodiversity conservation and payments for carbon se-
questration. In order to evaluate the performance of repeated auctions, the implementation of
these payments schemes is simulated by means of agent-based modeling. Agent-based models
allow simulating interactions among heterogeneous individuals, their learning effects and their
strategies, such that the effects that emerge from these dynamics can be analyzed. This study
confirms that the cost-effectiveness of auctions to provide biodiversity conservation decreases
with the learning effects of land users. Nevertheless, contrary to the expectations, learning
through social interaction can dampen the deterioration of the cost-effectiveness of auctions,
such that despite of learning effects, discriminatory auctions can be more cost-effective than
fixed payments. Moreover, this study shows that these learning effects can contribute to the
goal of poverty alleviation, which is especially relevant for the implementation of these schemes
in low income countries. Repeated discriminatory auctions can provide "pro-poor conservation"
effectively, especially in the presence of uncertainty about the income of alternative sources
and in settings of high competition among potential participants. This thesis also explores the
problem of asset specificity in the provision of environmental services, taking as an example
schemes of payments for carbon sequestration where land users are expected to plant trees on
their land. It assesses the design possibilities of payments schemes in order to overcome this
problem, and it explores the use of auctions to allocate contracts requiring specific investments.
The results provide evidence for losses in cost-effectiveness through non-compliance when one-
shot auctions are used to allocate long-term contracts if land users face high time preferences.
However, repeated discriminatory auctions can allow the agency to allocate short-term con-
tracts cost-effectively because the contract terms can be renewed and adapted to changes in
opportunity costs, such that compliance is not compromised in the long-run.
v

Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation ist ein Beitrag zur Analyse der Nutzung von Auktionen im Rahmen der
Allokation von Verträgen für Agrar- und Klimamaßnahmen. Hierbei geht es um Programme,
in denen Landnutzern direkte Zahlungen für ihre Leistungen angeboten werden. Diese For-
schungsarbeit fokussiert sich auf die Rolle der sozialen Interaktion als Lernquelle für potentielle
Teilnehmer in wiederholten Auktionen. Landnutzer lernen und verändern ihre Strategien ent-
sprechend, um höhere Renten zu erzielen. Zwei Arten von Programmen werden einer näheren
Betrachtung unterzogen; Bezahlungen für die Erhaltung von Biodiversität sowie Bezahlungen
für Kohlenstoffspeicherung. Um die Leistung von wiederholten Auktionen zu evaluieren, wer-
den verschiedene Programme durch eine Agenten-basierte Modellierung simuliert. Diese erlaubt
die Simulation von Interaktionen zwischen heterogenen Individuen sowie deren Lerneffekte und
Strategien, so dass die Effekte der daraus resultierenden Dynamiken analysiert und bewertet
werden können. Diese Studie zeigt, dass eine höhere Konnektivität zwischen den Landnutzern
einen höheren Informationsaustausch zur Folge hat und sich daher die Bereitstellung von Biodi-
versitätserhaltung weniger kosteneffizient gestaltet. Anders als erwartet, mindern die durch so-
ziale Interaktion induzierten Lerneffekte die Verschlechterung der Kosteneffektivität von Auk-
tionen, so dass diese trotzdem kosteneffektiver als fixe Bezahlungen sein können. Diese Studie
zeigt auch, dass diese Lerneffekte zum Ziel der Armutsbekämpfung beitragen können, und damit
eine Relevanz für ärmer Länder aufweisen. Wiederholte diskriminierende Auktionen können eine
pro-arm Biodiversitätserhaltung induzieren, besonders wenn Landnutzer Unsicherheit bezüglich
ihrer zukünftigen Einkommensquellen von alternativen Landnutzungen haben, und wenn diese
Programme unter hoher Konkurrenz implementiert werden. Diese Dissertation erforscht auch
das Problem der Faktorspezifität in der Implementierung dieser Programme anhand des Bei-
spiels der Wiederaufforstung für die Speicherung von Kohlenstoff. Die Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten
dieser Programme, hinsichtlich des Umgangs mit dem Problem der Faktorspezifität werden ana-
lysiert. Zudem wird der Einsatz von Auktionen als Instrument zur Allokation von Verträgen mit
faktorspezifischen Investitionen untersucht. Die Ergebnisse liefern Evidenz für Kosteneffektivi-
tätsgewinne durch diskriminierende Auktionen, sofern kurzfristige Verträge angeboten werden.
Diese erlauben eine kosteneffektive Anpassung der Vertragsbestimmungen gemäß den Änderun-
vii
gen der Opportunitätskosten, so dass die Einhaltung der Verträge auf lange Sicht nicht gefähr-
det wird. Allerdings können einmalig implementierte Auktionen zur Allokation von langfristigen
Verträgen dazu führen, dass Landnutzer mit hohen Zeitpräferenzen zu niedrige zukünftige Be-
zahlungen annehmen, so dass diese später nicht den Anreiz haben die gepflanzten Bäume zu
erhalten.
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1Thesis introduction
"Wir leben in einem gefährlichen Zeitalter. Der Mensch beherrscht die Natur, bevor
er gelernt hat, sich selbst zu beherrschen."
– Albert Schweitzer
1.1 Background
Forests produce environmental services, such as hydrological benefits, reduced sedimentation,
the prevention of floods and landslides, biodiversity conservation and carbon sequestration,
among others (Pagiola & Platais 2002). These services have a great value to human society,
however, their provision is often less profitable for land users compared to alternative economic
activities. This can lead to a natural capital depletion that is not socially optimal (Engel et al.
2008, p.664). This calls for measures to avoid deforestation, but also to induce the restoration
of ecosystems.
An instrument that has raised considerable interest in the last decades is the compensation
of land users through schemes of Payments for Environmental Services (PES). These schemes
imply an internalization of externalities according to the Coasean theorem (Engel et al. 2008,
p.665). They give land users an incentive to provide environmental services, considered to be
positive environmental externalities (Engel et al. 2008, p.664). Wunder (2005) describes them
as voluntary transactions where a well-defined environmental service, or a land use likely to
secure that service, is bought by at least one service buyer from at least one service provider,
conditional on the provision (p.3).
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Procurement auctions are claimed to increase the budgetary cost-effectiveness of such pay-
ment schemes. These auctions are a mechanism through which the environmental agency invites
bids from potential providers of environmental services for a specific contract. By means of mar-
ket competition and bidding rules, auctions allow agencies to disclose information about the
opportunity costs of land users, and thus to reduce overcompensation (Ferraro 2008, p.813).
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the potential of procurement auctions to allocate
contracts in payment schemes, considering that social interaction affects their performance over
time through learning effects. The following section provides an overview of the aspects of the
design of payment schemes that are relevant for this research. The third section introduces the
research questions addressed, and the last section describes the structure of the thesis.
1.2 Payments for Environmental Services
The logic behind payment schemes, as shown in figure 1.1, is the compensation of land users
for the provision of environmental services, provided that the latter is socially desirable. This
figure shows the private benefits of a land user from two different land uses; forest conservation
and the conversion to pasture. As long as the private benefits from the conversion of the forest
to pasture are higher, a land user will not have an incentive to conserve the forest. This would
induce negative environmental externalities, implying costs incurred by the society or users of
environmental services. Examples of these externalities are a reduction of water services, the
loss of biodiversity and carbon emissions, just to mention some (Pagiola & Platais 2002, p.2). As
long as the value of the avoided environmental external costs exceed the value needed to induce
forest conservation, the implementation of these schemes is socially desirable. Compensation
payments have to exceed the opportunity costs of land users in order to make forest conservation
more attractive than the conversion to pasture.
Payment schemes are often implemented for the conservation of forests, but they are not
restricted to that purpose. Payments can also be offered for restoration and establishment of any
land use inducing external environmental benefits, including even agricultural land uses (Engel
et al. 2008, p.665). In this thesis two main environmental services are considered; biodiversity
and carbon sequestration.
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Figure 1.1: The logic of payment schemes adapted from Pagiola and Platais(2007)
Biodiversity conservation relies on the contribution of biodiversity to the provision of en-
vironmental services, and on the idea that other land uses can lead to irreversible losses of
biodiversity (Millenium Ecosystem Assessment,2005). If biodiversity is given a monetary value,
biodiversity conservation can be converted into a profitable land use (Ferraro & Kiss 2002, p.
1719). The latter requires the proper management and protection of ecosystems. Examples of
schemes offering payments for biodiversity conservation are the Bolivian scheme in Los Negros,
where land users are paid for forest and páramo conservation, the Costa Rican PSA scheme,
which compensates land users for the conservation of their forests, and the CAMPFIRE scheme
in Zimbabwe, which offers compensations for the conservation of natural landscapes (Wunder
et al. 2008, pp.836-837).
Carbon sequestration is an environmental service related to the goal of mitigating climate
change. Forests are key components of the global carbon cycle. They are estimated to absorb
billions of tons of carbon every year through net growth, thus emissions can be mitigated through
reforestation (Canadell & Raupach 2008, p.1456). Examples of schemes offering payments for
carbon sequestration are the Ecuadorian scheme PROFAFOR, where land users are paid for
re- and afforestation, the PSA scheme in Costa Rica, where land users are paid for timber
plantations and agroforestry activities, and the Conservation Reserve Program in the US, where
land users are paid for the retirement of marginal land from agricultural production (Wunder
et al. 2008, pp.836-837).
Payment schemes have been already implemented all over the world for many different types
of land uses, in both developing and developed countries, differing one from the other. There are
user-financed schemes, as well as schemes in which the government acts on behalf of the users
of environmental services (Wunder et al. 2008, pp.836-837). Each scheme has a specific target,
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according to which the scheme is designed. The design of payment schemes comprises aspects
like the allocation of contracts, monitoring, sanctions, and conditionality (Wunder et al. 2008,
pp.840), the mode of payment, the amount paid, the timing of the payment and the contract
duration (Wunder et al. 2008, pp.842). This section gives an overview on the design of these
schemes.
1.2.1 Targets, requirements and payment design
Each payment scheme has a specific target to be achieved. An environmental agency offers
land users payments for an activity assumed to meet that target, or for successfully meeting
that target. These are referred to as input and outcome-based payments, respectively. If the
provision of environmental services cannot be observed, agencies cannot offer outcome-based
payments. In such cases input-based payments can be offered based on the area enrolled in the
scheme, or on alternative metrics used to measure inputs (Engel et al. 2008, p.668).
Participation can imply keeping the existing land use, such as in the case of forest conser-
vation, changing practices in the current land use, or even changing the land use, such as in
the case of reforestation and afforestation (Engel et al. 2008, pp.667-668). So are land users
in Bolivia and Ecuador paid for forest and páramo conservation in schemes whose goal is the
watershed and biodiversity protection. Land users in Ecuador are also paid for re- and af-
forestation in another scheme that targets carbon sequestration. Vittel pays land users for the
implementation of certain practices in dairy farming that lead to a better water quality. Land
users in the US are offered payments for the retirement of agricultural land in a scheme that
targets the quality of water, air and soil, as well as wildlife protection and carbon sequestration,
just to mention some examples (Wunder et al. 2008, pp.836-837).
Participation in a payment schemes can also imply in-kind benefits for land users (Engel et al.
2008, p.668). The benefits they would derive from participation must exceed their opportunity
costs in order to induce their participation. Deciding on the amount to be paid for participation
can be however challenging for an environmental agency whenever land users have private
information regarding their opportunity costs. The higher the overcompensation paid to land
users, the fewer the amount of contracts that can be allocated given a certain fixed budget. If
opportunity costs would be observable, the agency could decrease the level of overcompensation
and provide more environmental services (Ferraro 2008, p.811).
The requirements vary across schemes. Some require land users to submit a management
plan in order to apply for payments. Participation can imply technical requirements and ini-
tial investments. The latter are often barriers to participation, because of lacking access to
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information, because of liquidity constraints (Pagiola et al. 2005, pp.244-245), or because of the
presence of asset specificity. Asset specificity implies that investments are non-redeployable in
an alternative use without losses. This can imply a "hold up" situation for land users (Ducos
& Dupraz 2007, p.5), characterized by the existence of quasi-rents that could be potentially
appropriated by the environmental agency (Ducos & Dupraz 2007, p.7). Higher initial pay-
ments would be necessary to overcome these participation barriers. These could help land users
finance initial implementation costs (Pagiola et al. 2005, p.245), and in the case of asset speci-
ficity, these would prevent land users from exposing their quasi-rents. In this context, trust
plays an important role. Land users would agree to make specific investments in the absence
of initial payments if they trusted the intentions of the agency to compensate them ex post for
their investments (Ducos & Dupraz 2007, p.23).
Although payment schemes are conceptualized as a mechanism to improve efficiency in
the provision of environmental services, and are not thought to be an instrument for poverty
alleviation, it is often argued that they can also induce pro-poor effects. This effects can be a
result of the payments themselves, if these are made to poor land users. There are even schemes
that specifically target them (Pagiola et al. 2005, p.239). In fact, the need to improve the welfare
of the poor is one of the reasons why governments decide to choose these incentive-based policies
(Rosa da Conceição et al. 2015, p.250).
1.2.2 Scheme evaluation
Payment schemes are evaluated according to their budgetary cost-effectiveness. For budget-
constrained schemes, budgetary cost-effectiveness refers to the potential of the scheme to max-
imize the provision of environmental services given a certain budget constraint. Conditionality
is in this respect an important aspect of the design of payment schemes. It has to be verified
whether the target of the scheme has been met. This can be done through the definition of
certain indicators, and through the establishment of a baseline in order to determine whether
the scheme induced additionality (Engel et al. 2008, p.668). Leakage and other spillover effects
should also be considered when evaluating the scheme (Engel et al. 2008, p.670). A further
criterion is permanence, which refers to the ability of the payments to generate long-run envi-
ronmental benefits even beyond the period of the contract. However, this is often dependent
on the continued flow of financing (Engel et al. 2008, p.671).
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1.2.3 Contract design
Payment schemes have to be developed for the particular environmental, economic, social, and
political context in which they are going to be implemented. The context has a significant
influence on the design of the scheme (Engel et al. 2008, p.668).
The payment amount, the mode of payment, the timing and the contract duration dif-
fer among schemes. Agencies can moreover make differentiations according to space or other
characteristics. So are for example long-term contracts offered for reforestation in the US and
Ecuador, and short-term contracts for conservation in Costa Rica. Some schemes offer initial
ex ante payments, such as the payments for conservation in Bolivia, and others ex post pay-
ments which are subject to compliance, like the payments in Costa Rica. Many schemes offer
annual payments and land users are paid in cash (Wunder et al. 2008, p.842). All contracts
include sanctions in case of non compliance. This could be in form of a temporary exclusion
from participation as it is in the schemes in Bolivia and Ecuador, in form of losses of future
payments like in the Costa Rican scheme, or in form of repayment as in the CRP scheme in the
US (Wunder et al. 2008, p.840).
1.2.4 Allocation of contracts
The dominant forms of price setting are bilateral bargaining and fixed payments, however, these
allocation mechanisms can lead to inefficiencies because of the information asymmetry between
contract buyers and sellers. Land users can use their private information as a source of market
power to extract rents (Ferraro 2008, p.818).
Procurement auctions are claimed to improve the cost-effectiveness of a scheme by reducing
overcompensation, and thus allowing to increase the number of contracts. The environmental
agency invites bids from land users that are potential suppliers of the targeted environmental
services, and then contracts those offering the highest cost to benefit ratios. Bidding rules
and market competition reduce the incentive for sellers to inflate their payments (Ferraro 2008,
p.813). Nevertheless, the implementation costs of each allocation mechanism should be taken
into account in order to compare their net gains (Ferraro 2008, p.819). So far, the best-known
scheme where contracts are allocated by means of procurement auctions is the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP) in the US (Ferraro 2008, p.814).
The bidding strategies, and thus the cost-effectiveness of the auctions, depend on their
design. Auctions can be discriminatory, meaning that contracted land users receive a payment
equal to their bid. Alternatively, all winners can receive uniform payments, determined by the
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lowest rejected bid or the highest accepted one. Auctions can be conducted only once, or can
be repeated. The offers can be sealed or open, and thus observable (Ferraro 2008, p.813).
The dominant strategy in discriminatory auctions is overbidding, the bid depends on the
opportunity costs of participation and on the bidders’ expectation about the cut off payment
(bid cap) (Latacz-Lohmann & Van der Hamsvoort, Carel 1997, p.411). On the contrary, in
uniform auctions the dominant strategy is to offer a bid equal to the opportunity costs because
bids only determine the chance of winning a contract but not the payment (Latacz-Lohmann
& Schilizzi 2005, pp. 21-22).
The potential of auctions to provide services more cost-effectively than fixed payments has
been questioned in repeated auctions because repetition allows land users to learn. Land users
adapt their bids accordingly in order to secure higher rents over time (Latacz-Lohmann &
Schilizzi 2005, p.29). On the other hand, repeated auctions generate asymmetries among bidders
in terms of learning effects, specific assets, and social capital. This might lead to a favorable
effect in the provision of services through long-term solid and trustful contractual relationships
(Vogt & Bizer 2013, p.12).
There have been many efforts to investigate the learning effects of bidders and their influence
on the performance of auctions. Auction theory is less well developed for repeated procurement
auctions as a result of the level of complexity involved (Schilizzi & Latacz-Lohmann 2007,
p.499), therefore studies comprise laboratory experiments (Cason & Gangadharan 2004; Latacz-
Lohmann & Schilizzi 2007) and agent-based modeling (Hailu & Schilizzi 2004; Hailu & Thoyer
2006, 2010; Hailu et al. 2010; Lundberg et al. 2018). Agent-based models allow simulating
interactions between heterogeneous individuals, so that the macro-scale effects that emerge from
these dynamics, can be analyzed (Axelrod & Tesfatsion 2006). This allows the understanding of
how learning, strategizing, and interaction over time affects the outcome of payment schemes in
the presence of bounded rationality (Hailu & Schilizzi 2004, pp.153-154). Moreover, they allow
analyzing the outcomes resulting from the implementation in different scenarios, and under
different assumptions.
Studies using agent-based modeling provide evidence for the deterioration of the cost-
effectiveness of auctions over time. While most of these models include the assumption that
bidders learn from their own experiences through reinforcement learning algorithms, only one
study recognized the fact that learning can be the result of social interaction. Lundberg et al.
(2018) introduce a learning algorithm where bidders exchange information with their neighbors
in order to adapt their strategies over time. As long as bidders have information about a higher
successful bid, they will have an incentive to increase their offers (p.351). Nevertheless, to date
there is no study assessing the effect of the connectivity of land users in a social network on the
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cost-effectiveness of payments.
Although the use of auctions to reveal private information could be important in low-income
countries where markets do not function well, so far auctions in low-income countries have only
been implemented in some piloting projects. One reason for this is the pro-poor effect that
payments are expected to induce, and the concern that auctions may reduce the monetary
transfer to the poor (Ajayi et al. 2012, p.3). However, if auctions are used in a setting where
poor land users are those with the lowest opportunity costs, auctions could help reduce poverty
while still providing services cost-effectively because they target low-cost land users (Ajayi et al.
2012, p.4). On the contrary, the participation of the poor in fixed payment schemes can only
be ensured with additional targeting. One aspect that contributes to pro-poor effects is the
fact that fixed payments are not volatile as crop prices are (Pagiola et al. 2005, p. 247), which
might not be the case in procurement auctions. More evidence is lacking in order to evaluate
the benefits of implementing auctions in low income countries.
1.3 Research questions
This thesis explores the use of auctions in the allocation of contracts in payment schemes, taking
into account the role of social interaction. Social interaction is considered as a means for land
users to inform themselves in order to optimize their strategies. Social interaction affects their
expectations and perceptions. Thus, personal social networks are an important determinant of
participation (Sun & Müller 2012, p.2). The thesis addresses four different research questions,
which are explained in the following.
The first research question is whether discriminatory auctions can be more cost-effective
than fixed payments when bidders learn and adapt their strategies through social interaction
over time. If land users interact with their acquaintances in their social network, seeking for
information about their bidding strategies, over time they will have a better approximation of
the bid cap. This will allow them to increase their information rents. In this context the thesis
explores the role of the structure of the social network in the performance of auctions.
The second question is whether discriminatory and uniform auctions can induce a cost-
effective provision of environmental services and pro-poor effects at the same time in a low-
income country setting, where risk averse land users face uncertainty about their future oppor-
tunity costs, and when they learn through social interaction.
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The third question is how can contracts in payment schemes be designed in order to over-
come the problem of asset specificity, such that the scheme doesn’t impose risk for the agency,
and such that land users do not fear to lose their quasi rents.
The fourth question is whether auctions can provide environmental services cost-effectively
when participation requires investments in specific assets, considering that social interaction
frames learning effects and the reputation of the agency.
1.4 Outline
Each of the following four chapters is dedicated to answering the four research questions. In
order to simulate the implementation of auctions, we used agent-based modeling. Our agent-
based models are written in Java by means of Repast Simphony 2.5, an open source modeling
toolkit developed by North et al. (2013) in the operating system Microsoft Windows and Java
8. Repast Simphony is an open source agent-based modeling and simulation platform that
simplifies model creation and use. It supports the development of flexible models of interacting
agents.
Chapter two addresses the question of the cost-effectiveness of repeated discriminatory auc-
tions when bidders learn through social interaction. In order to answer this question, we ex-
tended the model of Hailu and Schilizzi (2004). The authors simulate a payment scheme for
biodiversity conservation, where contracts are allocated by means of fixed payments and dis-
criminatory auctions. Instead of adapting their bids according to a reinforcement learning
algorithm, land users are embedded in a small world network that allows them to interact with
their neighbors, and to learn from this social interaction. This chapter was submitted to the
Journal Biodiversity and Conservation as a manuscript entitled "Learning from social interac-
tion in repeated conservation auctions", written by Elsa Maria Cardona Santos, Sebastian Rasch
and Hugo Storm.
Chapter three addresses the question of the potential of uniform and discriminatory auctions
to induce pro-poor effects, while providing services cost-effectively. An agent-based model simu-
lating conservation auctions in a low-income country is used to answer this question. Land users
are assumed to be risk averse and to face uncertainty regarding future opportunity costs. This
chapter was submitted to the Journal Biodiversity and Conservation as a manuscript entitled
"The use of repeated conservation auctions in low-income countries: An agent-based computa-
tional model of uniform and discriminatory auctions", written by Elsa Maria Cardona Santos,
Sebastian Rasch and Hugo Storm.
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The contractual possibilities to deal with the problem of asset specificity are reviewed in
chapter four. Different propositions about the design of contracts are developed for different
implementation contexts. These are compared to the contract design of already implemented
schemes, through which land users were paid for tree planting and conservation. Chapter five
addresses the use of auctions to allocate contracts that require specific investments. An agent-
based model with empirical data from a tree planting trial in Malawi is used for this purpose.
This trial was implemented by Kelsey Jack, and is explained in detail in Jack (2010). The
scheme simulated requires land users to retire cropland, and to invest in tree planting. The use
of uniform and discriminatory auctions is analyzed for the allocation of short and long-term
contracts. This chapter will be submitted as a manuscript entitled "The use of auctions in
payment schemes that require specific investments: : An agent-based computational model",
written by Elsa Maria Cardona Santos, Sebastian Rasch and Hugo Storm. The last chapter
summarizes the most important findings of this research and provides an overall conclusion.
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2Learning from social interaction in
repeated conservation auctions
2.1 Introduction
Incentive-based mechanisms, such as Payments for Environmental Services (PES), have been
increasingly used to give land users financial incentives to provide environmental services. The
provision of environmental services might be lower than socially optimal because the potential
providers of environmental services receive less private benefits from this provision than from
alternative land uses. Compensating service providers allows internalizing what would other-
wise be environmental external effects. Thus, payment schemes put into practice the Coasean
theorem (Engel et al. 2008, pp.664-665). Although these payments are often made for forest
conservation, they can be offered for the restoration or for the establishment of any land use
that generates external benefits, including agricultural activities (Engel et al. 2008, pp.664).
Most of these schemes offer fixed payments. Some examples are the payments for hydrologi-
cal environmental services in Mexico (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008), the payments for environmental
services in Costa Rica (Pagiola 2008) and the payments for re- and afforestation in Ecuador
(Wunder & Albán 2008). In order to induce the desired land use or activity, payments have to
exceed the opportunity costs of land users. Therefore, in some schemes payments are established
based on estimations of the opportunity costs (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008, p.5).
However, establishing the level of the payments can be challenging for an environmental
agency. Whenever land users are better informed about their opportunity costs, they can claim
to incur higher costs in order to secure higher payments. The difference between the payment
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a land user receives and her opportunity costs can therefore be regarded as an information
rent. The provision of environmental services per unit spent decreases with the amount of
information rents paid. Thus, the presence of information asymmetry leads to a less cost-
effective provision compared to a situation in which opportunity costs are observable (Ferraro
2008, p.813). If the environmental agency is budget constrained, cost-effectiveness refers to the
scope of environmental services that can be provided per unit of budget available. In the case
of a target-constrained scheme, cost-effectiveness refers to the amount of budget necessary to
provide a unit of environmental services.
Procurement auctions are claimed to improve the budgetary cost-effectiveness of payment
schemes. The environmental agency invites bids from potential providers of environmental
services for a specific contract. After receiving the offers, the agency contracts those with
the best offers until the budget is exhausted, or until the target is met. By means of market
competition and bidding rules, land users’ incentives to inflate their contract prices are lowered,
such that auctions allow reducing the information rents. The induced bidding behavior depends
on the design of the auction (Ferraro 2008, p.813).
The Conservation Reserve Program in the United States is the biggest program where con-
tracts are allocated by means of discriminatory auctions. In discriminatory auctions, land users
are contracted according to lowest bids until the budget is exhausted, or until the target is
achieved, and are paid an amount equal to the bid they made. Thus, bids determine not
only the payments but also the probability of being contracted. Latacz-Lohmann and Van der
Hamsvoort (1997) show that in order to maximize their pay-offs, bidders make offers that exceed
their opportunity costs. Overbidding is higher for the land users with the lowest costs (p.411).
The potential of auctions to increase the cost-effectiveness of payment schemes is claimed
to decrease over time in repeated settings. Auctions are often repeated over time because
there are constraints to contracting all land users simultaneously or because renewable short-
term contracts are offered. Land users can gather information about the outcomes of previous
auctions and use it in order to increase their information rents. In this context, land users
are interested in knowing what was the maximum accepted offer, and in receiving information
that allows them to understand the distribution of the bids submitted. Every land user with
opportunity costs lower than the maximum accepted payment (bid cap) will have an incentive
to inflate the bid in order to secure a higher rent (Ferraro 2008, p.817).
There are studies providing evidence for the effect of these learning effects on the performance
of auctions. According to Reichelderfer and Boggess (1988), in the United States Conservation
Reserve Program, the average bid was very close to the maximum acceptable payment level
after some bidding rounds (p.10). Because auction theory is less well developed for repeated
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procurement auctions because of the level of complexity involved in learning effects (Schilizzi
& Latacz-Lohmann 2007, p.499), studies use approaches such as laboratory experiments and
agent-based modeling. Cason and Gangadharan (Cason & Gangadharan 2004) and Schilizzi
and Latacz-Lohmann (2007) show by means of laboratory experiments that in later rounds
repetition erodes the relative advantage of auctions because of learning effects (p.83). The same
is shown in studies using agent based modeling (Hailu & Schilizzi 2004; Hailu & Thoyer 2006,
2010; Hailu et al. 2010; Lundberg et al. 2018), where the performance of auctions is analyzed
under different assumptions and for different settings.
Agent-based models allow simulating interactions between heterogeneous individuals, such
that the macro-scale effects that emerge from these dynamics can be analyzed (Axelrod & Tes-
fatsion 2006). This allows understanding how learning effects, bidding strategies and interaction
affect the outcome of payment schemes over time in the presence of bounded rationality (Hailu
& Schilizzi 2004, pp.153-154). In most of these studies bidders are assumed to learn only from
their own past experiences. However, in reality land users are also likely to gather information
from the experiences of their acquaintances in order to understand their possibilities to increase
their own rents (Hailu & Schilizzi 2004, p.165).
It is important to take into account that bidders can learn from social interaction, espe-
cially if they lack confidence in their own strategies or if they are not certain about their own
opportunity costs (Chernev 2003, p.61). In the context of governance of many kinds of natural
resources1 it is observed that learning communities emerge because managers have common con-
cerns and pursue knowledge through interaction. Knowledge can be shared through connected
individuals, but also through bridging organizations acting as long-range links in a network
(Berkes 2009). Social interaction can play an important role in the management of natural
resources (Gunderson et al. 1999; Olsson et al. 2004), and its effect can depend on the topology
of the network (Bodin & Norberg 2005).
Hailu and Schilizzi argue that communication is likely to increase the speed of learning,
having implications for the cost-effectiveness of auctions (p.165). So far, Lundberg et al (2018)
is the only study that assumes learning through social interaction. They introduce learning
through neighbor interaction. In the first round bidders make an offer equal to their opportunity
costs. They are assumed to know the bids of their eight neighbors, and whether they were
successful or not. This information is assumed to have an accuracy of 10 percent. If bidders
have information about a higher successful bid, they copy it in the next round. In case of not
receiving a contract they offer again a bid equal to their opportunity costs. The authors show
that the loss in cost-effectiveness over time will depend on the distribution of the opportunity
costs and on the budget availability. If costs are subject to spatial correlation, agents will have
1Such as fisheries, forests, grazing lands, watersheds, wildlife and protected areas
15
2. Learning from social interaction in repeated conservation auctions
costs similar to their neighbors’ costs, such that it will take longer until the information about
the cut-off price is spread in the population compared to a random distribution of costs(p.355).
The higher the budget the longer it will take before the benefits from discriminatory auctions
are lost(p.356).
The purpose of our study is to investigate the effect of social interaction on the cost-
effectiveness of discriminatory auctions. We analyze the differences between the performance
of discriminatory auctions in a setting where land users learn in isolation from their own expe-
rience, and a setting where land users are likely to exchange information with their peers and
learn from their experiences as well. We compare these results with a fixed payment scheme in
order to have a benchmark. Moreover, we analyze the effect of different levels of competition
and of different patterns of the social network, because the latter is likely to affect the diffusion
of information among land users.
We address this by means of agent-based modeling. Our model is based on the study
of Hailu and Schilizzi(2004), who compare the performance of discriminatory auctions and
fixed payments in a scheme that makes payment for biodiversity conservation on private land.
The authors assume that land users start bidding their true opportunity costs, but that they
learn in repeated auctions through a reinforcement learning algorithm. We extend their model
by allowing land users to interact through a small-world network and to learn from social
interaction. This study contributes to the literature by focusing on the relevance of information
networks for the implementation of conservation auctions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section the model is described, as well
as the assumptions made. In the third section we show the results and discuss them. The fourth
and last section provides our conclusion.
2.2 Model
The purpose of our agent-based model is to analyze the effect of social interaction on the
cost-effectiveness of discriminatory conservation auctions. Our model builds up on the model
of Hailu and Schilizzi (2004). The authors simulate a scheme where land users are offered
conservation contracts in order to protect biodiversity. Conservation contracts are allocated
by an environmental agency through fixed payments or through discriminatory auctions. In
exchange for the payments, contracted land users are expected to adopt certain practices that
will favor the conservation of biodiversity on their private land. Land users are assumed to
learn in isolation through a reinforcement learning algorithm.
16
2.2. Model
We extend their model with a small-world network, that allows land users to learn through
social interaction. We introduce a learning algorithm through which land users adapt their
bidding strategies, according to the information they receive from their peers. We compare
these results, and analyze their sensitivity to alternative levels of competition and to different
levels of connectivity among bidders.
2.2.1 Individual decision making
There are two different agent types in the model. The first is an environmental agency
that seeks to maximize the provision of environmental services by offering repeatedly the same
conservation contracts, constrained by a fixed budget in every period. Conservation contracts
have a duration of 1 period.
The second agent type is comprised of land users whose goal is to maximize their profits
by enrolling their land in the payment scheme. The benefits from conservation are assumed to
be homogeneous. Land users have different opportunity costs of participation, the profit of the
next most profitable land use. This information is assumed to be private, so that there is an
information asymmetry between land users and the agency.
2.2.2 Allocation mechanisms
The environmental agency can allocate the contracts through discriminatory auctions or fixed
payments. These mechanisms are explained in the following.
Fixed payments are uniform, which means that all contracted land users receive the same
payment. The level of the fixed payments is announced by the agency, and land users whose
opportunity costs of participation are below this payment state their willingness to accept for
participation. The agency successively selects random land users and observes their willingness
to participate in the scheme for the offered payment. If those land users are willing to participate,
and the budget is not yet exhausted, the agency contracts them.
Auctions are sealed and discriminatory, which means that land users cannot observe the bids
of their peers, and that all contracted land users receive a payment equal to their bids. When
contracts are allocated by means of auctions, land users announce their bids and then the agency
contracts the land users offering the lowest bid, until the fixed budget is exhausted.
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2.2.3 Learning algorithms
If land users are assumed to learn in isolation only through their own experiences, they learn
through the reinforcement learning algorithm proposed by Hailu and Schilizzi (2004). If land
users are connected in a social network to other participants, they learn according to the learning
algorithm we introduce. The latter is based on the approach of Lundberg et al. (2018). Land
users decide on their bidding strategies, according to the information they gather. In both
scenarios land users start bidding their true opportunity costs, and adapt their strategies over
time based on the respective learning algorithm. These are described in detail in the following.
The reinforcement learning algorithm implies that land users learn from their own past
experiences. Land users change their current bidding strategy with a probability of 50 percent
according to whether their last bid was successful or not. If it was successful, and the land
user was contacted in the last round, they increase their bid by 10 percent. If it wasn’t, they
decrease it by 10 percent.
Learning through social interaction implies that bidders learn from the information they
gather through social interaction and adapt their bidding strategy accordingly. In every round
land users gain experience, and gather information about the payoffs of their peers in their
network. This information allows them to update their expectations about the bid cap. The
bidding strategies are adapted over time based on the highest payment they have information
about. If a contracted land user has information about an accepted bid that was higher than
her own (or than her own opportunity costs in case of not being contracted), she will have an
incentive to increase her bid in the following period in order to increase her rent. If, however, the
highest accepted bid she has information about is lower than her own, she could be a marginal
winner, therefore she will have an incentive to lower her bid in the following round in order to
secure participation. No bids are offered below the opportunity costs of participation.
This learning algorithm is described by equations 2.1 and 2.2. The term bi,t−1 describes
the last bid made by a land user i if contracted, or the opportunity costs of participation in
case of not being contracted. The term bj,t−1 describes the highest accepted bid land user i has
information about. The difference between these values is described by the gap in equation 2.1.
If the latter is positive, land user i will increase her bid in the next period according to equation
2.2. If the gap is negative, she will lower it according to the same equation (Latacz-Lohmann
& Van der Hamsvoort, Carel 1997).
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4i,j = bj,t−1 − bi,t−1 (2.1)
bi,t = bi,t−1 +
4i,j
2 (2.2)
2.2.4 Social network
Land users are assumed to be connected through a social network through which they can share
information with their acquaintances. We model a small-world network where each land user
has a certain amount of neighbors k, and where each land user is likely to know someone from
another neighborhood with probability β. This type of network can present a high connectivity
among land users with a small number of connections, allowing information to spread rapidly
to other areas of the network (Centola 2010).
We implement the Watts-Beta-Small-World Generator by Jung Project and Nick Collier. It
is a graph generator that produces a small world network using the beta-model, as proposed
by Duncan Watts (1998). It starts with a one-dimensional ring lattice in which each land user
has k-neighbors. Then, it randomly rewires the acquaintances with probability β. This small
world network can be created for different values of β and k, and exhibit low characteristic
path lengths and a high clustering coefficient. Land users in the same neighborhood are likely
to have similar opportunity costs. We investigate the role of connectivity among land users by
assuming different values for these two variables. Land users with similar opportunity costs
have a higher probability of being neighbors.
2.2.5 Performance indicators
We evaluate the extent to which an environmental agency can provide environmental services
cost-effectively by means of auctions. In the literature, the environmental goal is measured by
means of budgetary cost-effectiveness, meaning the extent to which environmental services can
be provided with the given budget.
We consider the returns to budget, measured by the number of contracts in every period,
and information rents, measured as the sum of the individual differences between payments
(pi) and opportunity costs (pii)( see equation 2.3).
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information rentst =
Nt∑
1
(pi − pii) (2.3)
The higher the number of contracts and the lower the information rents, the higher the
cost-effectiveness of the scheme. We observe these two indicators in each period in order to
address the dynamics of the model over time.
2.2.6 Initialization
Our parameters are based on the ones assumed in Hailu and Schilizzi (2004). The population
consists of 100 land users, of which each is endowed with one unit of land, whose environmental
value under conservation is homogeneous for all units. Each land user is assigned to a random
level of opportunity costs in a range from 0 to 1, distributed uniformly. The fixed budget equals
15. Fixed payments equal 0.5, the average opportunity costs.
We assume that land users have two neighbors , and that they can be rewired with a
probability of 20 percent. Afterwards we vary these parameters in order to investigate the
effects of different connectivity patterns.
2.2.7 Sensitivity analysis
In order to investigate how the results of our model are influenced by the assumptions in the
baseline setting, we vary the population and the budget restriction. Exploring the changes in
the outcomes under these alternative assumptions, allows us to determine the impact of these
variables on the performance of auctions, and thus to test the robustness of the results of the
model.
We vary the budget and the number of land users to investigate whether there are interaction
effects. We vary the budget from 5 to 25 units in steps of 1 unit. Ceteris paribus, we expect
the level of budget to have an influence on the amount of contracts. The lower the budget
level, the lower the number of land users contracted under a fixed payment scheme relative to
conservation auctions. The number of land users is varied through a range between 50 and 150
in steps of 10, without varying the distribution of the opportunity costs.
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Figure 2.1: Best allocation mechanisms for different budget and population
Figure 2.1 shows the results of the sensitivity analysis, which explores how the indicators
react to fluctuations of budget and population in the last implementation period. This graph
shows the best allocation mechanism given a certain combination of budget and number of land
users. The best allocation mechanism is the one that delivers the highest number of contracts,
as well as the lowest value of information rents. The number of land users can be found on the
vertical axis and the budget on the horizontal axis.
Conservation auctions perform better in terms of the number of contracts for any given level
of budget and number of land users when they learn from social interaction. The payments
on average are smaller under the fixed payment scheme for relatively higher ratios of budget
to number of land users, which leads to smaller information rents on average under a fixed
payment scheme.
From this analysis, we derive two extreme scenarios in order to analyze the relative per-
formance of discriminatory auctions, describing a high and a low level of competition among
participants.
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Low competition scenario refers to an implementation of the scheme in the presence of 50
land users, given a budget equal to 25.
High competition scenario refers to an implementation of the scheme in the presence of
150 land users, given a budget equal to 5.
We run every scenario 1000 times for 100 periods. Assuming that each period in our model
is equivalent to 1 year, our model would take into account 100 implementation years, which
would exceed the expected lifetime of a single land user. This time frame allows us to evaluate
the long-run effects of repeated auctions.
2.3 Results and Discussion
We analyze the effect of social interaction on the cost-effectiveness of repeated discriminatory
auctions for different social network structures. Figure 2.2 shows the number of contracts
allocated assuming different values for the parameters determining the structure of the social
network. Variable k describes the amount of neighbors that each land user has, and the variable
β describes the probability that two land users in different neighborhoods know each other.
These time series are the averaged results of 1000 simulations.
Figure 2.2: Performance of auctions in different
network structures
As shown in figure 2.2, the potential
of auctions to allocate contracts deteriorates
with an increase in the number of neighbors
and with an increase in the probability of
having acquaintances in other neighborhoods.
However, an increase in the number of neigh-
bors has a smaller effect than an increase in
the probability. The higher the number of ac-
quaintances, the higher the amount of infor-
mation available, and thus the better the esti-
mation of land users about the bid cap. Land
users in the same neighborhood are likely to
have similar opportunity costs. This means
that an increase in the number of neighbors
will allow land users to gather more information, but their potential to increase their rents won’t
be as high as it would be if this information would come from another neighborhood. Land
users in other neighborhood might face higher opportunity costs, and might thus receive higher
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compensation payments. Getting access to this information would allow low-cost land users to
increase their rents even more.
An aspect worth noting in figure 2.2 is the fact that at some point a further increase in the
amount of neighbors or in the probability of being rewired does not deteriorate the performance
of auctions any further. This is the point where all land users are already fully informed. We
take this setting into account and refer to it as highly crossed-linked social interaction
(k = 6 and β = 0.4).
Figure 2.3: Baseline scenario
Now, we compare the results of repeated
auctions in a setting where land users learn
from social interaction with a setting where
they learn only from their own experiences,
and with the allocation of contracts by means
of fixed payments. Figure 3.5 shows these re-
sults. The setting social interaction refers
to the baseline assumptions about the struc-
ture of the network (k = 2 and β = 0.2)
and the setting reinforcement learning al-
gorithm refers to the assumption that land
users learn only from their own experiences
through reinforcement learning. We show the results for the two indicators of cost-effectiveness,
the number of contracts allocated and the total information rents paid.
The fixed payment scheme leads to a constant number of contracts allocated over time and
to constant information rents on average. As shown in figure 3.5, during the first implemen-
tation periods, discriminatory auctions lead to a clearly higher number of contracts and lower
information rents, compared to the fixed payment scheme. Over time, the cost-effectiveness of
discriminatory auctions decreases under all scenarios. The extent to which it decreases depends
on how land users learn over time.
If land users do not know any other participant, they only adapt their bids according to
trial and error (reinforcement learning). Successful bids provide them an incentive to increase
their bids in the next period, and unsuccessful bids give them an incentive to lower the latter.
As shown in figure 3.5, this learning pattern leads to a number of contracts over time that
converges to the amount of contracts allocated by means of fixed payments. We confirm the
result of Hailu and Schilizzi (2004). All low-cost land users keep increasing their bids in many
rounds because of a lack of negative feedback. This leads to increasing information rents over
time.
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The number of contracts and the total information rents oscillate in the long run around a
steady state. The marginal losers are those land users who did not win a contract but whose
bids are close to the bid cap. Marginal winners are those who won a contract with a bid close to
the bid cap. At some point the payments increase to an extent that allows the marginal losers
to decrease their bids because the bid cap is above their opportunity costs. They enter again
the winning pool instead of the marginal winners of the last period, forcing them to decrease
their bids in order to enter the winners’ pool again in the following contracting round. This
effect is what Hailu and Schilizzi (2004) refer to as the "basket of crabs" effect.
Although discriminatory auctions also lose cost-effectiveness over time when bidders learn
through social interaction, the effect is different. The cost-effectiveness decreases at a higher
pace during the first periods, but it reaches a steady state already in the mid-term. The loss
of cost-effectiveness depends on the potential of land users to gather information. The better
connected they are in the network, the higher the amount of information obtained, and thus,
the better the estimation about the bid cap. In a setting where land users are only connected
to two neighbors, and where the probability that they know other participants that are not in
their neighborhood is 20 percent (This scenario is referred to as " Auction (social interaction)"
in the graphs), discriminatory auctions lead to a steady state number of contracts that is higher
than the number of contracts allocated through fixed payments. In a setting where every land
user has access to all the information available in the network (every land user has 6 neighbors
and each one knows someone from the other neighborhoods with a probability of 40 percent),
auctions allow contracting a lower amount of contracts (highly crossed-linked social interaction).
Nevertheless, in the setting where land users have access to all the information available
in the network, discriminatory auctions perform better than in a setting where land users do
not know anyone and learn through reinforcement. The reason for this result is that if land
users adjust their bids over time according to the bidding strategies of others, the learning
effects remain conditioned to winning bids. Learning effects in isolation imply that low-cost
land users increase their bids in every period as long as they keep winning contracts. This leads
to increasing payments over time. On the contrary, in the presence of social interaction, land
users approximate the bid cap faster but the bid cap reaches a steady state that remains below
the average payment made in a setting with reinforcement learning. Marginal winners don’t
keep on increasing their bids because they know that their bids could exceed the bid cap in the
following period. Information diffusion implies that learning can lead to a faster deterioration
of the cost-effectiveness in the short-run compared to isolated learning if participants know each
other very well, but in the long run the effect on cost-effectiveness is smaller.
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An interesting result is the effect on information rents. Although discriminatory auctions
in settings with high crossed-linked social interaction lead to information rents higher than the
ones implied in fixed payments, the number of contracts allocated is higher. This suggests,
that the payments made under discriminatory auctions on average are lower, but that those
participating have lower opportunity costs. If wealth is correlated with opportunity costs, this
would be an interesting result for payment schemes with the secondary objective to induce
pro-poor effects.
Figure 2.4 and figure 2.5 show the performance of the two different allocation mechanisms
under the different learning settings, assuming a high and a low level of competition, respec-
tively. Under a high level of competition, auctions outperform fixed payments independently of
how land users learn. The high level of competition does not allow land users to increase the
payments above the level of the fixed payment, even if land users learn through reinforcement
learning. Increased competition leads to more aggressive bidding, as bidders try to maintain
their chances of winning against more rivals. This is what Hong and Shum (2002) call the com-
petitive effect. In the absence of a winners’ curse, where bidders might make non-rational offers,
and assuming that no landholder would offer a payment smaller than their own opportunity
costs, the average bid level is expected to decrease as the number of bidders increases (Hong &
Shum 2002, p.871).
Interestingly, the information rents of discriminatory auctions, assuming highly crossed-
linked social learning, are higher than the ones under fixed payments. This suggests, that the
higher connected land users are in the network, the higher the potential for low-cost land users
to increase their rents. While under reinforcement learning all land users increase their rents
by the same percentage, under social learning those with the lowest-opportunity costs increase
their bids relatively more. Low-cost land users who have a good approximation of the bid cap,
and thus understand their possibilities to gain information rents, have a higher comparative
advantage.
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Figure 2.4: Effect of high competition Figure 2.5: Effect of low competition
Although the cost-effectiveness of auctions deteriorates the less competitive the environment
is, more contracts are allocated by means of auctions if land users learn through social inter-
action, compared to fixed payments. The number of contracts under reinforcement learning
converges to the one under fixed payments. Nevertheless, the information rents are higher than
the rents paid under fixed payments. The reason for this is that auctions target rather land
users with lower opportunity costs, while fixed payment schemes contract land users randomly.
As our results suggest, the performance of repeated discriminatory auctions strongly depends
on the learning algorithm assumed. If marginal bidders are not willing to take the risk of
not receiving a contract, they won’t increase their bids over their approximation of the bid
cap. However, if they would do so, the results could be similar to the results of reinforcement
learning. Nevertheless, the deterioration of the performance of auctions might take some time,
especially if the scheme is implemented in a competitive environment. In settings where land
users are rather risk averse, the cost-effectiveness of auctions would not deteriorate as fast.
Risk averse land users could be willing to accept lower payments compared to risk-neutral land
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users with the same opportunity costs, in order to decrease uncertainty (Ferraro 2008, p.815).
In low-income rural environments, land users are often confronted with uncertainty regarding
their income, and in the presence of risk aversion they are lacking possibilities of insurance
(Rosenzweig 1988, p.1148). Thus, it would be interesting to assess the potential of repeated
auctions under such circumstances.
2.4 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to investigate the effect of social interaction on the perfor-
mance of discriminatory auctions. We introduce a small-world network in which land users are
connected and can exchange information with their acquaintances. They learn from their own
experiences and from the experiences of their peers, and adapt their bidding strategies based
on this information.
Our results confirm the deterioration of the performance of discriminatory auctions over time
in terms of cost-effectiveness. However, we show that this deterioration is dependent on how
bidders learn over time. Contrary to the expectation that social interaction would deteriorate
the cost-effectiveness of repeated auctions more than reinforcement learning (Hailu & Schilizzi
2004), our results suggest that social interaction can dampen the learning effects of bidders
over time. When land users learn through social interaction, their bidding strategies remain
conditioned to winning bids. Land users would not increase their bids over a level higher than
the highest accepted bid they have information about, because they would risk participation.
On the contrary, when land users have only information derived from their own experiences,
they might increase their bids as long as they remain in the winners’ pool.
The better informed bidders are, the higher the information rents they can secure, and thus
the lower the cost-effectiveness in the long run. Nevertheless, higher connectivity also implies
that other land users have access to the same information, which creates more competition
among land users. Low-cost land users have thus a comparative advantage. Over time, the
bids align, and so does the level of the payment. This means that the loss of cost-effectiveness
occurs mainly during the first years of implementation and remains constant in the long-run. In
such a setting, auctions can still be more cost-effective than fixed payment schemes. This is not
the case when land users adapt their bids according to reinforcement learning. Because those
land users with the lowest costs can keep on increasing their bids without getting any negative
feedback, the cost-effectiveness of auctions keeps on deteriorating. In this setting, auctions
might not be more cost-effective than fixed payments in the long-run.
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The outcome of auctions when bidders can interact among each other could be similar to
the results of reinforcement learning if low-cost land users would be risk loving. If low-cost land
users would be willing to increase their bids despite the risk of not receiving contracts, the cost-
effectiveness of auctions would deteriorate even more. The results would thus be conditioned
to the share of risk-loving land users in the bidders pool.
An interesting result is the high amount of information rents paid under repeated discrimi-
natory auctions compared to fixed payment schemes, even when a higher number of contracts
are allocated by means of auctions. This implies that land users with relatively lower opportu-
nity costs receive the rents. This would be an interesting result for schemes aiming to reduce
poverty through the payments.
We conclude, that even in the presence of learning effects, discriminatory auctions can
remain more cost-effective than fixed payments in the short-run, provided that offers do not
exceed the fixed payments on average in the first round. Depending on the bidding strategies
of land users and on their access to information, auctions can still be more cost-effective than
fixed payments in the long-run. Moreover, even if fixed payments outperform auctions over time,
there might be interesting pro-poor effects worth considering. The latter would be relevant for
the implementation of payment schemes in low-income countries.
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3The use of repeated conservation
auctions in low-income countries
3.1 Introduction
Incentive-based mechanisms, such as Payments for Environmental Services (PES), are used to
give landholders financial incentives to adapt their land use, in order to provide environmental
services. In some schemes, payments have the additional goal of reducing poverty through
the provision of these direct income transfers. This is claimed to come at the cost of the
environmental objectives because of potential trade-offs between both goals (Pagiola et al. 2005,
2008; Wunder 2008a). Nevertheless, payment schemes are an interesting instrument for poverty
reduction because of the high incidence of poverty in rural areas and the high reliance of this
sector on natural resources (Bulte et al. 2008, p.247).
Some schemes target poor landholders specifically, such as the Western Altiplano Natu-
ral Resources Management Project in Guatemala or the National Environmental Management
Project in El Salvador (Pagiola et al. 2005). Another example is Costa Rica. Although the
PSA scheme is not designed to be a poverty reduction program, FONAFIFO, the agency im-
plementing the scheme, added disadvantaged districts to priority areas in order to target poor
landholders (Pagiola 2008). This scheme established fixed payments according to earlier forest
subsidy programs based on estimations about the opportunity costs (Pagiola et al. 2005). The
Mexican PSA-H scheme offers payments for conservation to landholders with primary forest
cover, as a strategy to avoid deforestation. In order to target the very highly marginalized land-
holders, the Mexican government introduced a weight for poverty in the application grading
system (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008).
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There is concern that the goal to maintain biodiversity can be in conflict with the goal of
poverty alleviation. Creating protected areas to enhance biodiversity can have a negative im-
pact on the poor, because it implies reducing their land use options. This has been a relevant
element of the debate about conservation policies (Adams et al. 2004). Some countries face the
dilemma of reducing deforestation rates, and at the same time preventing poor forest owners
from generating income. There are attempts to integrate the needs of the local people into
conservation goals. The latter has been referred to as "pro-poor conservation" (Adams et al.
2004). Payments for Environmental Services can be used as a means to protect the natural
capital through the financial compensation of poor landholders (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008). How-
ever such attempts to integrate both goals are claimed to be overambitious and underachieving
because of the trade-offs they imply (Adams et al. 2004).
There is a broad discussion in the literature about the potential of payment schemes to reduce
poverty. It is argued that although it might be attractive to try to achieve both, environmental
and social goals, through payment schemes, it can be counterproductive. Focusing on targeting
poor landholders might lead to a lack of provision of environmental services, which is the
ultimate goal of payment schemes (Pagiola et al. 2005). After reviewing the ways in which
payment schemes might affect poverty, Pagiola et al. (2005) conclude that schemes could be
designed in a way that it allows the poor to participate. However, they suggest that schemes
should not target highly marginalized areas if these are not likely to generate the desired services.
Budget constrained schemes face the trade-off between reducing the rents of landholders
in order to increase environmental cost-effectiveness, and increasing them in order to induce
poverty alleviation effects. Environmental cost-effectiveness refers to the potential of a scheme
to maximize the provision of environmental services subject to the fixed budget. The lower
the rents paid to landholders, where rents are the difference between the payments and their
opportunity costs of conservation, the higher the number of conservation contracts that can be
allocated. While the goal to achieve cost-effectiveness implies lowering these rents, the goal of
poverty reduction requires overcompensating landholders.
Auctions can allow environmental agencies to improve the cost-effectiveness of payment
schemes by reducing overcompensation through the revelation of landholders’ true opportunity
costs (Ferraro 2008). They can have a discriminatory payment format, such that contracted
landholders receive a payment equal to their bid. Under an uniform payment format, all con-
tracted landholders receive the same payment. Uniform payments can be determined by the
lowest rejected bid, or by the highest accepted one. In discriminatory auctions landholders are
confronted with a trade-off. The higher their bids, the higher their rents, but the lower the
likelihood to receive a contract. Bidding strategies depend thus not only on their opportunity
costs of participation, but also on their best guess about the highest acceptable bid. The domi-
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nant strategy is overbidding, especially for those with the lowest costs, because they can secure
higher rents. In uniform auctions by contrast, the bids determine only the chance of winning but
not the payment. Therefore, their dominant strategy is to offer a bid equal to their opportunity
costs (Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005, p.22).
Auctions could be particularly interesting in low-income countries, where markets do not
function well, because the latter increases the asymmetric information between landholders and
agency. In the presence of non-properly functioning land, labor and credit markets, it is difficult
for the agency to estimate the opportunity costs of landholders (Ajayi et al. 2012). Moreover,
in low-income countries landholders are likely to be heterogeneous in terms of opportunity costs
because of inequality in respect to technology and assets. For agencies in such settings, auctions
are particularly interesting for reducing rents paid to landholders (Wünscher & Wunder 2017,
p.673).
However, there is concern that auctions could undermine pro-poor effects through the re-
duction of the payments made to poor landholders (Ajayi et al. 2012). While this might be
true, it should be also taken into account that auctions have the potential to target the poorest
landholders, as long as opportunity costs are positively correlated with wealth (Ajayi et al.
2012). Auctions could thus increase cost-effectiveness while ensuring that the rents are paid to
poor landholders. In budget constrained schemes, a reduction of the compensation can imply
offering payments to other poor landholders. The latter would thus be compatible with the goal
of poverty alleviation (Khalumba et al. 2014). According to Wunder (2008b) poor landhold-
ers are likely to face low opportunity costs of participation if they possess marginal lands, are
strongly capital and technology-constrained, and labor remuneration is low. However, if they
work their smaller plots more intensively this might not be the case. The correlation of the
level of opportunity costs and the level of wealth is thus likely to be context-specific. Neverthe-
less, Wunder claims that, in general, the poor are more likely to have lower opportunity costs
(pp.284-285).
In theory, participation makes landholders better off as long as it is voluntary, because they
would only accept payments that exceed their opportunity costs (Engel et al. 2008). In uni-
form auctions all participating landholders ensure an overcompensation if the payment is set
at the lowest rejected bid. In discriminatory auctions landholders also ensure an overcompen-
sation as long as they do not offer bids below their opportunity costs. Latacz-Lohmann and
Van der Haamsvort (1997) show that the optimal bidding strategy in discriminatory auctions
depends not only on the opportunity costs, but also on the expected bid cap, such that low-cost
landholders can secure higher information rents, the closer their approximation to the true bid
cap (p.411). The level of overcompensation could thus increase in repeated settings because
bidders can learn and adapt their bidding strategies over time. The latter compromises the
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cost-effectiveness of payment schemes (Schilizzi & Latacz-Lohmann 2007), but it could provide
pro-poor effects.
So far, repeated auctions have not been implemented in low-income countries. The experi-
ences with auctions in low-income countries are limited to a couple of trials. These comprise
a uniform auction to allocate tree planting contracts in Malawi (Jack 2010) and in Tanzania
(Jindal et al. 2013), a uniform auction to allocate payments for soil erosion control in Indonesia
(Jack et al. 2009), a uniform and a discriminatory auction in Peru and Bolivia to allocate pay-
ments for the conservation of traditional crop varieties (Narloch et al. 2013), a discriminatory
auction to allocate tree planting contracts in Kenya (Andeltová et al. 2014), and an open dis-
criminatory auction with multiple rounds in Kenya, where bidders could only revise their offers
downwards after each round (Khalumba et al. 2014).
Some of these trials provide evidence for pro-poor effects. The trial in Malawi provided
evidence for the potential of auctions to help achieve poverty alleviation goals (Ajayi et al. 2012).
The auction allowed for positive livelihood effects. Landholders contracted through the auction
experienced a marginally significant increase in food security, and they engaged in less casual
labor. Moreover, the auction mitigated land use spillovers (Jack & Cardona Santos 2017). In
Tanzania, the auctions allowed the agency to reveal the opportunity costs of bidders, and thus to
estimate the costs of tree planting in that area. There were poor landholders participating under
cost-effective targeting, although not all poor landholders could be contracted (Jindal et al.
2013). In Peru and Bolivia, wealthier landholders, with higher land availability and agricultural
assets, had higher opportunity costs of conservation, and thus asked for higher payments in
order to participate in the scheme (Narloch et al. 2013). In Kenya, bidders had no difficulties in
understanding the auction mechanism, discriminatory payments were not perceived as unfair,
and the poor were over-represented among the contracted landholders (Khalumba et al. 2014).
A concern posed by Ajayi et al. (2012) regarding the implementation of auctions in low-
income countries, is the fact that landholders might not be better informed about their own
opportunity costs compared to the agency, because they might not be familiar with the con-
servation technology, or because the determinants of their opportunity costs might be highly
uncertain (p.3). Khalumba et al. (2014) also argue that if landholders are not able to precisely
estimate their true costs, competition might lead to bids that are not profitable (p.865). This
was also recognized as an issue in Indonesia, where low bids resulted in low compliance. In
low-income rural environments, landholders are confronted with uncertainty regarding their in-
come, and in the presence of risk aversion they are lacking possibilities of insurance (Rosenzweig
1988, p.1148). In Indonesia landholders perceived the contracts as an option, and thus offered
relatively low bids. After uncertainty was resolved, they complied only if their opportunity costs
were lower than the payments (Ajayi et al. 2012). Ajayi et al. (2012) call for more experimental
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designs in order to assess the benefits of repeated auctions in low-income countries.
To date there is no study focusing on the potential of repeated auctions to meet both
goals. The purpose of our study is to fill this gap by means of agent-based modeling. We
assess the compatibility or trade-offs between pro-poor targeting and an effective provision
of environmental services under repeated uniform and discriminatory auctions. Agent-based
models work as a computational laboratory. They allow analyzing the dynamics that emerge
from individual decision making. They are suitable for the simulation of repeated auctions
in different environments. One can model bounded-rational agents with a certain access to
information and capacity to process it, their bidding strategies, and learning effects over time.
These aspects are important determinants of the outcomes of auctions, because outcomes are
very sensitive to the underlying informational structure (Hailu & Schilizzi 2005, pp.6-7). Agent-
based modeling allows studying the effect of social interaction depending on certain behavioral
patterns, underlying institutions and environmental components (Hailu & Schilizzi 2005, p.10).
There are many studies addressing the performance of conservation auctions to provide
environmental services cost-effectively by means of agent-based models (Hailu & Schilizzi 2004,
2005; Hailu & Thoyer 2006, 2010; Hailu et al. 2010; Lundberg et al. 2018). However none of these
studies has assessed the distributional implications of auctions, nor their potential to induce
pro-poor effects. Our study contributes to the literature by evaluating the benefits of repeated
auctions to allocate conservation contracts in low-income countries where pro-poor effects are
part of the target of the scheme. Because the choice of the payment rule in auctions has a high
influence on the distribution of rents (Wünscher & Wunder 2017, p.674), we investigate the
outcomes of both uniform and discriminatory auctions in a low-income setting.
We assume that the opportunity costs of conservation are correlated with wealth (Wunder
2008b, p.284), and that landholders are risk averse and face uncertainty about their future
opportunity costs (Ajayi et al. 2012). They are assumed to be willing to accept contracts
with low payments as an insurance to even lower future opportunity costs. However, high-cost
landholders are less likely to maintain compliance because their ex-post opportunity costs are
more likely to exceed the payment agreed on ex ante (Kawasaki et al. 2012; Ajayi et al. 2012).
The bidding strategies are based on the theoretical and empirical literature on conservation
auctions (McKee & Berrens 2001; Cummings et al. 2004; Cason & Gangadharan 2004; Kawasaki
et al. 2012; Deng & Xu 2015). In uniform auctions bidders make offers close to their costs (Cason
& Gangadharan 2004, p.1215). In discriminatory auctions bidders make offers that exceed their
costs, and repetition leads to higher offers over time (Cummings et al. 2004, p.352). This is
especially true for low-cost bidders who increase their offers relatively more (Kawasaki et al.
2012, p.167).
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Most of the studies using agent-based modeling assume that bidders learn over time only
from their own experiences. However, learning is also a social process, and it is important to
take this into account, especially whenever landholders lack confidence in their own strategies
(Chernev 2003, p.61), or if they are not certain about their own opportunity costs, as pointed
out by Ajayi et al. (2012). Following Lundberg et al. (2018), we assume that bidders learn and
adapt their bids based on the information they gather through social interaction. The relative
extent to which landholders overbid is assumed to depend on their position in the distribution
of the costs (Schilizzi & Latacz-Lohmann 2007).
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we describe our model, and
in the third section we show the results of the simulations, which are further discussed in the
fourth and last section.
3.2 Model
The purpose of our agent-based model is to analyze the extent to which repeated conservation
auctions can induce pro-poor effects in a low-income setting. Our model builds up on the models
proposed by Hailu and Schilizzi (2004) and Lundberg et al. (2018). Hailu and Schilizzi (2004)
simulate a scheme where conservation payments are paid to landholders in order to protect
biodiversity. The authors compare the performance of repeated discriminatory auctions with
fixed payments, assuming that bidders learn over time through reinforcement learning.
We extend the model of Hailu and Schilizzi (2004) by a small-world network through which
landholders can interact and learn over time. We implement a learning algorithm based on
social interaction, following Lundberg et al. (2018). We assume that wealth is correlated
with the opportunity costs of conservation, that landholders are risk averse, and that they face
uncertainty in regard to their future opportunity costs. We compare the potential of uniform
and discriminatory auctions to achieve the goals of biodiversity and poverty alleviation with a
fixed payment scheme.
3.2.1 Agents
There are two different agent types in the model. The first is an environmental agency with
the goal of protecting biodiversity and alleviating poverty. The second agent type is comprised
of landholders whose goal is to maximize the profits derived from their land use. The agency
is assumed to offer payments to landholders willing to apply a conservation technology, and to
be constrained by a fixed budget in every period. Landholders are assumed to face different
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opportunity costs of participation in the payment scheme. Moreover, they are assumed to face
uncertainty in regard to these costs. pii,t describes the opportunity costs of a landholder i in
period t. The expected opportunity costs in every period equal the initial opportunity costs.
In each period these costs change according to a normal distribution with a mean value equal
to the expected opportunity costs, and a certain standard deviation (σ). σ determines the
degree of uncertainty faced by all landholders, such that if it equals zero, landholders do not
face uncertainty.
Landholders are assumed to use the conservation contracts as an option contract in order
to counteract this uncertainty. Therefore, they are assumed to be willing to accept contracts
with payments that are below their expected opportunity costs. Their minimum willingness to
accept for participation in the scheme can be thus interpreted as a certainty equivalent. The
certainty equivalent is the monetary value that guarantees them the same expected utility as
their expected income from the conventional land use, and is described in equation 3.1.
wtai,t+1 = E[pii,t+1]− x (3.1)
The amount x is the risk premium, the amount they are willing to give up in order to
insure themselves against uncertainty. This is uniformly distributed within the range [0;σ]. It
accounts for differences in the risk preferences of landholders. If, after uncertainty is resolved,
their opportunity costs exceed the payments, they are assumed not to comply with the contract.
Non complying landholders do not receive the payment. Nevertheless, the agency incurs the
opportunity costs of not having contracted another landholder, because it is assumed not to be
able to save the unspent budget for further periods.
3.2.2 Allocation mechanisms and strategies
We consider three allocation mechanisms: fixed payments, discriminatory auctions and uniform
auctions.
Fixed payments are uniform, which means that all contracted landholders receive the same
payment. When contracts are allocated by means of fixed payments, the level of the fixed
payments is announced by the agency. landholders state their willingness to participate if they
are willing to accept less than the fixed payment. The agency successively selects random
landholders and observes their willingness to participate in the scheme for the offered payment.
If those landholders are willing to participate, and the budget is not yet exhausted, the agency
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contracts them.
Discriminatory auctions are sealed. All contracted landholders are offered a payment equal
to their bids. Landholders announce their bids to the agency and the agency contracts those
offering the lowest bid, until the fixed budget is exhausted. In the very first round landholders
offer a bid that equals their minimum willingness to accept (equation 3.1). In further rounds,
they adapt their bidding strategy according to their learning effects. The algorithm used to
simulate the learning processes is described in the following section.
Uniform auctions are sealed. All contracted landholders are offered a payment equal to the
lowest rejected bid. Landholders offer a bid equal to their willingness to accept in every period.
3.2.3 Learning algorithm
Landholders learn through their own experience and through social interaction. In every period
they interact with their acquaintances and exchange information about their pay-offs. This
diffusion of information allows them to adapt their expectations about the bid cap over time
in discriminatory auctions. Landholders are assumed to adapt their bidding strategy over time
based on the highest payment they have information about.
If a landholder has information about an accepted bid that was higher than her own (or
higher than her minimum willingness to accept if not contracted), she will have an incentive to
increase her bid in the following period in order to increase her rent. If, however, the highest
accepted bid she has information about is lower than her own, she could be a marginal winner,
therefore she will have an incentive to lower her bid in the following round in order to secure
participation.
This learning algorithm is described by equations 3.2 and 3.3. The term bi,t−1 describes the
last bid made by a landholder i. The term bj,t−1 describes the highest accepted bid landholder i
has information about. The difference between these values is described by the gap in equation
3.2. If the latter is positive, landholder i will increase her bid in the next period according to
equation 3.3. If the gap is negative, she will lower it according to the same equation (Latacz-
Lohmann & Van der Hamsvoort 1997).
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4i,j = bj,t−1 − bi,t−1 (3.2)
bi,t = bi,t−1 +
4i,j
2 (3.3)
3.2.4 Social network
We assume that landholders are embedded in a social network. We implement a small-world net-
work, a commonly found network structure, which was identified by Watts and Strogatz (1998).
This type of network is characterized by a high connectivity with a small number of connections.
This means that most landholders can be reached through a small number of links. These social
networks are found in settings where landholders are connected to their neighbors, and where
most connections do not involve separation by great distances (Wang & Chen 2003). In such
networks, the presence of a few long-range links, meaning connections between landholders from
different neighborhoods, allows a rapid spread of information throughout the population (Watts
& Strogatz 1998; Centola 2010). Assuming this network structure is appropriate because resi-
dents in rural areas are shown to make more use of informal supportive neighborly relationships
(Nation et al. 2010).
We implement the Watts-Beta-Small-World Generator by Jung Project and Nick Collier.
The latter is a graph generator that produces a small world network using the beta-model,
as proposed by Duncan Watts (1998). It starts with one-dimensional ring lattices in which
each landholder has k neighbors. Then, landholders are rewired. landholders from different
neighborhoods know each other with probability β. We create a small world network in which
every landholder has 2 neighbors and a 20 percent probability of knowing other landholders in
other neighborhoods. Landholders in the same neighborhood have similar opportunity costs.
3.2.5 Evaluation indicators
The extent to which auctions can provide biodiversity protection is measured by the number of
contracted landholders that comply with the contracts. In order to assess the extent to which
auctions can induce pro-poor effects, we observe the information rents paid, and the opportunity
costs of the landholders receiving the payments. The information rents are defined by the sum
of the individual differences between payments (pi) and opportunity costs (pii):
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information rentst =
Nt∑
1
(pi,t − pii,t) (3.4)
The higher the information rents and the lower the opportunity costs of the landholders
receiving them, the higher the pro-poor effects of the payments.
3.2.6 Initialization
The baseline setting (setting A).consists of the same values assumed in Hailu and Schilizzi
(2004) for each parameter. There is a population of 100 landholders, each of which is endowed
with one unit of land. The fixed budget equals 15 and the fixed payment equals 0.5. The
uncertainty parameter σ equals 0.3. We explore three different scenarios, one for each allocation
mechanism, respectively.
3.2.7 Sensitivity and scenario analysis
Additionally to the three different allocation mechanisms, we model different settings underlying
the implementation of the payment schemes, in order to investigate how the results of our model
are influenced by the assumptions made in the baseline setting A. We vary the population, the
budget restriction, and the level of uncertainty for each allocation mechanism. We consider a
setting with low competition, where the agency has a budget of 25 units and the population
is comprised of 50 landholders, a setting with high competition with a budget of 5 units
and a population of 150 landholders, a setting without uncertainty and a setting with
high uncertainty, where the parameter σ equals 0.6. The combinations of these variations
lead to a total of 8 additional settings (settings B-I) for each allocation mechanism, respectively,
resulting in 24 additional scenarios (see Appendix).
Exploring the changes in the outcomes under these alternative assumptions allows us to
determine the impact of these variables on the performance of auctions, and thus to test the
robustness of the model’s results. Moreover, it allows us to answer the question of how relevant
are uncertainty and competition for achieving both goals simultaneously.
40
3.3. Results
3.3 Results
We simulated each scenario 1000 times, considering 100 implementation periods. We start
analyzing the scenarios with the baseline setting, for which we created time series representing
the averaged outcomes per period for each mechanism. This is followed by the analysis of the
additional scenarios.
Baseline setting
Figure 3.1a shows the averaged time series of the payments made under the different alloca-
tion mechanisms in the baseline setting. The lowest payments made on average are the ones
resulting from the uniform auctions. While uniform payments oscillate around a steady state,
average discriminatory payments increase over time. Social interaction and past experiences
allow landholders to adapt their bidding strategies. The more information they gather, the
better their approximation of the cut-off payment. Therefore, over time, they gain a better
understanding about their possibilities to increase their rents. As it can be observed in figure
3.1a, bidders learn very fast during the first implementation rounds. The average payment made
through discriminatory auctions exceeds in early periods the uniform payments, approximating
the fixed level in the long run. Uniform payments remain low because they are only determined
by landholders’ willingness to accept, which, in the presence of uncertainty, is assumed to be
lower than their current opportunity costs. On the contrary, discriminatory payments become
also a function of the learning effects over time.
In figure 3.1b, we show the averaged time series of the number of contracts allocated. Auc-
tions allow the agency to contract a higher number of landholders, compared to fixed payments
because of the lower payments made on average. The number of contracts allocated under
uniform auctions oscillates around a steady state, just like the uniform payments. Although
the number of contracts allocated under discriminatory payments is the highest after the first
bidding round, it decreases fast over time, approximating the number of contracts allocated by
means of fixed payments.
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(a) Average payment (b) Contracts allocated on average
Figure 3.1: Allocation and implementation of biodiversity conservation contracts
Figure 3.2: Compliance on average (ex post)
In order to determine which allocation
mechanism provides the highest level of bio-
diversity conservation, we take a look at the
number of landholders complying with the
contract once uncertainty is resolved. Figure
3.2 shows the averaged time series of the num-
ber of landholders complying ex post with the
contracts accepted. These are the landholders
actually receiving the conservation payments
agreed on. The agency is assumed not to be
able to use the unspent budget in the next pe-
riod. Thus, non-compliance implies opportunity costs for the agency. Even after uncertainty is
resolved, uniform auctions remain the most cost-effective allocation mechanism. Nevertheless,
the difference between the level of biodiversity conservation provided through discriminatory
auctions and the one provided through uniform auctions is very small. This means that the
incidence of non-compliance is higher under uniform auctions.
Compliance is a function of the payments agreed on and of the ex post opportunity costs
of landholders. Landholders comply only as long as the rents derived from compliance are
not negative, or put in other words, as long as the payments are at least as high as their ex
post opportunity costs. While 73 percent of all landholders contracted through discriminatory
auctions comply with the contract, only 50 percent comply with the contracts allocated through
uniform auctions.
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Figure 3.3: Budget expenditure
Figure 3.3 shows the budget expenditure
under each allocation mechanism in the last
implementation period. More than half of the
budget remains unspent under uniform auc-
tions and fixed payments. Under discrimina-
tory auctions, the highest share of the budget
is spent in form of rents to complying land-
holders.
If the goal of the agency is not only to
provide biodiversity conservation, but also to
alleviate poverty, it is important to observe the size of the rents being paid and the type of
landholders receiving them. Figure 3.4a shows the averaged time series of the total rents made
to complying landholders. The learning effects under discriminatory auctions lead to increasing
total information rents over time that exceed the rents paid through the other allocation mecha-
nisms. The total rents paid through uniform and fixed payments oscillate around a steady state
over time. Total rents under fixed payments are the lowest. Figure 3.4b shows the averaged
time series of the average opportunity costs of the landholders receiving these rents.
(a) Rents (b) Average opportunity costs
Figure 3.4: Poverty alleviation effects
Complying landholders contracted through uniform auctions are clearly the poorest on av-
erage. In uniform auctions, those landholders with the lowest willingness to accept are the ones
contracted. Thus, the lower the opportunity costs and the higher the risk aversion, the higher
the likelihood of receiving a contract under uniform auctions. Although uniform payments
always exceed the willingness to accept of all contracted landholders, they do not necessarily
exceed their ex post opportunity costs. Landholders with low opportunity costs have therefore a
higher likelihood to comply with the contract, resulting in a high share of low-cost landholders.
43
3. The use of repeated conservation auctions in low-income countries
In discriminatory auctions we observe complying landholders that are wealthier on average.
Learning effects lead to increasing payments over time, allowing also landholders with higher
opportunity costs to receive a contract as long as their willingness to accept does not exceed
the cut-off payment. Although the likelihood of compliance is higher for poorer landholders,
some of the wealthier ones do also comply with the contract once uncertainty is resolved.
A similar effect is observed under fixed payments. The high payment allows wealthier land-
holders to participate. Because landholders are contracted randomly, they face the probability
to be contracted, as long as their willingness to accept is lower than the fixed payment. How-
ever, wealthier landholders are less likely to comply ex post. Under fixed payments we observe
the highest average opportunity costs, meaning that participating landholders are the wealthier
on average.
Figure 3.5 shows the the distribution of the rents in each allocation mechanism during the
last implementation period. We grouped all complying landholders into different classes of
opportunity costs. This figure shows the average rents paid and the amount of landholders
receiving them, for each of these classes. While only landholders in the two poorest categories
receive rents under uniform auctions, also wealthier landholders receive rents under discrimina-
tory auctions. However, under discriminatory auctions, the poorest landholders receive higher
rents on average, compared to uniform auctions. Under discriminatory auctions, the majority
of the participants belongs to the poorer sector, and the wealthier ones receive lower rents on
average.
Figure 3.5: Rents distribution
These results suggest that, if
landholders are risk averse and per-
ceive the conservation contract as an
option to insure themselves against
too low opportunity costs in the fu-
ture, uniform auctions are the most
cost-effective allocation mechanism.
The provision of biodiversity conser-
vation under this mechanism is the
highest despite of the high incidence
of non-compliance. This mechanism
targets the poorest sector, which is
desirable in terms of the goal of poverty reduction. Nevertheless, the rents received by these
landholders are low, and almost half of the budget gets lost as a result of non-compliance. Dis-
criminatory auctions are the second-best allocation mechanism in terms of cost-effectiveness,
providing only a slightly lower level of biodiversity conservation. Although not only poor land-
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holders receive rents under this mechanism, the poorest sector receives rents that are higher
than the rents received through uniform payments. About half of the amount lost under uniform
auctions is actually spent in discriminatory auctions in form of rents.
Effects of competition and uncertainty
In this section we present the results of the simulation of the additional scenarios. As explaind
in section 2.7, we varied the level of competition and the level of uncertainty. The results are
summarized in table 3.1 in the Appendix of this chapter.
Figure 3.6: Compliance per unit of budget in
the long-run
Figure 3.6 shows the number of complying
landholders in the long run for different lev-
els of uncertainty. According to these results,
whenever risk averse landholders face uncer-
tainty about their future opportunity costs,
uniform auctions provide the highest level of
biodiversity conservation. In the absence of
uncertainty, the average discriminatory pay-
ment remains below the uniform one despite
of the learning effects, allowing the agency to
contract a higher number of landholders. All
contracted landholders comply with the con-
tract in the absence of uncertainty.
Figure 3.7 shows the average opportunity costs of complying landholders and their rents in
the long run for different levels of uncertainty. In all allocation mechanisms, uniform auctions
target poorer landholders, irrespective of the level of uncertainty. However, the total rents they
receive are higher under discriminatory auctions, whenever landholders face uncertainty.
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Figure 3.7: Poverty alleviation effects in the long run under different levels of uncertainty
Figures 3.8a and 3.8b show the distribution of the rents in the absence of uncertainty and
under high uncertainty, respectively. In the absence of uncertainty, uniform auctions provide
higher poverty alleviation effects, compared to discriminatory auctions. While the rents paid to
poor landholders under uniform auctions decrease with the level of uncertainty, the rents paid
under discriminatory auctions increase.
(a) No uncertainty (b) High uncertainty
Figure 3.8: Distribution of rents under different levels of uncertainty
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Figure 3.9: Payments made on average under
high uncertainty
Because landholders are assumed to be
risk averse, uniform payments decrease with
the level of uncertainty, and so do the rents.
Discriminatory payments, on the contrary, in-
crease on average with the level of uncertainty.
The higher the uncertainty, the lower the will-
ingness to accept of landholders, and the lower
the first bids. The agency can thus contract
many landholders in the first round, which
means that a higher share of landholders in
the network shares information. This accel-
erates the learning effects, leading to higher
average payments. Figure 3.9 shows the averaged time series of the payments made on average
under each allocation mechanism.
Figure 3.10: Budget expenditure under high un-
certainty
Figure 3.10 shows the budget expenditure
in a scenario with high uncertainty. Com-
pared to the baseline seeting (figure 3.3), a
higher share of the budget remains unspent in
uniform auctions, and a lower share is actually
used to cover the opportunity costs of partici-
pants. Although the share of budget unspent
in discriminatory auctions also increases with
the level of uncertainty, the highest share of
the budget is still spent in form of rents paid
to complying landholders. Thus, high uncer-
tainty does not only decrease the provision of biodiversity conservation, but also the poverty
reduction potential of uniform auctions.
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Figure 3.11: Compliance per unit of budget in
the long-run under different levels of competi-
tion
Figure 3.11 shows the amount of landhold-
ers complying with the contract in the long
run, for different levels of competition. The
cost-effectiveness of auctions increases with
the level of competition. Under all allocation
mechanisms, we observe a higher provision of
biodiversity conservation under uniform auc-
tions. In the absence of uncertainty however,
discriminatory auctions are the most cost-
effective mechanism if landholders are con-
fronted with a high level of competition. The
cost-effectiveness of fixed payments does not
vary much with changes in the level of com-
petition because the level of the payments remains unchanged.
Figure 3.12: Poverty alleviation effects in the long run under different levels of competition
A high level of competition implies a lower budget and a higher population. The relative
cost-effectiveness advantage of uniform auctions compared to discriminatory in the presence
of high competition is a result of change in the population. A higher number of low-cost
landholders keeps the uniform payments lower than the average discriminatory payment.
Figure 3.12 shows the poverty alleviation effects in the long run, for different levels of
competition. Although, irrespective of the level of competition, the landholders receiving the
rents are poorer on average under uniform auctions, the total rents paid under discriminatory
auctions are almost double as high.
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3.4 Discussion
The purpose of this study was to determine the potential of auctions to reduce poverty, while pro-
viding biodiversity conservation cost-effectively, and to understand the compatibility or trade-
offs between these goals. By means of agent-based modeling, we simulate the implementation of
a biodiversity conservation scheme in a low income country. Wealth is assumed to be positively
correlated with opportunity costs. Landholders are assumed to face uncertainty about their
future opportunity costs. Landholders are assumed to treat the conservation contracts as an
option, in case of incurring very low opportunity costs. Therefore, they are willing to accept
payments below their opportunity costs. If, after uncertainty is resolved, participation in the
scheme would not be profitable for contracted landholders, they would not comply and the
agency would incur opportunity costs.
According to our results, if risk averse landholders face uncertainty about their future op-
portunity costs, auctions are more cost-effective than fixed payments in the provision of biodi-
versity conservation. Moreover, auctions allow for higher poverty alleviation effects, compared
to non-targeted fixed payment schemes. We observed a higher share of poor participants when
contracts were allocated by means of auctions, and, under some conditions, in both auction
designs these landholders received higher rents than the ones derived from the fixed payments.
Our results show however that the level of competition among landholders has an effect on the
potential of auctions to alleviate poverty. While the share of poor participants increases with
the level of competition, their rents decrease.
If the goal of the environmental agency is to provide conservation cost-effectively, and poverty
alleviation should only be a positive externality of the scheme, uniform auctions seem to be a
more adequate allocation mechanism. The low uniform payments resulting from risk aversion
allow the agency to allocate the highest number of contracts. Low-cost landholders have the
highest likelihood of receiving a contract under this mechanism, and they are also more likely to
comply with the contract once uncertainty is resolved. Thus, assuming that wealth is positively
correlated with the opportunity costs of conservation, uniform auctions allow the agency to
target the poorest landholders.
In the presence of uncertainty, discriminatory auctions provide biodiversity conservation
less cost-effectively than uniform auctions, but they induce a higher poverty alleviation effect.
The rents paid to the poorest landholders increase with the level of uncertainty. This is the
result of learning effects. The higher the uncertainty, the lower the bids in the initial rounds,
and the higher the share of participating landholders. More information spreads in the social
network, allowing landholders to learn faster over time. This leads to higher discriminatory
payments on average. Because low-cost landholders are more likely to comply ex post, they
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are the ones receiving these rents. Although the high cut-off payment allows also wealthier
landholders to receive contracts, those actually complying do not secure high rents. Thus,
if the main goal of the agency is the provision of so called "pro-poor" conservation, meaning
that the conservation payments should help reducing poverty, discriminatory auctions seem to
be the adequate allocation mechanism. Thus, learning effects, claimed to decrease the cost-
effectiveness of discriminatory auctions, actually turn out to be an advantage for both goals in
the presence of uncertainty and risk aversion. They increase the incidence of compliance and
at the same time increase the rents paid to the poorest contracted landholders.
It is necessary to discuss the implications of the assumptions made in our model when
interpreting the validity of our results. In our model we assume that the distribution of the
opportunity costs is independent on the level of provision of environmental services, and we do
not take into account that the quality of environmental services can be heterogeneous. Although
this was not the focus of our study, this can have implications on our results. Lundberg et al.
(2018) show that the cost-effectiveness of different allocation mechanisms can be determined
by the relationship between provision costs and the provision of environmental services. If the
correlation between both variables is positive, auctions might provide low additionality. The
authors claim that this is the reason why in the tropical forest conservation schemes in Mexico
and Costa Rica auctions would induce little gain (p.356).
In the Mexican scheme, for example, the risk of deforestation is a proxy for opportunity
cost, such that these are lower, the lower the risk is (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008, p.7). According
to the results of Lundberg et al. (2018) in those cases, targeted fixed payment schemes are a
more effective mechanism in enrolling those landholders that provide the highest additionality.
This implies however a high cost, and a consequence would be that only a few landholders
could be enrolled. The authors argue that if the program has the additional objective of de-
creasing poverty, which is the case in Mexico, this would be an important trade-off to consider
(pp.354-355). While this argumentation is valid for uniform auctions, our results show that
discriminatory auctions could still be an interesting allocation mechanism. Discriminatory auc-
tions allow high-cost landholders to participate in the scheme for relatively lower rents. This
means that the highest rents would still be paid to the poorest landholders, but also landholders
offering a higher additionality would provide biodiversity conservation.
An additional aspect that has to be taken into account when evaluating the possibilities
of payment schemes to induce pro-poor effects are potential barriers to participation of the
poor. Some aspects that might prevent the poor from participating in payment schemes can be
correlated with poverty, such as insecure land tenure, small land holdings, or lack of access to
credits (Pagiola et al. 2005, p.248).
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This study shows that, even in the presence of uncertainty and when landholders are risk
averse, repeated auctions can be an interesting tool for the cost-effective provision of so called
"pro-poor conservation". We show that, even though rents do imply a trade-off between both
goals, trying to reduce poverty while enhancing biodiversity conservation is not necessarily
counterproductive if auctions are used to allocate contracts. Uniform auctions can implicitly
induce poverty alleviation effects, and learning effects in discriminatory auctions might act as
a key element for synergies between these two goals in the presence of uncertainty and risk
aversion.
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Appendix
Table 3.1 shows a matrix with the values of the indicators at the last implementation period
(period 100) for each scenario, in order to evaluate the indicators in the long-term. The abbre-
viations in the table fp, da and ua refer to fixed payments, discriminatory auctions and uniform
auctions, respectively. Setting A describes the baseline setting. Settings B and C describe the
variations in the level of competition from the baseline setting. Settings D and G describe the
variations in the level of uncertainty from the baseline setting. Settings F, G, H and I describe
combinations of low and high levels of competition with high and no uncertainty.
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Baseline High competition Low competition
Indicator fp da ua fp da ua fp da ua
Setting A B C
Contracts 29 30.47 46.36 9 18.79 43.63 49 27.61 37.18
Payment 0.5 0.48 0.31 0.5 0.25 0.10 0.5 0.88 0.64
Rents 4.22 9.09 5 1.33 2.74 1.34 7.19 15.94 10.16 Baseline
Opportunity costs 0.21 0.17 0.09 0.20 0.08 0.01 0.20 0.30 0.26
Compliance 14.52 22.45 23.42 4.57 12.04 15.04 24.65 24.15 26.70
Setting D E F
Contracts 29 22.92 53.56 9 12.68 63.66 49 22.08 36.70
Payment 0.5 0.63 0.26 0.5 0.36 0.66 0.5 1.10 0.63
Rents 5.21 9.15 4.80 1.60 2.70 1.25 7.05 16.51 9.92 High uncertainty
Opportunity costs 0.14 0.19 0.04 0.54 0.09 0.03 0.2 0.32 0.19
Compliance 14.53 16.20 22.29 4.48 7.79 19.98 22.15 18.26 22.39
Setting G H I
Contracts 29 42.55 38.03 9 32.07 26.73 25.01 32.95 34.73
Payment 0.5 0.35 0.38 0.5 0.15 0.18 0.5 0.74 0.69
Rents 7.25 5.28 7.24 2.24 1.38 2.39 6.27 12.68 12.05 No uncertainty
Opportunity costs 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.25 0.10 0.08 0.24 0.36 0.34
Compliance 29 42.55 38.03 9 32.07 26.73 25.01 32.95 34.73
Table 3.1: Steady states under different levels of competition and uncertainty
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4Design of payment schemes in the
presence of asset specificity
4.1 Introduction
Offering land users payments for the adoption of environmentally friendly land uses has become
a popular means to secure the provision of environmental services. These incentives, commonly
called payments for environmental services (PES), have been implemented already all over the
world (Wunder et al. 2008, p.836).
The requirements for participation in payment schemes vary considerably, depending on the
environmental service considered. In some schemes land users are paid for restricting the land
use in order to provide conservation or natural regeneration, and sometimes for actively provid-
ing protection. In other schemes, payments are offered for the restoration of ecosystems. This
includes practices such as reforestation (Wunder 2005, p.7). In order to participate, land users
are often asked to undertake investments that are necessary for the provision of environmental
service. This can be in form of infrastructure, training and negotiation (Wunder 2008, p.293),
reforestation or in the form of a land use change, such as afforestation or the retirement of land
from agriculture (Wunder et al. 2008, p.836).
The requirement to make initial investments that are specific to the provision of environ-
mental services can be a deterrent for participation in the scheme (Ducos & Dupraz 2007, p.23).
Investments that are specific to the land use promoted are not redeployable beyond the contract,
which means that they lose value in any alternative use. Investing in specific investments can
therefore imply being locked in the transaction with the agency offering the payments. In case of
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contract cancellation, or if contracts are not renewed and land users are not fully compensated,
they would lose their quasi-rents (Klein et al. 1978, p.301).
Making payments to land users can also be seen as a specific investment for the environmental
agency. After contract expiration, the agency has no influence on the use of the land that was
invested in. Therefore, as long as the provision of environmental services is desirable, it is in
the interest of the agency to ensure that the land remains allocated to the promoted land use.
Investing in new land would be more costly for the agency.
According to Williamson (1985), transactions that are uncertain in outcome, recur fre-
quently, and require transaction-specific investments, are more likely to take place within a
hierarchical organization instead of taking place between actors in the market. Hierarchical
organization in the context of the provision of environmental services would imply buying the
land instead of offering incentive based payments to land users. Wunder (2006) argues that pay-
ment schemes might be cheaper and more adaptive than making changes in land tenure. Land
acquisition would only be an option whenever offering payments would imply prohibitively high
transaction costs over time, or in the presence of a high likelihood of contract violation or cancel-
lation. Moreover it would prevent a posterior integrated conservation-development dimension.
In cases where land acquisition is not considered, the design of payment schemes has to remain
incentive compatible in order to ensure the participation of land users and their compliance
(Wunder 2006, p.5).
The presence of asset specificity gives room for opportunistic behavior. Opportunism refers
to individual gain seeking behavior through the strategic use of asymmetrical information, or
through the lack of self-enforced promises during the contract implementation and contract
renewal (Williamson 1973, p.317). Thus, in the presence of asset specificity, promises alone are
not credible. This and the presence of bounded rationality 1 call for a governance under which
specific investments can be undertaken. Nevertheless, these contracts will always be incomplete
because of the impossibility to take into account every single potential contingency (Williamson
1985, pp.66-67).
The purpose of our study is to analyze how payment schemes can be designed in order to give
land users the incentive to make specific investments on their land. We consider contracts where
land users are paid to plant trees on their land. We review the theoretical propositions to address
the problem of asset specificity, derive hypotheses on the appropriate design of contracts under
different scenarios, and compare the latter with the empirical results of already implemented
reforestation contracts. Our study provides recommendations for the further implementation
1Bounded rationality is understood as a limited access to information and a limited ability to process it
(Williamson 1973, p.317).
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of such payment schemes.
4.2 Asset specificity in payment schemes
Examples of land uses promoted by payment schemes are the conservation of forests, refor-
estation or afforestation, and silvopastoral practices, among others (Engel et al. 2008, p.668).
There are two main actors in payment schemes, the providers and the buyers of environmental
services. Potential providers are land users who would be willing to adapt their land use in
exchange for the payments. Potential buyers are those who benefit from the environmental
service provision, which in some cases are represented by a governmental entity (Engel et al.
2008). These contracts are established on a voluntary basis. Land users will only be willing
to participate in the program if their participation makes them better off. This means that
the expected benefits from participation have to exceed their expected opportunity costs, or in
other words, their expected benefits from the second-best land use (Pagiola et al. 2005; Wunder
2005; Engel et al. 2008).
Some contracts require land users to invest in different forms of capital. Asset specificity
refers to the extent to which these investments have a higher value in the use established in
the contracts, compared to an alternative use. The level of specificity varies with the degree
to which the investment can be redeployed. Williamson (1983) identifies several forms of asset
specificity. Site specificity refers to a dependence of the exchange relationship on the location
of the assets, which become immobile or costly to relocate, for example fences, windbreaks,
shelterbealts, or corridors of trees. Physical asset specificity refers to physical assets designed
for a specific transaction or use, such as certain tools or machinery. Human asset specificity
refers to all skills, knowledge or know-how specific to a certain transaction, activity or land use,
including the knowledge related to the enrollment process in the payment scheme.
The provision of environmental services is additional as long as the returns to investment
do not overcome the investment costs in the absence of financial incentives. This means that if
the provision is not profitable outside the scheme, it will only be undertaken under a contract
with the environmental agency. Payment schemes are evaluated according to their effectiveness
(Engel et al. 2008, p.670). The overall objective of a scheme is to generate profits to land
users, while generating additional positive environmental externalities without leakage effects.
As long as the permanence of these environmental benefits is desirable, and as long as this is not
profitable for land users, their participation has to be ensured through further compensation
payments. Permanence cannot be expected in the absence of further financial incentives (Engel
et al. 2008, p.671).
61
4. Design of payment schemes in the presence of asset specificity
Asset specificity creates ex post advantages for land users that already enrolled land in
the scheme against those who have not (Vogt & Bizer 2013). This asymmetry can result in
what Williamson (1985) calls a fundamental transformation. Even if there are many potential
providers of the environmental services at the outset, a bilateral trading relationship would
evolve over time (Williamson 1983, p.211), ensuring the permanence of the environmental ben-
efits. The agency would contract the same pool of providers over and over again, whenever the
level of asset specificity is nontrivial.
Asset specificity can, however, be a deterrent to participation when land users fear not to
be compensated for their investments (Ducos & Dupraz 2007). Asset specificity implies the
creation of quasi rents. The quasi rent is the difference between the value of the investment in
the transaction to which it is specific and its value in the second best use. This is the loss that
occurs whenever the investment cannot be used in the intended way. The higher the specificity
of the investment, the higher the quasi rent. Klein et al. (1978) refer to them as "appropriable
quasi-rents".
Quasi rents could be appropriated by taking advantage of the position of the partner who
made the transaction-specific investment. If land users have invested in the scheme, and the
investment loses value outside the contract, land users become dependent on the willingness
of the environmental agency to compensate them. If ex post the agency is able to reduce the
compensation payment without endangering the provision of environmental benefits, land users’
quasi rents would be appropriated. This would be especially the case for irreversible land use
changes, meaning that reconverting the land is not profitable. On the other hand, if the agency
makes a site specific investment on privately owned land by fully compensating land users for
their investments ex ante, it would face the possibility to lose its quasi rents ex post. This would
be the case if land users would decide to cancel their contracts, or if they would not comply
with the contractual requirements.
The higher the possibility to be harmed through an appropriation of the quasi rent, the
higher the contractual gaps (Williamson 1985, p.60). It is important to distinguish between
two forms of uncertainty, parametric and strategic. Parametric uncertainty refers to the un-
predictability of external events, such as environmental changes, or price changes. Strategic
uncertainty refers to uncertainty related to the behavior of the transaction partner. Asset
specificity gives room to this type of uncertainty, because opportunism is a source of behavioral
uncertainty (Williamson 1985, p.49).
Williamson (1983) identifies three circumstances that could potentially occur after the spe-
cific investment is made, and that would prevent land users from investing in the scheme. The
first one derives from demand uncertainty, or in other words, the uncertainty about contract
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renewal in case of not being fully compensated ex ante. The second one is uncertain valuation,
referring to a situation where land users do not recognize whether the value of the investment is
the one the agency claims to be, for example long-term environmental benefits, such as better
soil quality, less erosion, and better water quality. And the third one is incomplete contract-
ing, referring to situations where complexity does not allow contracts to adapt to unforeseen
circumstances, such as natural disasters.
Granovetter (1985) supports the theory that behavior and institutions are influenced by
social relations, and claims that Williamson fails to recognize the extent to which transactions
are embedded in social systems. The author suggests that complex market transactions do
not necessarily have to be internalized within a hierarchical structure. Economic actors are
connected by networks of personal relations. The latter generate trust and discourage oppor-
tunistic behavior, allowing these transactions to take place in the market (p.490). Trust refers
to the perception that one can rely on the partner’s benevolent intentions. In other words, trust
refers to the perception that the partner won’t behave opportunistically. Trust eliminates the
need for formal contracts that are costly to formulate and enforce, and reduces thus transaction
costs (Dyer & Chu 2003, pp.58-59). The presence of trust is, however, not a sufficient condition
if outcomes are highly uncertain, if reputation is difficult to establish, and if the payoffs from
opportunism overcome the discounted future value of cooperation (Hill 1990).
Ducos and Dupraz (2007) identified trust as a a crucial condition under which land users
would be willing to adopt more specific practices. The authors showed empirically that the
more land users trust the environmental agency, the lower the magnitude of transaction costs,
and the higher the probability of choosing more specific assets. Gong et al. (2010) also provide
evidence that if land users do not trust the agency, they might perceive that the agency could
behave opportunistically and reduce the benefits to the land users after signing the contracts.
Transparency and trust are important elements for collective practices in payment schemes
(Muradian et al. 2010, p.1207).
Hwang (2006) suggests that the concern of quasi-rent losses can be expected to decrease
with the degree of trust and a relationship characterized by a longer time horizon. This implies
that engaging in repeated transactions with a trusted agency has a multiplicative impact on
land users’ willingness to make specific investments.
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4.3 Contract Design
In this section, we analyze the extent to which the presence of asset specificity in payment
schemes hinders their successful implementation under different scenarios, and discuss how this
can be prevented through the design of contracts. We discuss the aspects that we consider
to be crucial determinants of the problem of asset specificity. Then, we introduce different
contractual possibilities that the agency has to counteract this problem. We conclude this
section by deriving propositions about how contracts should be designed in order to overcome
the problem of asset specificity in payment schemes.
As a reference for our analysis, we consider a scheme where participating land users are
paid to plant trees on their land. We chose this example because reforestation implies a specific
investment for land users. The level of specificity depends on the net benefits land users derive
from reforestation outside the scheme (the opportunity costs). Thus, it depends on the net
value of the use of the trees once harvested, and on the time it takes for them to be ready
for harvest. During this period, land users incur opportunity costs in terms of forgone profits
from an alternative land use, and might not get any benefits. The level of specificity of such an
investment is determined by the difference between the net benefits that land users derive from
participation in the scheme, and the net benefits of the trees in an alternative land use.
4.3.1 The problem of asset specificity given different scenarios
Assuming that the goal of each land user is to maximize the profits derived from the land
they are endowed with, they would only be willing to enter a reforestation contract under the
condition that the expected net present value of the investment is positive2. Both the benefits
and the costs of reforestation vary according to the payment scheme. If land users are required
to invest in commercial plantations, they can profit from future returns from payments, but also
from timber sales. In schemes where the goal is to promote forest conservation, land users can
benefit from conservation payments and from byproducts. Reforestation can also imply benefits
such as the improvement of the soil quality, the prevention of erosion, and the production of
raw material, among others. The costs associated with participation in a reforestation scheme
are the opportunity costs of participation, investment costs, and in some cases also maintenance
2If the decision to invest can be postponed, option values have to be taken into account. When investments
are specific and their returns uncertain, and when the decision to invest can be postponed in order to gain more
information about future returns, an option value arises (Dixit & Pindyck 1994). When an irreversible investment
is undertaken, the option to invest is lost, and the option of waiting for new information that might influence the
desirability or timing of the expenditure is given up. This option value increases the opportunity costs, which
can considerably change the decision to invest in the provision of environmental services (Schatzki 2003; Isik &
Yang 2004; Yemshanov et al. 2015).
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costs. Land users would thus only be willing to participate in a reforestation scheme as long as
the total payment offered by the agency exceeds the costs incurred, diminished by the discounted
future expected returns to investment.
Investing in reforestation implies for a land user i the creation of quasi rents under two
conditions. The first condition is the presence of asset specificity. By definition, as long as
investments are specific, their value in the current use is higher than their value in any alternative
one. The quasi rent of land user i equals the difference between the value of the forest under a
conservation contract with the agency and the value of the forest in any alternative land use.
As long as conservation payments are higher than the opportunity costs of the land user, a
quasi rent arises. The second condition is that this land user is not fully compensated ex ante
for the investment costs.
On the other hand, paying a land user i ex ante for the investment implies for the environ-
mental agency the creation of a quasi rent under two conditions. The first condition is that the
provision of biodiversity is not safeguarded, meaning that this land user can decide ex post to
allocate the land to an alternative land use. The second condition is that the difference between
the net value of conserving the unit of land of user i is higher than the net benefit of contracting
a new land user j.
The existence of quasi rents creates room for opportunism. As long as the quasi rents are
positive and observable, there is potential for the parties to increase their own rents. Land user
i can demand higher conservation payments ex post, as long as they don’t exceed the difference
between the agency’s benefit of conserving her land, and the net benefit of contracting another
land user j. The agency’s net benefits would still exceed its opportunity costs, but its quasi
rent would be appropriated by the land user. The same would be true if the land user does
not comply ex post with the level of environmental service provision they agreed on. This is a
typical problem of moral hazard, a situation where land users lose the incentive to comply with
the contractual responsibilities, after ensuring a compensation through the contract (Ferraro
2008, p.811). Land users would only put effort in conservation to the extent to which this has
an effect on their benefits. Therefore, the agency has no incentive to fully compensate land user
i ex ante. However, by not doing so, land user i would be the party facing the possibility to be
harmed by opportunism. This would be the case if ex post the agency would not compensate
the land user with the payment they agreed on ex ante.
The extent to which the agency and land users face quasi rents, and thus the risk of quasi
rent appropriation, depends on the scenario under which the payment scheme is implemented.
In the following, we describe the aspects that act as key determinants for the problem of asset
specificity.
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Land use change irreversibility
Asset specificity implies sunk costs, which can lead to land use rigidity (Roberts & Lubowski
2007, p.535). After reforesting the land, if the net present value of allocating the land back to
the alternative use is equal or lower than the present value of not doing so, the land will remain
reforested even in the absence of further financial incentives for conservation. The lower the
opportunity costs ex post, the higher the degree of irreversibility, and the higher the dependency
of land users on the agency’s willingness to compensate them for their investment. This means
that land users face the possibility of a quasi rent appropriation if participation in the scheme
implies a high degree of land use change irreversibility.
In order to illustrate this, we consider a scheme where reforestation is promoted as a strategy
to increase biodiversity. Plantations are most likely to contribute to biodiversity when native
tree species are established on degraded lands (Bremer & Farley 2010). If native trees have a
long rotation age and little commercial value, participation in the scheme implies a high level of
specificity. The longer the permanence of the trees, the higher the level of irreversibility. The
more trees get established, the more difficult and costly will be their removal. Land users might
not be keen to reverse this process (Van Kooten, G Cornelis et al. 2002, p.570). If plantations
are made on idle land, where the opportunity costs are close to zero, the degree of reversibility
will be rather low.
Liquidity constraints
Land users might not be able to incur the costs for the required initial investment. The
reason might be liquidity constraints and no access to credits. Whenever payment schemes are
implemented in such a context, ex ante payments can be offered in order to help land users
finance the implementation.
Such payments should however not substitute a long-term payment stream because they
could reduce the incentives of land users to comply (Pagiola et al. 2005, p.245). Conditionality
is an essential element of the design of payment schemes. Payments must be conditional on
the provision of environmental services in order to ensure it (Engel et al. 2008, p.668). A
lack of compliance with the contract requirements would imply losses in the quasi-rent of the
environmental agency, if the former leads to a lower provision of environmental services.
If, however, participation in the scheme implies irreversible land use changes, up front pay-
ments would not compromise the quasi-rent of the environmental agency. An irreversible land
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use change would ensure the permanence of the provision of environmental services, such that
the requirement of conditionality would be automatically met once land users invest in refor-
estation.
Trust in the environmental agency
Even if no party is actually willing to behave opportunistically, the sole perception that the
partner might do so leads to strategic uncertainty. Trust in the intentions of the partner is thus
a key element in the contracting process in the presence of quasi rents. We refer to trust as the
land users’ perceived probability of being harmed by opportunism in the future. Trust reflects
the extent to which land users expect not to lose their quasi rents if they invest in the scheme
(Ducos & Dupraz 2007).
As long as land users fully trust the intentions of the agency to compensate them over
time, the agency can offer them payments ex post. The lower the trust, the higher the initial
willingness to accept of land users for reforestation. For any level of distrust, land users would
expect an insurance payment ex ante. Thus, the higher the level of distrust, the higher the
agency’s exposure to a quasi rent appropriation.
Uncertainty about the relative profitability of participation
In reforestation schemes, land users are confronted with the decision between participating
and receiving payments, or not participating and deriving returns from alternative land use
practices. There might be uncertainty about the profitability of the payments made by the
agency in case of participation, relative to the profitability of alternative practices. In this case,
land users would also experience uncertainty about their quasi rents.
Some land users might prefer to participate in the scheme in order to have a stable income
if this sort of uncertainty is the result of fluctuating crop prices or yields (Isik & Yang 2004,
p.243), this could be especially the case for poor land users (Pagiola et al. 2005, p.247). Risk
averse land users might even be willing to accept lower payments compared to risk-neutral land
users with the same opportunity costs, in order to decrease parametric uncertainty (Ferraro
2008, p.815).
On the other hand, if land users expect alternative crops to become more profitable over
time, or if there is uncertainty about the agency’s future budget availability, or policy changes,
about tree planting costs, yields, or about the long-term returns to investment, future crop prices
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or governmental agricultural programs, land users might not be willing to accept a contract for
reforestation (Van Kooten, G Cornelis et al. 2002, p.561), or might do so for payments that
compensate them for this uncertainty. The latter would expose however the agency’s quasi rent.
Observable external indicators
Changes in external conditions could be addressed by making payments dependent on the
market prices of alternative products (Benítez et al. 2006). According to Williamson (1985),
there are two preconditions that have to be met for contract specifications to be adjustable to
parametric uncertainty: they must relate to exogenous, relevant and easily verifiable events,
and the resulting costs must be quantifiable (Williamson 1985, p.77). By making payments
dependent on an external indicator, quasi rents become also dependent on this information.
The extent and nature of the problem of asset specificity, and therefore the solution possi-
bilities, depend on the scenario in which the payment scheme is implemented. In figure 4.1 we
show how the interplay of the aspects listed above have an influence on the contracting process.
Following Williamson (1985), depending on the different attributes, we differentiate between
three contracting processes: competition, promise and governance (private ordering).
If participation does not imply asset specificity, no other contracting process is needed, other
than discrete market contracting. The transaction partners are not interested in the identity of
one another. Williamson refers to this as a world of competition (Williamson 1985, p.31).
Whenever the specific investment implies land use irreversibility, the land will remain allo-
cated to the use promoted by the agency. Compensating land users ex ante for their investment
does therefore not compromise the quasi rent of the agency, nor the quasi rent of land users.
The transaction can thus take place in a world of competition as well.
Whenever participation implies land use reversibility to some extent, the quasi rent of the
agency is exposed for any ex ante compensation made to participating land users. This becomes
more evident in a situation where land users face liquidity constraints and can thus not finance
the investment without ex ante monetary transfers. Such a contracting process has to take
place in the world of governance, where contract execution falls on the institutions of private
ordering (Williamson 1985, p.32). Transactions have to be organized so as to economize on
bounded rationality, in a way that the environmental service provision is ensured, simultaneously
safeguarding the transaction partners against opportunism.
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Figure 4.1: Aspects of the contracting process
The presence of land use reversibility does not require governance, as long as liquidity con-
straints are absent and the land users trust the agency. In this case, promises are credible. Land
users can provide environmental services without fearing being harmed by opportunism, and
the agency can compensate land users ex post, not exposing itself to quasi rent appropriation.
If there is uncertainty about the relative profitability of participation, land users might demand
higher payments.
Whenever land users do not trust the intentions of the agency, they would expect an ex
ante compensation, and the agency would face a quasi rent. This would call for an alternative
governance structure, one of private ordering. Environmental services would thus be provided
by means of contracts safeguarding both transaction partners from opportunism. The design
of these contracts will depend on the presence of liquidity constraints, on the presence of un-
certainty about the relative profitability of participation, and on the existence of observable
external factors to account for the latter.
In total we identify six different scenarios in which contractual governance is needed to
address the problem of asset specificity (figure 4.1). Each of these scenarios calls for a different
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contract design. In the following section we review the contractual possibilities and derive
propositions for the design of contracts.
4.3.2 Contractual possibilities
In the last section we showed that, when the contracting process cannot take place in a world
of competition or promises, governance is needed to address the problem of asset specificity.
The contract design necessary to address this problem depends on the attributes present in
the scenario in which the scheme is implemented. Contracts should ensure the provision of
environmental services without endangering the quasi rents of the transaction partners. In the
following, we review the contractual possibilities of the agency.
Contract length
Short-term contracting implies the risk of one party having advantages that can be exploited
in bilateral negotiations over renewal terms, and thus discourage specific investments (Pollak
1985, p.582).
According to Klein (1978), the primary alternative to vertical integration, as a solution to
the risk of quasi rent appropriation, is offering economically enforceable long-term contracts.
This would imply integrating reforestation and conservation payments under the same contract.
Long-term contracts act as an enforced contractual guarantee and allow the specification of
possible contingencies. However, the longer and more detailed contracts are, the more negotia-
tion time and potential legal fees may be required (Greiber 2009, p.47). This often implies high
costs of policing and litigation, detection of violations and contract enforcement (Klein et al.
1978, p.303).
Long-term contracts can also employ market instead of legal enforcement mechanisms, such
as the imposition of a capital loss through the withdrawal of expected future transactions (Klein
et al. 1978, p.303).
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Payment design
The payment structure can be adapted according to the specific situation. For example,
higher initial payments can be made in the presence of liquidity constraints, in order to ensure
that investments can be made (Pagiola et al. 2005, 245).
In order to give land users an incentive to meet the environmental goal, the contract can
include result-oriented payments. These payments are directly linked to the desired environ-
mental goal, for example, land users may receive payments per surviving tree. By increasing
land users’ intrinsic motivation, result-oriented payments can create incentives for land users
to be innovative, and to choose the best practices according to their own know-how. Making
at least part of the compensation dependent on the performance, can prevent non compliance
(Matzdorf & Lorenz 2010, p.536), and thus reduce the risk of quasi rent appropriation. Result-
oriented payments can only be implemented when the environmental goal is quantifiable and
observable, such that the development of appropriate indicators is possible (Matzdorf & Lorenz
2010, p.537).
Payments can be thought of as an insurance for the agency to prevent non-compliance
(Klein et al. 1978, p.305). Land users can be offered future payments whose present discounted
value exceeds the gain from opportunism, creating quasi rents that would make opportunism
unprofitable. Payments increase with the monitoring and enforcement costs (Klein et al. 1978,
p.304).
Result-oriented payments might negatively influence the willingness to participate of land
users if meeting the environmental goal does not only depend on their efforts, but also on
exogenous factors, such as the weather condition (Wätzold & Schwerdtner 2005).
Flexible terms
Long-term contracts increase the rigidity of land conversion (Parks 1995, p.35). If land users
expect crop prices to rise over time, they would require very high payments in order to commit
to a long-term contract for reforestation and conservation, or might not even be willing to enter
into a contractual relationship with the agency. Although both parties have an incentive to
sustain the contractual relationship ex post, they cannot be expected to accede to proposals for
contract adaptation. Adjustments of conservation payments have a zero sum quality, meaning
that the benefit of one party would be the loss of the other one. There is therefore a need
for flexibility under terms which both trust (Williamson 1985, p.76). Long-term contracts can
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adapt to changing external conditions, as long as an exogenous, relevant and easily verifiable
indicator exists (Williamson 1985, p.77).
If the trees have a commercial value, their opportunity costs of conservation will increase
over time with the growth of the trees. In order to ensure participation, conservation payments
have to increase with the opportunity costs of conservation. The same is true for increasing
crop prices. The agency has an incentive to increase conservation payments over time, provided
that this is more cost-effective than reforesting other land units.
Sanctions
An alternative to the costly specification of every possible contingency, is imposing costs
on the opportunistic party (Klein et al. 1978, p.303). The reduction of the likelihood of non-
compliance requires an adequate deterrent. A sanction to avoid contract termination or non
compliance should be high enough to make the expected value of this options unprofitable.
One possibility is to terminate future payments. If the payments have been made ex ante,
then an alternative form of sanctioning would be necessary (Greiber 2009, p.54). Sanctions could
take the form of monetary penalties, however, this could be counterproductive to develop trust
among the parties, and to promote participation. Within particular social contexts, seemingly
weaker penalties can prove effective, such as the the exclusion of the payment scheme for a
certain period (Greiber 2009, pp.54-56).
The transaction costs incurred through the specification of contracts have to be taken into
account. The costs implied should not exceed the potential benefits of sanctioning or of the
procedures for non-compliance (Greiber 2009, p.56).
Bonding
Another alternative to detailed long-term contracts is bonding (Klein et al. 1978, p.303).
A fully bonded contract implies that each party is fully insured against opportunism. Both
transaction partners would pay for the investment. Part of these payments would be used to
finance it, and the other part would serve as a bond to enforce the contract. An impartial umpire,
assigns responsibility for any action deceiving the initial agreement between the transaction
partners. This prevents both sides from being harmed by opportunism, and allows enforcing
the agreement without difficulty (Kennan 1979, p.62).
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Bonding contracts are however only feasible as long as land users do not face liquidity
constraints. In the presence of liquidity constraints, the agency would have to offer ex ante
payments to the land users for them to be able to undertake the investment. Premiums as an
incentive to meet the agency’s environmental goal would therefore be necessary to ensure the
provision.
4.3.3 Contractual governance
After reviewing the contractual possibilities that an agency has to counteract the problem of
asset specificity, we derive propositions about the design of contracts, depending on the scenario
in which payment schemes are implemented. We refer to the six scenarios identified in section
4.3.1, for which contractual governance was identified as an alternative to competition and
promises.
Contract type 1 In the presence of asset specificity, and as long as land users do not face
liquidity constraints, bonded contracts or long-term contracts with result-oriented payments will
ensure the provision of environmental services.
In the presence of asset specificity and in the absence of credible promises, land users will
require a contract that safeguards them from quasi rent losses. They would be willing to invest
in specific assets if compensated ex ante. However, ex ante payments are not conditional on the
successful provision of environmental services, and thus the provision of environmental services
would not be safeguarded with such payments. In order to ensure that no transaction partner
suffers losses from opportunism, long-term contracts can be offered with payments dependent
on the provision of the services. Contracts could also include sanctions for non-compliance.
The duration of the contracts should be as long as the desired horizon of the provision. An
alternative to long-term contracting is bonding. The latter implies an insurance for both parties
against opportunism through a co-financiation of the investment. In bonded contracts, a third
impartial party has the task to ensure the enforcement of the agreement (Kennan 1979, p.62).
Contract type 2 If potential participants face liquidity constraints, the provision of environ-
mental services will be ensured through ex ante and result-oriented payments.
If land users face liquidity constraints and lack access to credits, the agency cannot offer
bonding contracts. The agency has to finance the investment through unconditional initial
payments. This can endanger the provision of environmental services. Once ensured the com-
pensation, land users’ incentives to comply with the contract requirement are lower (Ferraro
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2008, p.811). If land users do not comply, the agency cannot impose monetary sanctions and
land users won’t be able to pay the investment costs back. This calls for incentives for com-
pliance. In order to ensure the provision of environmental services, ex ante payments should
not compensate land users for their opportunity costs. Conditionality can be ensured through
result-oriented payments. They compensate land users for their opportunity costs, and provide
them with the necessary incentives for compliance.
Contract type 3 If land users face uncertainty about the relative profitability of participation
in the scheme, and as long as an external observable indicator exists, flexible long-term contracts
will be offered to land users, in which payments are adapted to changes in the profitability of
alternative land uses. In the absence of an external indicator, land users will require a premium
to account for this uncertainty.
Uncertainty implies that land users do not know whether investing in the scheme will result in
a relative profitable land use or not, and they might not be willing to make a specific investment
unless they are sure about its profitability. To account for this, contracts could be flexible. This
means that payments could vary according to the opportunity costs of participation, as long as
an external observable indicator exists. This insures land users when committing to a long-term
contract that might imply payments that do not cover future opportunity costs in case they are
increasing. On the other hand, it prevents the agency from committing to long-term contracts
that imply payments that overcompensate land users for their provision in case the opportunity
costs decrease over time. In the absence of an observable indicator, land users will require a
premium to account for the possibility of a future increase of their opportunity costs in order
to enter a long-term contractual relationship. The level of the premium necessary to induce
participation in the scheme will depend on the level of uncertainty, but also on the expected
future opportunity costs of land users. Land users would be willing to accept lower payments if
they are risk averse compared to risk neutral land users, because this would reduce parametric
uncertainty (Ferraro 2008, p.815).
According to the latter propositions, we show in table 4.1 the attributes that contract
design could include in each of the scenarios identified in figure 4.1. Scenario I implies land
use reversibility, uncertainty and liquidity constrained land users in a setting where no credible
promises can be made. This scenario would require long-term contracts with an initial payment
to help land users finance the investment and result-oriented payments to ensure compliance.
Scenario II would allow for the use of bonding contracts because land users are not liquidity
constrained. An alternative to bonded contracts would be long-term contracts with result-
oriented payments. In this scenario contracts could also include sanctions for non-compliance.
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ontract
D
esign
Scenario Ex ante
payment
Bonding Result-oriented
payments
Flexible
payments
Premium Sanctions Long-term
I + + +
II + + + +
III + + + + +
IV + + + +
V + + + + +
VI + + + +
Table 4.1: Contract attributes for each scenario
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In Scenario III flexible contracts could be offered to land users in order to account for
uncertainty. In the absence of such an indicator, such as in scenario V, the agency could offer
premiums instead, which would account for the potential increase in future opportunity costs.
Additionally, contracts would have to include initial payments as long as land users face liquidity
constraints, such as in Scenario IV and VI. Scenario VI represents the highest risk for the agency,
as well as the highest costs. If initial payments and premiums are paid, the agency runs the
risk of reduced compliance incentives, and thus of quasi rent losses. Moreover, in the absence
of increasing opportunity costs, the agency would have unnecessarily committed to payments
that overcompensate land users for the provision of environmental services.
4.4 Case studies
In this section we review payment schemes where land users were required to plant trees on their
land, and compare their design with our theoretical predictions. Although these reforestation
schemes imply a specific investment for land users, they do not necessarily imply that the land
use is irreversible once the trees are planted.
4.4.1 Commercial plantations in Costa Rica
Since the year 2000, the PSA(Pagos por Servicios Ambientales) program in Costa Rica, managed
by FONAFIFO, offers land users payments for the establishment of commercial plantations on
their land. The goal of this scheme is to help land users finance the initial costs of establishing
plantations. By converting an unprofitable investment into a profitable one, the scheme enhances
the provision of forest resources for timber production (Pagiola 2008, p.13).
This scheme implies a high degree of reversibility, because trees could be removed right
after being planted. Because land users face liquidity constraints, the payments would have
to be made ex ante in order to allow them finance the planting costs. This setting leads to
contracts of type I. The permanence of the trees depends on the perception of land users about
the profitability of the plantations. The higher the time preferences of land users, the lower
the expected net present value of the plantations. Put in other words, the more they discount
future consumption, the higher their incentives to remove the trees and plant other crops instead.
Moreover, in this setting land users lack liquidity, which means that waiting for the investment
to be profitable might compromise fulfilling their primary needs. They might thus prefer to
remove the trees and plant other crops instead, which would provide them returns in the short
run. The agency would have to ensure the conservation of the trees between reforestation and
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harvesting period.
FONAFIFO ensures the permanence of the trees through long-term contracts. Contracts
have a length of 20 years. This is written into the land title, so that it transfers to the new
buyer in case that the land is sold. Land users pay for the initial management plan, and in case
of being contracted they are required to comply with the provisions stated in their plans until
the contract terminates. Payments are made per hectare enrolled, and are conditioned to at
least 85 percent of trees survival. At the beginning, payments were made during the first five
years (about 550 USD): half of the payment was made in the first year, 20 percent in the second
year, 15 percent in the third, 10 percent in the fourth, and 5 percent in the fifth. However,
because most land users found it difficult to maintain plantations because of the lack of revenue
in the interval between the end of the plantation contract and the harvest of the timber, both
the amount and the duration of payments had to be increased in 2006 (816 USD/ha over 10
years)(Pagiola 2008, p.7-8).
The scenario in which this payment scheme is implemented is compatible with scenario I
in table 4.1. Land users are expected to make a specific investment on their land, but they
face liquidity constraints that do not allow them to finance the investment costs. The land
use is reversible, so that the agency has to ensure the permanence of the land use. As we
proposed for this scenario, the agency offers long-term contracts to ensure that the trees are not
harvested during 20 years. The initial payments implied in these contracts are the highest in
order to finance the plantation costs. At the beginning, result-oriented payments were offered
only during the first 5 years, because the intention of the scheme was only to allow them finance
the investment. The idea was that land users would have had an incentive to conserve the
trees because they will profit from the harvesting the trees after 20 years. Facing a positive net
value of conservation, land users would not require payments that compensate them for their
opportunity costs of conservation. Nevertheless, this was not the case in reality. Land users’
opportunity costs of conservation seemed to exceed the net present value of the trees. The
reason for this could be high time preferences. If land users discount future benefits at high
rates, the value of the trees will be rather low during the period prior to harvest. Moreover,
land users faced liquidity constraints, such that they might still have needed income to fulfill
their needs.
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4.4.2 Agroforestry systems in Costa Rica
The SAF (Systemas Agroforestales) program is implemented in southern Costa Rica since 2004
by FONAFIFO in order to promote agroforestry. Agroforestry on small-scale farms is claimed
to provide important ecological services (e.g. carbon sequestration and biodiversity), while
providing on-farm products for domestic use and marketing. The scheme’s goal is thus to
promote sustainable farming practices through the adoption of this farming technology (Cole
2010, p.208). Participants are required to have active areas of agriculture or cattle grazing
on their land. Tree planting is funded for the following categories: hardwoods in perennial
crops, multiple-use trees, windbreaks, forestry planting in fence lines, forestry plantations in
blocks, inter-planting trees with agricultural crops and fallow systems on indigenous reserves.
These systems are expected to provide land users with subsistence and market products such as
food, fodder for animals, and wood for construction and future sale. Tree planting is therefore
expected to make marginal farm areas more productive. Furthermore, the scheme is expected
to contribute to the reduction of poverty by targeting small-scale farmers in regions with low
socioeconomic status (Cole 2010, p.209).
The scenario in which this scheme is implemented resembles scenario I in table 4.1. The
scheme targets small-scale farmers with low income, thus, they are likely to face liquidity con-
straints. This would require higher initial payments in order to finance the investment. In
principle all tree plantations are highly reversible because they can all be removed after plan-
tation. However, the degree of irreversibility changes over time depending on the type of
plantation. The shorter the rotation age, and the higher their value, the higher the degree of
reversibility. Land users will choose the planting category according to the expected value of
the investment, and according their opportunity costs. Land users might for example prefer to
make inter-cropping plantations instead of large forestry plantations, unless they have idle land,
because otherwise they would compromise productive land for the production of other crops
(and thus uncertainty would play a role). The permanence of the trees would be ensured only
to the extent to which they provide land users with benefits in the short term, otherwise they
would require conservation payments at least during the first implementation years.
The SAF program offers five-year contracts, during which land users have to maintain the
planted trees. Land users are responsible for establishing a management plan for tree plant-
ing, and for certifying the project for payments. Payments are made per tree planted (1.30
USD), under the condition that at least 350 trees per contract are planted. Participants receive
payments during the first three years: 65 percent in the first year, 20 percent in the second,
and 15 percent in the third year. Payments are contingent on tree survivorship of at least 85
percent. Farmers planning to plant more than 1000 trees can apply for an advance on the first
payment(Cole 2010, p.209).
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The payments helped to overcome potential barriers to reforestation, such as the high initial
costs, perceived risk in investing in activities with long-term returns, and a lack of technical
knowledge. However, according to Cole (2010) land users planted more often trees in forestry
blocks than in inter-cropping systems, because they were not willing to engage in practices
that compromise crop production. They depend on agriculture for their subsistence and cash
incomes. Most of the forestry blocks were located on marginal land without agriculture, and
where opportunity costs were low. Moreover, land users preferred to plant timber trees over
trees that supplied fuelwood, fruit, or mulch for perennial crops. The payments often exceeded
planting expenses (p.213). According to Cole (2010), there was a concern that participants
would minimize tree maintenance activities in order to save payment money for other uses.
Because most of the planted trees were timber species, farmers viewed them as a ’savings
account’ for future generations, so that they did not get short-term benefits (p.215).
Cole’s conclusions suggest that the scheme did not give land users the proper incentives to
adopt inter-cropping systems in their land. In order to promote this land use and its permanence,
the scheme should have included premiums as to give land users the incentive to plant in inter-
cropping systems instead of planting large blocks of trees on land with little additionality. The
design of the scheme was compatible with our predictions, however payments should have been
offered over a longer period of time in order to ensure the permanence of the trees, and to allow
land users fulfilling their basic needs.
4.4.3 Reforestation and afforestation in Ecuador
The PROFAFOR program is implemented since 1993 in Ecuador in order to offset the carbon
emissions of Dutch electricity companies through reforestation and afforestation. Initially, the
program considered only exotic species with short rotation age (15 to 20 years), mostly pines
and some eucalyptus, but since 1999 also native species are planted through this program. The
scheme’s goal is to promote reforestation and the permanence of the tree cover through the
re-establishment of the trees after harvest (Wunder & Albán 2008, pp.691-692).
The land use promoted by this program can be reversed to some extent. The permanence of
the trees is conditioned to their relative profitability. As long as the production of alternative
crops is more interesting than the production of timber, land users will have an incentive to
reverse the land use, unless they have idle land, or unless payments account for this. In the
Ecuadorian scheme, land users are offered long-term contracts that give them the incentive to
plant new trees after harvest. Participating land users are likely to face liquidity constraints,
mostly communal and individual land users are the beneficiaries of the program (Wunder et al.
2008, p.836). Thus, the scenario would be comparable to scenario I, or to scenarios IV or VI in
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the presence of uncertainty.
The process of plantation site selection in this scheme was based on biophysical conditions,
such as slopes, soils and altitude, but also on economic criteria, such as the locally marketabil-
ity of timber. At the beginning of the implementation, land users were offered contracts to
reestablish and maintain tree cover for single cropping cycles of fast growing trees (15 years for
eucalyptus and 20 for pines). In the year 2000, contracts were extended to 99 years, covering
several cropping cycles. Land users receive an initial per-hectare payment for the production of
seedlings and planting (100 to 150 USD/ha). This covers about 80 percent of the costs (labor,
tools, transportation, etc.). The remaining 20 percent are paid after three years conditioned to
at least 75 percent of tree survival. Land users benefit from all by-products such as thinning and
pruning, but also from timber sales after harvest. They receive only 70 percent of the revenues
from harvest after the end of the cycle if they do not re-establish the plantation. In case of not
fulfilling the terms, land users would have to reimburse the payments (Wunder & Albán 2008,
p.692).
In practice it is difficult to ensure contract compliance for the extended contract length.
Participants do not seem to take the extension seriously. In some cases land users had the
incentive to repeat planting, but in other cases the contracted area was reduced ex post. It
is not always feasible to make land users reimburse payments in case of non-compliance, or to
keep 30 percent of timber sales in case of non re-establishment of forests. The scheme faces the
dilemma of making initial payments that are attractive for land users, and reducing leverage
for contract compliance. Between the first three years and the harvest, land users’ revenue is
limited. In order to deal with non-compliance contracts had to be modified. 20 percent of the
payment was withhold and made contingent on plantation conditions(Wunder & Albán 2008,
pp.692-693).
Although initially the design of the contracts did not include result-oriented payments as
we predict for this type of scenario, these were introduced later. As Wunder and Albán (2008)
confirm, the extension on contract length was not enough to ensure compliance. Sanctions in
this case were not an effective deterrent because their application is not feasible. Contracts have
to provide the correct incentives for land users to maintain the forest cover. The result-oriented
payments were a first step in this direction. However, the incentives should be provided along
the whole contract period. Permanence over time depends on the relative profitability of forest
conservation, and depends therefore on the development of prices for timber and agricultural
products. A scheme planned to be implemented for several cropping cycles has to take the
development of prices into account to the extent that observable indicators exist. If feasible,
the Ecuadorian scheme should include on-going payments that ensure the relative profitability
of timber production, and thus of carbon sequestration.
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4.4.4 Silvopastoral practices in Nicaragua
The Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Ecosystem Management Project, implemented in 2003
in Nicaragua, promoted silvopastoral systems. These imply combining fodder plants with trees
and shrubs. Such systems provide on-site benefits such as fruits, fuelwood, fodder and timber,
but also biodiversity benefits, hydrological beenfits and carbon sequestration (Pagiola et al.
2007, p.2). These systems imply however a very costly investment. Establishment costs are
high for sowing improved pasture, planting trees, establishing fodder banks and live fences, and
increasing herds to take advantage of increased fodder production. The investment becomes
profitable only in the long term. The goal of this payment scheme is to generate biodiversity
conservation and carbon sequestration by encouraging the adoption of silvopastoral practices
in degraded pastures (Pagiola et al. 2007, p.3).
This scenario is compatible with scenario I because it is thought to help land users to
overcome liquidity constraints in order to promote silvopastoral systems, and because land use
reversibility is possible. Uncertainty might not play a role because land users can still maintain
the current land use. The permanence of the systems depends however on their returns. Because
land users in this setting face liquidity constraints, in order to ensure permanence, the scheme
should include incentive payments for conservation until the investment becomes profitable.
Land users were offered four-year contracts with annual payments, based on their Environ-
mental Services Index (ESI). Contracted land users receive a one time payment(10 USD/per
baseline point) and further annual payments over a four-year period after the land use change
is undertaken (75 USD/ESI point/year). This scheme design assumes that a payment provided
ex ante will increase the net present value of investments in silvopastoral practices enough to
ensure permanence (Pagiola et al. 2007, p.5). To determine the permanence of the land use
changes, a randomly selected group was paid the same amount over two years, instead of four.
Some of this land users cut some of the trees they had planted soon after they had received the
final payment. This suggests that in the absence of further financial incentives, the land use
change might not necessarily be permanent (Pagiola et al. 2007, p.9).
Although initial payments were offered as we predicted, result-oriented payments were not
included in the contracts. Our predictions are confirmed by Pagiola et al. (2007), who claims
that the scheme requires long-term payments in order to induce permanent land use changes.
These would prevent land users from burning their fields, or cutting trees in other parts of the
farm (p.9).
81
4. Design of payment schemes in the presence of asset specificity
4.4.5 Cropland retirement in the US
The goal of the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the USA since 1990 is to establish
forests on agricultural land. Highly erodible and environmentally sensitive land is retired from
production, and resource conserving practices are promoted instead. This should contribute to
the provision of environmental benefits, such as reduced soil erosion, improved water quality
through wetlands and field buffers, reduced fertilizer use, and increased wildlife habitat (Stubbs
2014). The program addresses a full range of objectives through the Environmental Benefits
Index (EBI). The EBI includes following factors: (1) wildlife habitat benefits, (2) water quality
benefits from reduced water erosion, runoff, and leaching, (3) on-farm benefits of reduced wind
or water erosion, (4) long-term benefits of certain practices, (5) air quality benefits from reduced
wind erosion, and (6) benefits from enrollment in conservation priority areas . Land is eligible
for enrollment if it has a history of crop production and is highly erodible, if it is located in
a national or state Conservation Priority Area, or if it will be devoted to wetland restoration,
streamside buffers, or conservation buffers (Claassen et al. 2008, p.741).
Assuming that land users are not constrained by liquidity problems and that they face
uncertainty about the future profitability of participation, the scenario in which this scheme
is implemented would be compatible with scenario III or V in case flexible contracts are not
feasible. Long term contracts would ensure permanence, and on-going result-oriented payments
would ensure compliance. A premium could account for uncertainty if flexible contracts are not
feasible.
In the CRP program, participants are offered contracts with duration of 10 to 15 years and
annual payments. The program covers moreover 50 percent of the planting costs. Land users
wishing to cancel a contract face a penalty of full repayment with interest (Stubbs 2014, p.10).
Contracts are allocated by means of auctions. When a land user submits a bid, objective data
is provided in order to estimate the EBI, which is divided by the bid, the cost of contracting
that land user. A bid cap ensures that bids do not exceed a certain value. Land uses that can
induce long-term benefits beyond the 10–15 years of the contract, receive higher points in the
EBI. The EBI is flexible, and changes over time as the goals of the program change (Ribaudo
et al. 2001, pp.12-15). Because land was cropped prior to enrollment, it is likely that land
users allocate it back to crop production after contract termination, depending on its relative
profitability. Because of the uncertainty about the permanence of the land use change, and due
to the fact that many contracts would have expired by 2007, contracts were extended for one
to three years, and the Department of Agriculture committed to fully replace or renew expiring
contracts (Roberts & Lubowski 2007). Land is eligible for re-enrollment, but the latter is not
automatic. Land users have to apply for it (Claassen et al. 2008, p.741).
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Although these payments seem to be an attractive and profitable option for land users, they
might prefer to dedicate to agriculture as a consequence of risk-aversion and expected capital
gains. When not only the returns of crop production, but also those of forests are uncertain,
and the correlation between them is non positive, risk-averse land users will diversify the land
among both land uses. If however, only agricultural returns are known with certainty, land
users might not be willing to convert their land to forests (Parks 1995, pp.44-45).
Roberts and Lubowski (2007) examine the permanence of cropland retirements. Their find-
ings suggest that temporary enrollment of land often reduces cropping activities beyond the
contract period. The likelihood of land re-conversion is not only associated with the profitabil-
ity of cropping activities, but also on land attributes and location. Land units with trees were
about half as likely to return to crops as lands covered with grasses or legumes. Land that did
not return to crop production, despite the increase in crop net returns since 1986, suggested
land-use irreversibility. This is a very interesting claim. If the contract length was long enough
as to cause a high degree of irreversibility, no further payments would be necessary to ensure the
permanence of the land use. However, as the authors point out, this could also be the result of
a lack of additionality because land users could have exited cropping even in the absence of the
program. Moreover, for some land users it may not be optimal to re-convert land immediately
after contract termination due to option values associated with uncertain future returns from
crops. Land users who did not re-convert right after exiting CRP may, nevertheless, plan to
do so eventually. Therefore, incentive payments should still be provided for land management
practices in addition to land retirement.
Although long-term contracts are offered, as we proposed for this scenario, uncertainty
could still be addressed through flexible contracts that take into account the development of
the relative profitability of alternative land uses over time. Because participants do not face
liquidity constraints, both contractual partners can co-finance the tree-planting investment,
sharing thus the risk of quasi rent appropriation, as proposed in bonded contracts. Compliance
was ensured by means of sanctions.
4.4.6 Reforestation in China
The Guangxi CDM project has multiple objectives comprising carbon sequestration, enhancing
biodiversity, reducing soil erosion, and improving local livelihoods through contracts for refor-
estation in China’s Southern Province of Guangxi from 2006 to 2035 (Gong et al. 2010, p.1295).
The private sector has no incentive to reforest because of low rates of return. The goal of this
project is to remove financial and institutional barriers to reforestation, assuming that land
users would profit from the sales of carbon credits, timber and pine resin. The project consid-
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ers 3000 ha to be planted with five tree species (mainly native species) with different growth
rates and rotation periods, and 1000 ha with eucalyptus. Participation should take place in
abandoned and degraded land (Gong et al. 2010, p.1296).
Because reforestation is undertaken in idle non-productive land, the likelihood that the land
use change will be reversed is rather low. This implies that participants could be offered ex
ante payments without endangering the quasi rent of the agency, at least as long trees are
not ready to be harvested. The incentive to maintain the trees is mainly the sale of carbon
credits, although participants would also profit from resin and environmental benefits in the
long term. As long as the net present value of the maintenance of the trees over time exceeds
the opportunity costs, land users will have an incentive to maintain the tree cover. Otherwise,
the scenario would resemble scenario I and thus contracts would have to include long-term
result-oriented payments.
The Guangxi CDM Project offered land users a contract with local forest companies for a
period between 2006 and 2035. These contracts, whose framework was called "share-holding
system", stipulate that the local forest companies are fully responsible for financing the project.
This includes monitoring costs, costs associated with reforestation and forest management,
harvest and product sales, as well as technical support and training to the local land users
regarding the carbon project. Local land users only need to contribute their lands. The forest
companies are allowed to establish plantations by leasing lands from local land users at the
local land rent prevailing in 2005 (60 yuan/ha/year). Local land users receive 40 percent of the
income from the future sales of timber and pine resin and 60 percent of the income from sales
of carbon credits. The companies claim all revenues from the sales of products from eucalyptus
(Gong et al. 2010, pp.1296-1297).
Although the net present value of the project was estimated to be positive for all parties,
and although the share-holding contracts were an attempt to make the project accessible to
small land users, a large area remained unforested. Gong et al. argue that this is the result
of restrictive contractual rules, property rights disputes, and weak social capital. The authors
suggest that high social capital can overcome the lack of clearly defined property rights. Land
users did, however, not trust the intentions of the local forest companies to fully compensate
them (Gong et al. 2010, p.1299). The implementation of this project shows the importance
of trust in the agencies offering the payments, and the importance of providing the proper
governance in order to deal with distrust.
The contracts would have to include initial payments, in order to give land users an incentive
to participate according to Gong et al. If land users did not participate because they face high
time preferences, such payments would have compensated them for the commitment of their
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land. Other lands might have remained unforested because of increasing opportunity costs in
the production of other species (orange trees)(Gong et al. 2010, p.1301). This would imply
scenario IV or VI, depending in the availability of an external indicator to approximate changes
in the opportunity costs of participation. In order to account for uncertainty about the relative
profitability of participation,contracts could be flexible or include a premium.
4.5 Discussion
In the last section we reviewed the implementation of payment schemes under different scenarios.
Although each scheme had a different goal and setting, they all have in common that land users
are contracted to plant trees on their land. Table 4.2 gives an overview of the requirements of
the contracts and their design. In this section, we discuss the advantages and drawbacks of the
contract design of these schemes.
Bonded contracts were not used in any of the schemes described. This has partly to do with
the fact that in most of the schemes land users faced liquidity constraints. Moreover, policy
makers assumed that the investments would be profitable enough in the long-run to ensure
conservation until harvest. The crop retirement scheme is the only one that offers contracts
where land users have to co-finance the investment. These contracts have a duration of 10 to
15 years with ongoing result-oriented payments and the possibility of renewal. However, no
resources are served as a bond to enforce contracts.
The duration of the contracts proved to be an important aspect in the design of the
schemes. The optimal duration of contracts depends on the net present value of the future
returns to investment. Land users will only have an incentive to maintain the trees to the
extent to which they value the returns to investment. This means that the optimal duration
of the contract depends on the value of the future returns, on the time lag between investment
and returns, but also on the time preferences of land users.
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Case study (source) Specific in-
vestment
Returns to investment (ex-
cluding payments)
Contract
length
Payment design
Commercial plantations in
Costa Rica
(Pagiola 2008)
management
plan and tree
planting
Timber sales 20 years Payment per ha conditional on
tree survival: decreasing share
over 10 years
Agroforestry systems in
Costa Rica
(Cole 2010)
Management
plan and tree
planting
Subsistence and market prod-
ucts, fodder, timber, land pro-
ductivity
5 years Payment per tree: decreasing
share over 3 years
Reforestation in Ecuador
(Wunder & Albán 2008)
Seedlings pro-
duction and tree
planting
By-products and returns from
harvest (70 % without refor-
estation)
99 years Payment per ha conditional on
tree survival: decreasing share
over 3 years
Silvopastoral practices in
Nicaragua
(Pagiola et al. 2007)
Tree planting,
fodder banks
and live fences
Fodder, fruits, fuelwood and
timber
4 years Initial payment + annual pay-
ment per index point
Cropland retirement
in the US (Roberts &
Lubowski 2007)
Field clear-
ing and tree
planting
10 years +
renewal
Annual payments according to
bids
Reforestation in China
(Gong et al. 2010)
Tree planting 40 % from timber sales and 60
% from carbon credits
30 years Annual land rent per ha
Table 4.2: Case studies
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The shorter the rotation age and the higher the commercial value of the trees, the lower the
optimal duration of the contract. We observe this in contracts for commercial plantations and
agroforestry in Costa Rica, but also in contracts for silvopastoral practices in Nicaragua. Land
users are only offered payments during the first years to finance the initial specific investments,
under the assumption that the land use will provide enough future returns to make conservation
profitable. In schemes that enhance biodiversity, and where plantations provide low or no
returns, long term contracts are necessary to enhance conservation. This is the case in Ecuador,
where contracts were extended to 99 years, but also in the US, where land users are able to
renew their contracts.
The degree of land use irreversibility can increase with the duration of contracts. The more
trees get established, the more costly it becomes to remove them. This means that long term
contracts could ensure the permanence of the trees even after contract termination and in the
absence of further payments. However, land users would have to be fully compensated during
the contract length. This can explain why some land users in the US did not remove the tree
cover after contract termination.
The length of the contract does, however, not ensure conservation per se. The purpose of
the duration of the contracts is twofold: on the one hand it should provide land users with
certainty about future compensation, on the other hand it should ensure the permanence of the
trees during that period. However, the necessary financial incentives should be provided along
the contract duration. As long as the benefits of non-compliance exceed the net present value
of conserving the trees, forest cover will not be ensured.
Sanctions or financial incentives for compliance are shown to be an important aspect
of contract design along with an optimal contract duration. In Costa Rica, conservation pay-
ments had to be increased and offered during a longer period of time because land users had
difficulties in complying with the maintenance of the trees. In Ecuador, instead of being offered
conservation payments, land users were confronted with sanctions in case of non-compliance.
This however was not feasible because the agency was not able to reimburse the payments or to
keep a share of the returns from timber sales. This suggests that offering land users conservation
payments might be more effective than threatening them with sanctions, because the difficulty
to implement the latter can lead to a loss of credibility of the scheme.
While offering long term contracts with the proper financial incentives can ensure addition-
ality, offering short term contracts can give land users the incentive to plant trees in areas where
the additionality is rather low. This was the case in the agroforestry scheme in Costa Rica.
High short-term payments made participation attractive for land users, but they compromised
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the permanence of the trees and the additionality of the scheme. Land users preferred not
compromise agricultural production because of a lack of ongoing benefits. Thus, the contract
design allowed them to incur low opportunity costs. Furthermore, they reduced the expenses
for the maintenance of trees to the minimum. If trees are harvested, land users have to be
offered further incentives for reforestation. This can take the form of reforestation payments.
Alternatively, the income from timber sales can be made conditional on reforestation, as done
in Ecuador.
Flexible contracts were not offered in any scheme. In some cases they were not necessary
because land users could partly maintain the land use. But in other cases, accounting for the
increase in opportunity costs could have been beneficial to promote participation. This was
the case in the Chinese scheme for example. Flexible contracts might not have been offered
because of a lack of proper indicators to approximate opportunity costs, or because of the
high transaction costs implied in the contract design. In the absence of flexible contracts, land
users expecting increasing opportunity costs will require a premium in order to enroll their
land to the scheme. Although no scheme offered premiums explicitly, the rents implied in fixed
payments could have accounted for this uncertainty. In the US, land users might have included
these premiums in their bids, such that the payments they required implied a full compensation
during the contract duration.
Distrust can lead to inefficiencies even in the presence of seemingly attractive contract de-
signs. Although participation seemed to be profitable in the Chinese scheme, land users were
not willing to commit their land. This was partly explained by the lack of trust in the intentions
of the companies to compensate them over time for their investment. Ex post payments only
give an incentive to invest as long as they are credible. If there is no trust in the institutional
setting, contracts won’t be credible. For those cases initial payments and/or on-going payments
are crucial to induce participation. Under such circumstances, the agency faces the dilemma of
compensating land users ex ante to decrease their perceived risk, and risking thereby its own
rent. A solution to this problem could be to offer land users higher on-going payments, instead
of a share of the revenues from timber sales in the long run.
If several contracting rounds are intended, the agency can gain reputation over time through
the compensation of already participating land users. However, until then, the allocation of
payments might be inefficient in the presence of a certain degree of distrust. If fixed payments
are offered, those offering little or no additionality, those with very low opportunity costs, would
profit from large over-compensations. This could be however seen as an investment in the future
reputation of the agency. In this respect, it remains important to focus on the role of information
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access and diffusion among land users, in order to understand to which extent this influences
the opinions of land users about the environmental agency.
Initial payments were often needed in order to finance the investments. This alleviated land
users’ liquidity constraints, but also their potential for quasi rent losses. While in some cases
the agencies financed the whole investment costs, in other cases, they only co-financing it. By
doing so, agencies exposed themselves to the possibility of quasi rent losses.
Result-oriented payments were part of the contract design of all schemes. These were
made per area, per tree planted, or per unit of environmental benefits delivered. Payments
made for a certain area were conditional on survival rates. This means that, while payments
are still conditional on the efforts of the land users, the agency takes responsibility for a smaller
share of non-surviving trees. This design reduces the risk for land users, and gives them an
incentive to take care of the trees.
In most schemes, fixed payments were offered to all potential participants. The level of these
payments was established by taking into account estimates of the investment and opportunity
costs that land users would incur, as well as the value of environmental services they would
provide. These can be adapted over time in order to to changing conditions, or corrected if
misestimated, as it was done in Costa Rica’s commercial plantations program. This can however
lead to inefficiencies. Determining appropriate payments is a challenge in the implementation
of schemes.
Auctions can serve as a cost-revealing mechanism (Ferraro 2008). The crop retirement pro-
gram in the US allocates contracts by means of discriminatory auctions. The bids determine
not only the payment, but also the probability of receiving a contract. Therefore, land users
are confronted with a trade-off between increasing the bid to receive higher rents, or keeping
the bid low to increase the chance of winning. This might avoid overcompensation and increase
the effectiveness of the scheme.
Allocating contracts by means of auctions could allow agencies to replace long-term contracts
by short-term ones. Having already made the specific investment the agency requires, increases
the chances of being re-contracted for conservation (Vogt & Bizer 2013). Thus asset specificity
allows for advantages over other potential participants. This might ensure the permanence
of the contractual relationship over time. This is what Williamson refers to as fundamental
transformation (Williamson 1985, p.61). A repeated interaction allows for the creation of trust
between contractors, which is crucial for the willingness to engage in conservation activities,
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but also for the willingness to accept. It might increase cooperation and reduce uncertainty in
respect to the provision of environmental services (Vogt & Bizer 2013, pp.3-7). Moreover the
bidding system allows the adaptation of the payments to changing conditions.
Whether auctions offer an increase in cost effectiveness for payment schemes requiring spe-
cific assets needs to be assessed. Allocating reforestation and further conservation contracts by
means of repeated auctions could allow the agency to contract those land users with the lowest
opportunity costs, reducing the contracting costs, and reducing the potential of leakage effects.
Land users expecting increasing opportunity costs can include a premium in their willingness to
accept for participation. The possibility to adapt the payments according to the development
of the opportunity costs of land users is an interesting tool to avoid misestimation of payments.
However, learning effects leading to strategic bidding over time could also undermine the ef-
fectiveness of the scheme (Schilizzi & Latacz-Lohmann 2007). The gains in cost-effectiveness
might moreover be diminished by the administrative costs of auctions (Ferraro 2008, p.814).
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the design of contracts of payment schemes that require land users
to make specific investments, focusing on payments for tree planting. We provide a theoretical
framework to analyze the conditions under which the schemes are implemented in order to
address them with a proper contract design. We review different case studies in order to compare
our theoretical predictions with the implementation of such contracts in reality. The analysis
of the implementation of several tree-planting schemes allowed us to confirm our propositions,
and gave us insight about further contractual possibilities.
We observed that long term contracts have to be offered whenever the reversibility of invest-
ments endanger the quasi rent losses of the agencies. Long-term contracts, or the possibility for
contract renewal, are key to ensure the permanence of the trees if desirable.
We confirmed that the adequate contract design depends on whether land users face liquidity
constraints, on whether they trust the agency, and on whether the relative profitability of
participation is uncertain. Long-term contracts have to go hand in hand with proper incentives
for compliance, taking into account the opportunity costs of land users.
Trust is a key determinant for participation in payment schemes requiring specific assets.
This becomes more evident in the presence of irreversibility, and in the presence of parametric
uncertainty about future external shocks and future returns. We learned that the existence
of long-term contracts offering high future payments might not enhance participation as long
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as these are not credible commitments. This means that distrust can still be a deterrent to
participation even in the presence of contracts. In those cases the agency might have to expose
itself to quasi rent appropriation through ex ante payments in order to increase the trust of
land users, or might offer high on-going payments.
Compensating land users ex ante can decrease their incentives for maintenance ex post,
leading to quasi rent losses for the agency. This issue can be addressed by sanctioning non-
compliance, or by making financial incentives dependent on the outcome. The decision to
choose sanctions instead of result-oriented payments depends on the costs implied, but also on
the social context.
Furthermore, we learned that sanctions might not always be an appropriate solution to non-
compliance. Especially in countries where participants face liquidity constraints, schemes have
to promote compliance through on-going financial incentives. These should take into account
the opportunity costs of conservation, but also the costs for maintenance. This could allow land
users to fulfill their basic needs, while complying with the requirements of the contracts.
We do not observe flexible contracts in any scheme. Schemes offer mostly incentives for
investment, assuming that the returns will be compensation enough for land users to conserve
the trees. In contrast, the scheme in the US allows for re-negotiation through contract renewal.
Auctions can be used to disclose information about the opportunity costs of land users,
and thus to increase the cost effectiveness of the scheme. In the long run this could lead to a
fundamental transformation, where the same land users would be contracted over time, ensuring
the permanence of the environmental benefits. The use of auctions in order to allocate schemes
for environmental services open up possibilities to increase the effectiveness in the presence of
asset specificity. If several contracting rounds are intended, the agency could gain reputation
over time through the compensation of participating land users. Costs related to inefficient
allocations until then could serve as an investment in the future reputation of the agency. In
this respect, it remains important to investigate whether repeated auctions could potentially
increase the cost effectiveness of schemes requiring specific assets. The role of information access
and diffusion among land users would have to be taken into account in further research. This
would allow understanding the extent to which social interaction can influence the reputation
of the agency.
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5The use of auctions in payment
schemes that require specific
investments
5.1 Introduction
Through the conservation, restoration or establishment of forest ecosystems, land users are
potential providers of many environmental services. Some examples of these services are the
regulation of hydrological flows, the conservation of biodiversity, and carbon sequestration.
Forests are being lost at rapid rates because their conservation provide land users less private
benefits compared to alternative land uses. Incentive-based mechanisms, such as Payments
for Environmental Services, address this issue by financially compensating land users for their
provision (Pagiola et al. 2005, p.238). Participation in payment schemes is voluntary, therefore,
payments have to exceed the opportunity costs of land users in order to induce participation
(Engel et al. 2008, p.667). These schemes are typically offered by governments, NGOs, or other
organizations, on behalf of the users of these services (Engel et al. 2008, p.666).
Participation in payment schemes implies adapting the land use to the environmental goal
of the scheme. In some cases, land users are required to make investments that are specific to
the transaction with the environmental agency. This implies that the investment yields lower
returns in the second best use (Williamson 1985, p.55). Some examples are fences, windbreaks,
shelterbealts, or corridors of trees; these assets are site specific. Also tools and machinery can
be specific assets if they cannot be used for alternative activities. Investments in human capital
such as knowledge and acquired skills can also be specific to the transaction (Ducos & Dupraz
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2007, p.6).
Through payment schemes, environmental agencies might also make specific investments.
The extent of these investments is determined by the payments made to land users in advance
for their provision. By making payments in advance for the adaptation of the land use, agencies
would be making site specific investments that cannot be redeployed for alternative uses, or at
least not without losses.
When a specific investment is made, a quasi-rent arises (Klein et al. 1978, p.298). The
quasi rent is the difference between the returns to investment in the intended transaction and
the returns to investment in the second best use. Therefore, the investor runs thus the risk of
incurring the costs and not being compensated for the investment ex post. In the absence of an
ex ante full compensation for the specific investment undertaken, the transaction partner has
thus the potential to appropriate the quasi rent of the investor.
If payment schemes require land users to make specific investments on their land, the con-
tracts have to be designed in a way that both transaction partners are safeguarded from oppor-
tunism. Offering ex ante payments might compromise the provision of environmental services
ex post, and thus the quasi rent of the agency. On the other hand, land users might not accept
ex post payments in order to avoid being harmed by an opportunistic agency.
The higher the level of asset specificity, the higher the contracting costs (Klein et al. 1978,
p.298). Williamson (1985) identified vertical integration as a solution to the problem of asset
specificity. Specific investments are more likely to take place within a hierarchical organization
because of the high transaction costs implied in such an agreement. Applied to the provision of
environmental services, a vertical integration would imply buying the land instead of offering
incentive based payments to land users. However, payment schemes might be cheaper and more
adaptive, compared to changes in land tenure. Moreover, land acquisition would prevent a
posterior integrated conservation-development dimension. The acquisition of land would only
be an option in the presence of prohibitively high transaction costs, or a high likelihood of
contract violation or cancellation (Wunder 2006, p.5).
Klein (1978) argues that some form of economically enforceable long-term contract would
be the primary alternative to vertical integration (p.302). Long-term contracts can ensure
that quasi rents are not appropriated by the transaction partner (Klein et al. 1978, p.303).
Short-term contracts can allow one party to have advantages that can be exploited in bilateral
negotiations over renewal terms. This can discourage investments in specific assets (Pollak
1985, p.582). However, long-term contracting can imply high costs of policing, litigation, and
enforcement (Klein et al. 1978, p.303).
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Granovetter (1985) supports the theory that behavior and institutions are influenced by
social relations. This is what he calls the "embeddedness" argument (pp. 481-482). The
author suggests that trust is generated through personal relations and social networks, and
that decision makers seek for the best information they can get about their potential transaction
partners. He argues that trust discourages opportunistic behavior, allowing these transactions
to take place in the market (p.490). Trust, referring to the perception that one can rely on the
partner’s benevolent intentions, eliminates the need for formal detailed contracts that are costly
to formulate and enforce, and reduces transaction costs (Dyer & Chu 2003, pp.58-59,Gulati
1995, p.93). Ducos and Dupraz (2007) show that if land users trust the intentions of the
agency, they are more likely to enroll their land for agri-environmental practices requiring
specific investments. They refer to trust as the perception that the transaction partner shares
the same goals and won’t make unfair decisions. Trust is therefore "expected to reduce the hold
up pressure on the transacting parties" (Ducos & Dupraz 2007, p.12). The more land users trust
the intentions of the agency, the lower their need to protect themselves, and thus the lower the
transaction costs implied in the contracting process.
In most payment schemes, contracts are allocated by means of posted offers. Payments
should exceed the opportunity costs of land users in order to induce participation. However,
estimating these costs imposes a challenge for the agency because land users are usually better
informed about their own opportunity costs. This allows them to secure informational rents
by claiming to incur higher costs (Ferraro 2008, p.811). Reverse auctions are claimed to allow
agencies to reduce informational rents because bidders reveal their costs through their offers
(Ferraro 2008, p.813).
Pricing in auctions can be discriminatory or uniform, both formats leading to different bid-
ding strategies. In uniform auctions, every winner receives the same payment. It is determined
by the highest accepted bid or by the lowest rejected one. Theoretically, the dominant strategy
in this auction design is to offer a bid equal to the opportunity costs because bids only determine
the chance of winning a contract, but not the payment (Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005, pp.
21-22).
Under a discriminatory auction, land users receive a payment equal to their bid. They are
confronted with the trade-off between increasing the bid to secure a higher rent, and decreasing
it to increase the likelihood of winning a contract. Theoretically, the dominant strategy in this
pricing format is to overbid. Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Haamsvort (Latacz-Lohmann &
Van der Hamsvoort, Carel 1997) derive the optimal bidding strategy of land users. They show
that the optimal bidding strategy of risk-neutral land users is a function that increases linearly
with the opportunity costs of participation and their expectation about the cut off payment
(bid cap). Moreover, they show that land users who have already participated in previous
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rounds, and have thus already incurred the implementation costs, will make use of this relative
advantage in order to increase their rents. The authors highlight that this might lead to a
free-rider problem whenever the agency is unable to counteract this behavior (p.411).
Many economists have turned to experiments and agent-based modeling in order to deter-
mine which auction design leads to a higher cost-effectiveness (Ferraro 2008, p.815). Experimen-
tal settings show that the bidders’ behavior corresponds to the theoretical predictions (McKee
& Berrens 2001; Cummings et al. 2004; Cason & Gangadharan 2004; Kawasaki et al. 2012;
Deng & Xu 2015). The repetition of auctions over time allows bidders to learn and adapt their
bidding strategies. This leads to overbidding over time, and thus to a lower cost-effectiveness
of discriminatory auctions, especially if low-cost bidders have an accurate estimation of the bid
cap (Cummings et al. 2004; Kawasaki et al. 2012). Kawasaki et al. (2012) provide evidence
for seemingly irrational underbidding. The authors explain this behavior through a lack of
comprehension of the auction dynamics or through the joy of winning, a phenomenon in which
bidders bid more aggressively because they derive utility from winning or from spite (p.165).
The authors analyze the incentives for compliance in auctions. Their results show that low-cost
participants are more likely to comply with the contract requirements. Participants with costs
higher than the bid cap would only be willing to underbid in the expectation of benefits from
non-compliance. Thus, discriminatory auctions can lead non-compliance to the extent that
these allow high-cost land users to enter the winners’ pool (p.176).
Repeated auctions create an asymmetry among bidders through learning effects, reputation,
and asset specificity (Vogt & Bizer 2013, pp.2-8). This asymmetry can lead to what Williamson
(1985) calls fundamental transformation: even if at the outset there are many potential providers
of the environmental services, the agency is likely to contract the same land users over time.
This can lead not only to institutional but also to trust relations [p.62]. This in turn could imply
a better reputation for the agency, given that trust building is a social process, as Granovetter
proposes. A better reputation would lead to more trust in the agency, and thus to lower bids
over time. On the other hand, auctions can imply uncertainty for land users in regard to future
payments because their participation in the scheme is not only dependent on their own bids,
but also on the bidding strategies of other bidders. Uncertainty could lead to an increase in
land users’ willingness to accept for participation.
The purpose of our study is to analyze whether auctions could increase the cost-effectiveness
of the allocation of contracts in the presence of asset specificity. We consider one shot auctions
to allocate long-term contracts and repeated auctions to allocate short-term contracts. We
contribute to the literature by taking into account the role of asset specificity and the role of
social networks in the implementation of payment schemes. In this context social networks
allow for information diffusion, having an influence on the reputation of the agency and on land
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users’ learning effects over time.
By means of agent-based modeling, we simulate the implementation of a scheme of payments
for carbon sequestration. The scheme requires land users to invest in reforestation and for fur-
ther conservation. Agent-based modeling allows simulating interactions between heterogeneous
individuals, allowing for the analysis of macro-scale effects that emerge from these dynam-
ics (Axelrod & Tesfatsion 2006, p.1649). It allows understanding how learning, strategizing,
and interaction affect over time the outcome of payment schemes in the presence of bounded
rationality (Hailu & Schilizzi 2004, pp.153-154).
We simulate two types of contract design, short-term and long-term contracts, as well as
three different allocation mechanisms, fixed payments (posted offers), uniform auctions and
discriminatory auctions. In our model bidders are connected through a small-world network
that allows them to interact and exchange information about their bidding strategies and their
level of trust. Social interaction allows land users to learn over time. This has an effect on
the cost-effectiveness of the scheme through the influence on reputation and on the level of
payments. The parameters used in the model are based on empirical data from a tree-planting
field experiment in Malawi (Jack 2010).
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we describe the agent based model
and the data used. In the third section we present the results of our simulations, which are
analyzed and discussed in the fourth and last section.
5.2 Model
By means of agent-based modeling, we create an hypothetical payment scheme in a low-income
country. The scheme’s goal is to provide carbon sequestration by offering land users payments
for reforestation and for further conservation of the trees. Our model is based on a tree-planting
trial in Malawi undertaken by Jack (2010), where land users were offered payments for planting
a certain amount of M’bawa trees (African Mahogany) on their land.
The purpose of our model is to determine which contract length and allocation mechanism
induces environmental services more cost-effectively, when participation requires investing in
specific assets. We take into account the perceived trust in the agency, and the presence of
learning effects over time, which both have an effect on land users’ willingness to accept for
participation.
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5.2.1 Individual decision making
Our model consists of two agent types, an environmental agency and land users. We explain
their objectives and decision making processes in the following.
The environmental agency has the goal of maximizing the provision of carbon seques-
tration through the conversion of marginal agricultural land to forests. It offers reforestation
payments to land users willing to invest in planting 100 M’bawa trees in one acre of their land,
which is allocated to crop production.
The agency values each unit of land according to the carbon storage it provides. Table 5.1
shows the estimation of the carbon storage potential (in tons) of a M’bawa tree in Malawi, based
on biomass estimates by Kachamba (2008) (Jack, 2010, p. 51). According to this table, the
carbon storage potential of a tree increases until year 40, and it starts to decrease afterwards.
The value of a tree in terms of its carbon storage potential is thus higher for older trees than it
is for younger ones, as long as they are not older than 40 years.
Year Above ground biomass Below ground biomass Total tons/tree
5 0.01 0.003 0.013
10 0.01 0.003 0.013
15 0.06 0.016 0.076
20 0.16 0.041 0.201
25 0.51 0.127 0.637
30 0.64 0.160 0.800
35 0.65 0.161 0.811
40 0.47 0.117 0.587
Table 5.1: Carbon storage potential of M’bawa trees in Central Malawi
This implies that the agency is interested in contracting reforested land for conservation, as
long as the net benefit of doing so exceeds the net benefit of reforesting other areas. The agency
offers conservation payments that are expected to give land users an incentive to maintain the
trees. Thus, these payments account for their opportunity costs after the land use change is
undertaken.
The agency is endowed with a fixed budget in every period that can be spent for reforestation
or for conservation of previously reforested land. In the contracting process, the agency takes
the value of the land into account, as well as the price of contracting it. Therefore, the agency
gives priority to conservation contracts, as long as the net benefit of re-contracting a land user
for conservation is higher than the net benefit of contracting a new land user for reforestation.
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Land users are assumed to maximize the profits derived from their land. They can keep their
land allocated to the production of crops, or enroll it in the payment scheme. The annual profit
from crop production is described by pii, and is a proxy for the opportunity costs of participation
in the payment scheme. Reforestation is not a profitable land use in the short run, however,
in the long run, when the trees are high enough, land users can use them as firewood. These
benefits (fi) become thus part of the opportunity costs of conservation. Land users would only
be willing to invest in the scheme if the discounted expected net benefits from reforestation
exceed their discounted expected opportunity costs during a time horizon T (condition 5.1).
The latter refers to the time horizon in which land users could potentially receive payments.
pi,0[
T∑
0
pi,t
βt
]θi,t >
T∑
0
pii
βti
+ I +
T∑
τ
fi
βti
(5.1)
The left hand side of condition 5.1 describes the expected benefits from participation in
the scheme; the reforestation payment pi,0, and the expected discounted future payment flow
[∑T0 E[pi,t]βt ]. Land users discount their future benefits at a factor βi. They create expectations
about the level of future conservation payments pi,t and about the probability of receiving them.
The latter is determined by their trust in the agency’s willingness to re-contract them over time,
and thus to compensate them for the specific investment. Trust is modeled as an individual
factor θi,t that takes a value between 0 and 1, where 0 means that land users do not trust the
agency’s intentions to compensate them over time, and 1 that they fully do.
The right hand side of condition 5.1 describes the discounted costs implied in participation.
While investment costs I are only incurred once for reforestation, opportunity costs are incurred
in every contracting period. The forgone profit from crop production is incurred in every period,
while the opportunity costs of not deforesting the land are incurred only from period τ on, when
the trees are high enough to be harvested. Transforming condition 5.1, gives the condition for
reforestation, as follows:
pi,0 >
T∑
0
pii
βti
+ I +
T∑
τ
fi
βti
− [
T∑
1
pi,t
βt
]θi,t (5.2)
Land users will only be willing to invest in reforestation if the reforestation payment exceeds
their minimum willingness to accept. The latter equals all costs incurred, diminished by the
expected level of future compensation through conservation payments. The willingness to accept
for reforestation decreases with the level of trust. The higher their level of trust, the higher
their expectation about future benefits from conservation, and thus the lower their willingness to
accept for reforestation. If land users do not trust the intentions of the agency to contract them
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for conservation after reforesting their land, they would only agree to invest in reforestation as
long as the reforestation payment fully compensates them for all costs incurred.
The minimum willingness to accept for conservation (after having invested in reforestation)
is given by the discounted sum of opportunity costs. After having reforested the land, the
opportunity costs comprise the foregone benefits from firewood if the trees are old enough, and
the foregone benefits from crop production if the land would be reconverted back. The latter
would imply re-conversion costs c. The condition for conservation for any period Γ > τ is
expressed in condition 5.3. Land users will only be willing to conserve the trees as long as the
conservation payment fulfills this condition.
pi,Γ ≥
T−Γ∑
0
pii + fi
βt
− c− [
T−Γ∑
1
pi,Γ
βt
]θi,Γ (5.3)
5.2.2 Contract design
As explained in the last section, the agency offers land users reforestation and conservation
payments in order to achieve its goal of carbon sequestration. These can be embedded in
short-term or long-term contracts, as explained below.
Long-term contracts are offered for a time horizon equal to 40 years (T+1). This is the time
during which trees provide increasing carbon storage. A long-term contract includes an initial
reforestation payment and annual conservation payments that remain constant over time. Land
users are required to conserve the trees during the whole contracting period. While reforestation
payments are equal for all land users independently of the mechanism used to allocate the
contracts, conservation payments are determined by the respective allocation mechanism.
Short-term contracts have a duration of one year. Reforestation contracts are offered to
new participants, and conservation contracts are offered to re-enrollers. Because contracts for
conservation can be renewed every year, the terms can be adapted. At the end of every contract
period land users compete again for conservation contracts. In case of not being contracted,
they can allocate their unit of land back to the previous land use, if profitable. However,
once re-converted, the land looses eligibility for further participation in the payment scheme.
Short-term conservation contracts are only renewed for a total of 40 years.
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5.2.3 Allocation mechanisms
Contracts can be allocated by means of fixed payments (posted offers), uniform auctions, or
discriminatory auctions. The contracting process, the strategies, and the implication for the
payment scheme change depending on each mechanism. In fixed payment schemes, reforestation
and conservation payments are established ex ante. These are equal for short and long term
contracts. When long-term contracts are offered, the reforestation payments equal the fixed
payments, and land users are contracted according to the bids they offer for annual conservation
payments. When short-term contracts are offered, both reforestation and conservation contracts
are determined through the auctions.
Fixed payments for reforestation and conservation are established ex ante by the environ-
mental agency for both contract types. Land users with opportunity costs lower than these
payments are assumed to be willing to accept a contract.
Uniform auctions imply that all bidders are offered the cut-off bid, the lowest rejected bid.
Land users’ dominant bidding strategy is assumed to be offering a bid equal to their opportunity
costs.
Discriminatory auctions imply that bidders are offered a payment equal to their bid, as long
as these are lower than the cut-off bid. Their dominant strategy is assumed to be overbidding.
5.2.4 Social network
Land users are embedded in a social network through which they share information with their
acquaintances in every period. According to this information, they adapt their perceived likeli-
hood to receive future payments (trust) and their expectations about the level of these payments.
The latter allows them to estimate the bid cap, and to adapt their bidding strategy accordingly.
We model a small-world network where land users know their neighbors, and where they
might also know land users from other neighborhoods. Such that, although most land users are
not neighbors of one another, their neighbors are likely to know each other. This has implications
on the diffusion of information. We implement the Watts-Beta-Small-World Generator by Jung
Project and Nick Collier, a graph generator that produces a small world network using the
beta-model, as proposed by Duncan Watts (1998). It is described by two factors; the number
of neighbors that every land user has, and the probability to know someone from another
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neighborhood. In our model we assume every land user to have 2 neighbors, and a probability of
20 percent to know someone else. Land users in the same neighborhood have similar opportunity
costs. This type of network can present a high connectivity among land users with a small
number of connections, allowing information to spread rapidly to other areas (Centola 2010).
The information land users receive through social interaction has an influence on their
willingness to accept for participation, and on their bidding strategies, as explained below.
Social interaction and reputation
As explained in section 2.1, trust refers to the perceived likelihood of receiving conservation
payments in future periods. The average level of trust among the population can be interpreted
as the reputation of the agency. This variable is a function of the dynamics of contract allocation
and of social interaction.
If land users are fully compensated during the period in which the trees do not provide any
benefits, their trust level is assumed to increase by 10 percent. If a land use re-conversion is
not profitable, and they are not compensated for their investment, their trust level decreases
by the same percent because they lose their quasi-rent.
The level of trust can also be influenced by social interaction. We model trust based on
the opinions model of Sun and Mueller ((2012)). Each land user has an initial trust level that
is uniformly distributed among the population in the range [0;1]. A trust level of 0 refers to
full distrust and 1 to full trust. This level can be influenced by the trust level of other land
users. In every period a land user i interacts with a random land user she j knows. They
exchange information on their trust levels. Land users with extreme values are less open to
external influences. This is captured by σ, which decreases for values close to 1 and close to 0
(see equation 5.4).
σi = 1− 2(|θi,t − 0.5|) (5.4)
As long as the difference between both trust levels is smaller than σ, land user i adapts the
perceived trust level according to equation 5.5. The convergence factor µ, which also ranges
between 0 and 1, reflects the personality of land users. This is exogenously given. Land users
with a value equal to 0 never change their initial trust level, whereas those with µ values close
to 1 would always follow the trust perception of their peers.
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θi,t = θi,t−1 + µi(θj,t−1 − θi,t−1) if | θj,t−1 − θi,t−1 |< σi (5.5)
Social interaction and learning effects
Social interaction allows land users to learn and adapt their expectations about future conser-
vation payments. In every period land users gain experience through the interaction with the
agency, and gather information about the payoffs of their acquaintances. They use this infor-
mation to update their expectations about future conservation payments, and thus to adapt
their minimum willingness to accept in every period.
This is especially relevant when repeated auctions are implemented because, in contrast to
fixed payment schemes, the level of conservation payments is not known. In uniform auctions,
land users assume that future conservation payments are going be equal to the last value payed
by the agency. In discriminatory auctions, the expectations about future conservation payments
are adapted according to the highest payment they have information about. They do not take
into account land users whose land’s value is higher.
5.2.5 Bidding strategies
The bidding strategies differ according to the payment format and to the contract design, as
explained in the following.
Long-term contracts
Long-term contracts imply one-shot auctions, such that learning effects become irrelevant. In
long-term contracts all land users receive the same initial reforestation payment, which exceeds
the investment costs. Bids determine only the level of the annual conservation payments.
Uniform auctions imply that land users offer a bid equal to their opportunity costs of conser-
vation. They offer an annuity payment equivalent to their willingness to accept for conservation
during the whole contracted period.
Discriminatory auctions imply that land users’ dominant strategy is overbidding. They
inflate their opportunity costs (pii), according to equation 5.6, following Latacz-Lohmann and
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Van der Haamsvoort (1997). p¯i describes the average opportunity costs of all potential partici-
pants, assumed to be common information. Thus, those with relatively lower opportunity costs
offer relatively higher bids, and land users with a willingness to accept higher than p¯i do not
expect to receive a contract. Nevertheless, they are assumed to inflate their costs by 10 percent.
After having inflated their costs, they offer the annuity payment equivalent to their willingness
to accept for conservation during the whole contracted period.
pii =
pii + p¯i
2 (5.6)
Short-term contracts
Short-term contracts imply repeated auctions, such that learning effects become relevant for
the optimization of bidding strategies.
Uniform auctions imply bids equal to the current opportunity costs of conservation (see
condition 5.3), influenced by the current level of trust and the current expectation about future
conservation payments.
Discriminatory auctions imply learning effects. If a land user i has information about an
accepted bid (bj,t−1) that was higher than her own (or than her current opportunity costs in case
of not being contracted), she has an incentive to increase the current bid in order to increase
her rent (Lundberg et al. 2018). The bid adaption is determined by the difference between
both pay-offs. This difference is given by the gap 4i,j) (see equation 5.7). If the gap is negative
(positive), land users are assumed to decrease (increase) their bids according to equation 5.8. In
the absence of information about higher accepted bids, land users do not change their bidding
strategy (Lundberg et al. 2018).
4i,j = bj,t−1 − bi,t−1 (5.7)
bi,t = bi,t−1 +
4i,j
2 (5.8)
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5.2.6 Data description
We use empirical data from a tree-planting field trial in Malawi, explained in detail in Jack
(2010). The field trial was undertaken in Ntchisi District, an area heavily dependent on rainfed
agriculture, where land users grow primarily maize, soy, tobacco and potatoes. The tree planting
contract required land users to set aside half an acre of land and plant 50 seedlings of M’bawa
trees (African Mahogany) provided by an organization. They were paid a fixed payment for
each surviving tree over three years. Contracts were allocated by means of fixed payments and
uniform auctions. Information was shown to flow easily within villages and contract holders,
such that within a village, land users may have learned from each other about how to keep the
trees healthy after contract allocation. Moreover, land users might have exchanged information
before participating in the auction.
In our model, we assume the agency to contract land users for a maximum of 40 years. Land
users are expected to plant 100 seedlings in one acre. We use the foregone income from crop
production as a proxy for opportunity costs, because this represented the largest cost associated
with allocating land to the tree planting contract. We include in the opportunity costs the value
of firewood, because most land users in the trial stated that they would use the trees for this
purpose. We approximate this value by multiplying the times per year they have to gather
wood by the price they would pay for it in the market.
African Mahogany trees have gained great interest because of its rapid growth and its supply
of wood in the short term (Pinheiro et al. n.d., p.64). On average, participants expected to keep
the trees on their land for 7 years before harvesting or replacing them. In Malawi these trees
can reach a height of 8 m and a diameter of 9 cm after 7 years. However, removing them with a
diameter less than 70 cm can result in a lack of natural regeneration (Pinheiro et al. n.d., p.68).
In our model, we assume that trees can be harvested after 10 years for the purpose of using the
timber as firewood. The individual discount rates were calculated based on the time preferences
revealed through the questionnaire in the trial. The population equals 428 land users. Table
5.2 shows the descriptive statistics of the empirical data.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Crop income (MWK) 42526.14 50462.99 750 370000
Firewood value (MWK) 12625.58 11709.69 480 108000
Discount rate (%) 515 491 120 125
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics
Investment and clearing costs are derived from the calculation of costs per acre provided by
Ntchisi District Agriculture and Development Officers and by the 2007 Crop Estimate Report
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for Ntchisi District (Jack 2010). The numbers are given in units corresponding to Malawi
Kwacha (MWK). Investment costs are assumed to be the same for all land users, and to equal
10400 MWK. These are comprised by land clearing costs (2400 MWK) and by field preparation
and planting costs (8000 MWK). In case of reconverting the land to crop production after the
contract expires, land users are assumed to face again the land clearing costs, and the costs for
field preparation and planting. Re-conversion costs equal 6800 MWK, taking the numbers for
the production of soya, the most profitable crop in that region. Because similar weeding and
harvesting costs are implied in crop production and tree planting, these are not considered in
the model.
The fixed budget available to the agency every period is determined by multiplying the
amount of contracts allocated with the fixed payment. It equals 546000 MWK. The fixed initial
reforestation payment equals 12000 MWK, following Jack (2010), and the fixed conservation
payment is set at half the reforestation payment. The environmental value of the land is
determined by the report on carbon storage potential of M’bawa trees in Central Malawi, shown
in table 5.1. This is given in tons of carbon sequestrated. Sequestration benefits are reversed if
trees are used for firewood.
5.2.7 Performance indicators
To measure cost-effectiveness we consider the returns to budget, measured as the number of
conservation contracts allocated.
Although we do not consider the agency to behave opportunistically, we consider land users’
perceived risk of being harmed by opportunism. Land users who invested in the scheme, and
for whom re-conversion is not a profitable option, could lose their quasi rents if they would not
receive conservation payments because of the allocation dynamics. We use the number of land
users that are hold up in the transaction, and that do not receive conservation contracts, as a
proxy for land users’ quasi rent appropriation.
The environmental agency would lose its quasi rents any time a land user decides to re-
convert her land back to crop production, or whenever land users do not comply with the
contract requirements. The latter implies cutting down trees in order to obtain firewood. We
measure the agency’s quasi-rent losses by the number of land users that allocate their land
back to crop production, and the share of land users that do not comply with the contract
requirements. Furthermore, non-compliance is also an indicator for additionality, because in
the absence of conservation payments these land users would not necessarily re-convert their
land back to crop production.
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5.2.8 Sensitivity analysis
We conduct an analysis in order to determine how sensitive our model reacts to changes in the
parameters. The parameters we varied are the distribution of the opportunity costs, the initial
range of trust, the range of personality of land users (µ), the amount of budget available for
the agency and the number of land users. We run the model 1000 times for each combination
of these parameters and for each contract type.
Figure 5.1: Empirical distribution of opportu-
nity costs
Figure 5.1 shows the empirical distribu-
tion of opportunity costs. This is a right
skewed distribution where the majority of the
land users have rather low opportunity costs.
In order to investigate the effect of an al-
ternative distribution of opportunity costs,
we model a normal distribution with a mean
value equal to the empirical average.
In our model we assume that the level
of trust is uniformly distributed among land
users within a range of [0;1]. We model an ini-
tial reputation from within the ranges [0;0.5]
and [0.5;1], in order to account for an initial
bad and good reputation, respectively. We do
the same with the factor describing the per-
sonality of land users, and thus their likelihood to be influenced by the opinions of their peers.
By doing this, we account for a society that is highly influenced by social interaction, and a
society who is not. This might influence the dynamics of the reputation, and thus the allocation
of the contracts. We vary the budget available to the agency, as well as the number of land
users through the random generation of numbers. We generate 10 different random numbers
of farmers within the range [50;1000], and 10 different random budget levels within the range
[100000;1000000].
We generate regression trees in order to illustrate our results, taking into account the amount
of conservation contracts allocated in the last implementation period considered, which is our
main performance indicator. Linear regression is a global model, that produces a single predic-
tive formula for the entire data-space. Regression trees can be used when the data has variables
that interact in complicated, nonlinear ways. Regression trees are a conceptually simple and
powerful tool (Friedman et al. 2001, p.305). This method partitions the observations into a set
of clusters, and then fits a simple model in each one. Each cluster is represented as a "leave" in
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the regression tree. The tree starts with a root node, and asks a sequence of questions about
the features in every leave. Each question refers to only a single attribute, and has a yes or
no answer, for example, “Is the number of land users > 50?” or “Do the opportunity costs
follow a normal distribution?”. According to the attributes, the tree predicts which allocation
mechanism is the one allowing the agency to allocate the highest number of contracts in the
last implementation period. Thus, each "leave" of the tree represents a parameter that leads to
a certain class variable, which in our analysis is the allocation mechanism. The gini index mea-
sures the level of impurity, the lower this index, the lower the misclassification rate (Friedman
et al. 2001, p.309).
Figure 5.2 shows the result of long-term contracting. As it can be seen in this figure, the only
relevant attribute is the distribution of the opportunity costs. It determines which allocation
mechanism leads to the highest number of contracts. The tree shows that if the empirical right
skewed distribution is considered, uniform auctions provide the highest number of contracts.
However, if the opportunity costs follow a normal distribution, contracts should be allocated by
means of discriminatory auctions. The empirical distribution implies that most of the land users
have rather low opportunity costs. These land users secure high rents through fixed payments
and through their bids in discriminatory auctions, such that more contracts can be allocated
through uniform auctions.
Figure 5.2: Regression tree for long-term contracting
Figure 5.3 shows the regression tree for short-term contracting. As it can be seen in this
regression tree, the relevant attributes are the distribution of the opportunity costs, the level of
budget available, and the number of land users competing for contracts. This means that the
level of competition plays a role in the differences in cost-effectiveness between the allocation
mechanisms only if short-term contracts are offered. The reason for this is that the level of
competition determines the possibilities of land users to increase their rents over time under
discriminatory auctions.
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If the opportunity costs follow a normal distribution and the agency has a low budget,
discriminatory auctions allow allocating a higher number of conservation contracts. Uniform
auctions do not perform better than discriminatory auctions because low-cost land users receive
uniform payments that overcompensate them more than discriminatory payments. Nevertheless,
for higher levels of budget, uniform auctions promise a higher number of contracts. The reason
for this is the level of competition. Discriminatory auctions allow bidders to learn and increase
their rents according to this information. The higher the budget, the higher the informational
rents that low-cost land users can secure, and thus the less cost-effective in comparison to
uniform auctions, where their overcompensation is smaller.
Considering the empirical right skewed distribution, discriminatory auctions lead to a higher
number of contracts if the budget is large. This indicates that overcompensation through
discriminatory payments would still be lower under discriminatory auctions despite of learning
effects, compared to uniform auctions. If the agency faces a low budget, the result will depend
on the number of land users competing for a contract. If there is a small number of land
users, the likelihood that they have low opportunity costs on average is high. According to the
regression tree, discriminatory auctions allow the agency to allocate more contracts in such a
setting. The repetition of auctions allow them to increase their rents over time, however not as
much as in cases where land users are more heterogeneous. If the majority of the contracted
land users faces low opportunity costs, increasing their bids implies risking participation in the
next round. Securing rents through the increase of bids is therefore rather possible for bigger
samples, where land users are more likely to be heterogeneous. Uniform auctions would allow
the agency to contract the highest number of land users.
Figure 5.3: Regression tree for short-term contracting
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This analysis shows that our results are not sensitive to variations in the initial trust range,
nor in the range of the personality factor. The latter determines the likelihood that the trust
level is influenced by social interaction. Although the level of trust has implications on the
willingness to accept, it does not have an effect on the choice of the allocation mechanism.
5.3 Results
We simulate a payment scheme for carbon sequestration in order to investigate the performance
of fixed payments, uniform auctions and discriminatory auctions to allocate short- and long-
term contracts. We compare the results based on the performance indicators described in section
2.9. The results of 1000 simulations are averaged. Table 5.3 summarizes the results in the long
term (the last implementation period in year 40.). The time series are shown below in order to
illustrate the dynamics over time, whereas 50 random runs are shown in the graphs in order to
show the variation of the results.
Long-term contracts
We start analyzing the results of long-term contracting, where land users receive contracts with
a duration of 40 years. They are expected to reforest their land and to conserve the forest during
this contracting period. Figure 5.4 shows the number of long-term contracts allocated over time
under each allocation mechanism. Contracting occurs mainly during the first implementation
periods, afterwards the budget constraint does not allow the agency to contract more land
users, because contracted land users receive annual payments for conservation. Clearly, less
contracts are allocated by means of fixed payments. The conservation payments resulting from
auctions are lower on average than the fixed conservation payments. This can be seen in figure
5.5. Discriminatory payments are slightly higher than the uniform payments on average, which
means that the environmental agency pays higher information rents under the former allocation
mechanism. This is a result of the dominant strategy of overbidding, where those land users
facing the lowest opportunity costs inflate their bids relatively more than the high-cost land
users.
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Allocation mechanism Reforestation
contracts
Conservation
contracts
Conservation
payments
Info.
rents
Non-
compliance
Avr. Trust Re-
conversion
Long-term contracts
Fixed payments 0 54.72 6000 0.49 0.68 - -
Uniform auctions 0 328.14 1621.33 0.50 0.95 - -
Discriminatory auctions 0 259.76 2050.12 0.49 0.95 - -
Short-term contracts
Fixed payments 0 23.05 6000 0.62 0.33 0.62 25.69
Uniform auctions 5.32 40.32 6978.17 0.53 0.78 0.53 152.34
Discriminatory auctions 0.25 63.87 8261.41 0.55 0.33 0.55 87.45
Table 5.3: Long term results of short-term and long-term contracting
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Figure 5.4: Number of long-term contracts
Figure 5.5: Average conservation payments in long-term contracts
The quasi rent losses of the environmental agency are the losses in environmental value
resulting from non-compliance. Non-compliance means that, despite of being paid for con-
servation, land users cut-off the trees they need in order to satisfy their needs for firewood.
Non-compliance implies therefore that the expected level of environmental benefits are not pro-
vided, which is equivalent to a loss in the quasi-rent of the agency. Once the trees are high
enough to be harvested, contracted land users incur additional opportunity costs in the form
of forgone benefits from firewood. We assume that land users would not have an incentive to
comply with the contract requirement if their benefits from firewood in one period are higher
than the conservation payment, because a loss of future payments would still imply positive net
gains from non-compliance. We do not have information about the amount of trees land users
would cut in case of non-compliance, so that we cannot quantify the losses of the agency.
The payments for conservation are not high enough to give land users an incentive to comply
with the contract requirement, once trees can be harvested. This is especially the case in
auctions, where we observe a share of non-compliance close to 100 percent.
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Figure 5.6: Share of contracted land users that do not comply under long-term contracting
As long as the trees are not high enough, there is no reason not to comply, because con-
servation payments exceed land users’ opportunity costs. The latter are only comprised by the
forgone benefits of allocating their land back to crop production. However, after period 10,
land users’ opportunity costs increase with the possibility to harvest of the trees. Conservation
payments are not high enough to compensate land users for these additional opportunity costs.
Non-complying land users receive more benefits from the use of firewood than from land use-
reconversion. This means, that keeping such land users contracted does not imply additional
conservation, because they would not re-convert their land in the absence of payments. Figure
5.6 shows the share of land users that would not have an incentive to comply.
The reason why land users accepted ex ante conservation payments that would not fully
compensate them ex post for their opportunity costs can be explained by the high time pref-
erences land users have (see table 5.2). Land users calculate the net present value of the costs
they will incur if they participate in the scheme. The opportunity costs with the highest weight
in this calculation are those incurred in the first period, where land users plant the trees and
receive conservation payments. The periods given the lowest weight in the calculation are those
in which conservation implies higher opportunity costs because of the foregone benefits from
the use of the trees as firewood. This means that the higher the rent they receive through the
reforestation payment, the lower their willingness to accept for conservation in the future. Land
users secure the rents from reforestation at cost of future compensation. This leads to payments
that are not high enough to provide the incentives to comply with the contract, once trees can
be harvested. In the Appendix we provide figures showing the number of contracts allocated
under each mechanism and the share of non-complying land users, for different assumptions on
the level of discount rates.
Our results suggest, that fixed payment schemes result in more environmental benefits com-
pared to auctions, if long-term contracts are offered to land users with high time preferences.
Auctions provide more environmental services than fixed payment schemes only during those
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years where trees are not high enough to be harvested, whereas uniform auctions provide the
highest number of contracts.
Short-term contracts
Short-term contracts have a duration of one year. They are offered for reforestation to new
enrollers, and for conservation to re-enrollers. Re-enrollers are those who have already invested
in reforestation. Figure 5.7 and figure 5.8 show the number of short-time contracts allocated
over time for reforestation and for conservation, respectively.
While new enrollers are mostly contracted during the first implementation periods in fixed
payment schemes and discriminatory auctions, contracts for reforestation are allocated under
uniform auctions throughout the 40 years. Under all three mechanisms, the number of con-
servation contracts allocated decreases rapidly once the trees are high enough to be harvested
(after period 10). The increase in opportunity costs leads to a higher willingness to accept for
conservation, and thus to higher payments necessary to induce conservation. In fixed payment
schemes and discriminatory auctions, the number of conservation contracts reaches a steady
state over time. The latter being higher under discriminatory auctions. In uniform auctions,
however, the number of conservation contracts is subject to variations. In order to understand
the dynamics behind these results, we take a look at the average conservation payments in figure
5.9.
Figure 5.7: Number of short-term reforestation contracts allocated
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Figure 5.8: Number of short-term conservation contracts allocated
Figure 5.9: Average conservation payments in short-term contracts
Discriminatory payments increase over time, until the average payment level reaches a steady
state at a level higher than the fixed conservation payments (figure 5.9). This increase occurs
in two phases. The first one is the result of learning effects. In every period land users receive
information about the bidding strategies of the participating land users they know. This allows
them to have a better estimation about the bid cap. They adapt their bidding strategy accord-
ingly, in order to secure higher information rents. The second phase corresponds partly to the
increase in opportunity costs once the trees are high enough to be harvested. Land users adapt
their bids to their increased opportunity costs.
The steady state reached over time describes what Williamson (1985) calls the fundamental
transformation, predicted as well by Voigt and Bizer (2013) for repeated conservation auctions.
Over time, the payments align and the agency re-contracts the same pool of land users. All
contracted land users have bids close to their estimated bid cap, such that they believe that
increasing their bids would compromise their participation in the conservation scheme. The
budget constrained agency does not contract new-enrollers because re-enrollers have a compar-
ative advantage. Because they already invested in the scheme, the value of their land is higher
in terms of the provision of environmental services. Figure 5.10 shows the cumulative number of
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land users who reconverted their land in every period. In discriminatory auctions, re-conversion
occurs only after trees can be harvested. Over time no additional units of land are re-converted,
such that the same land users remain contracted in every period.
Figure 5.10: Cumulative re-conversion of land in short-term contracting
In uniform auctions conservation payments are very volatile. They remain constant during
the first 10 years. Afterwards, they increase as a result of increased opportunity costs when
trees become high enough to be harvested. This increase in conservation payments does not
allow the agency to re-contract all land users again. Non-contracted land users re-convert their
land if profitable. This is shown in figure 5.10.
As a result of the price increase in period 10, contracted land users expect higher future
benefits from conservation. This in turn lowers their willingness to accept in the next period.
Because all land users do so, the level of the conservation payments decreases, leading to a
collective negative effect in terms of their information rents. This allows for budget availability,
such that the agency agency can contract new enrollers for reforestation. This is reflected in the
second increase in the number of conservation contracts in figure 5.8. We observe afterwards
a slight increase in the level of conservation payments as a result of the lower expected future
benefits from conservation. For some years, this leads to a rather stable number of conservation
contracts on average (figure 5.8) and no re-conversion (figure 5.10).
Over time, the opportunity costs of those who reforested their land later increase as well
as a result of the growth of the trees. We observe therefore the same effect again, however
this time it is less strong because a smaller amount of land users is contracted in every period,
compared to the first years of implementation. This rise in opportunity costs over time leads
to an increased rate of re-conversion (figure 5.10). The dynamics are the same as before. We
observe two effects. The first effect is a decrease in the level of uniform payments, resulting from
the fact that reforestation contracts are allocated in almost every period. Those who reforested
their land less than 10 years before face lower opportunity costs than those who are already
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incurring the opportunity costs of foregone firewood benefits. This decreases the conservation
payments. The second effect is an increase in the uniform payment level as a result of lower
expected benefits from conservation. However, the first one is higher because the share of early
adopters is lower as a result of the high re-conversion rates. The contracting dynamics lead to
a substitution effect, where old-enrollers are substituted by new ones.
While long-term contracts prevent land users from losing their quasi-rents, we observe some
quasi-rent losses under short-term contracting. Land users only face quasi-rent losses under
discriminatory auctions, as it is shown in figure 5.11. This occurs, however, only during the
time where conservation implies higher opportunity costs, such that not all land users can be
re-contracted with the fixed budget. High-cost non-contracted land-users re-convert their land,
and low-cost non-contracted land-users face quasi-rent losses. The latter lower, however, their
bids in the following round, such that they are re-contracted in further periods.
Figure 5.11: Quasi-rent appropriation in short-term contracting
These results explain why trust does not have a high effect on the cost-effectiveness of
auctions (recall the sensitivity analysis for short-term contracting). In the absence of quasi
rent appropriations, the reputation of the agency is not influenced negatively by the allocation
dynamics (see figure 5.12). Although there are some quasi-rent appropriations after period 10
in discriminatory auctions (figure 5.11), the number of land users whose trust level increases
is higher. This is the result of full compensation during the period where trees did not deliver
any private benefits to the land users. Nevertheless, we observe a higher trust level in fixed
payment schemes on average, compared to auctions (table 5.3). The reason for this are the
higher re-conversion rates, that do not allow a full compensation of land users, which in turn
does not allow those land users to experience a higher trust in the agency.
During the 40 years of implementation, the level of conservation payments that result from
repeated auctions remains on average above the fixed level. Nevertheless, a higher number of
conservation contracts is allocated through auctions. The reason for this is that no other land
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user is willing to invest in the scheme given the level of future conservation payments. All
land users with opportunity costs lower than the fixed payment have invested already. This is
why we see almost no reforestation in later periods (5.7). Conservation payments are higher in
auctions. This increases the expected future benefits from reforestation. This is why more land
users are willing to reforest their land. This implies that a share of the budget is not spent in
fixed payment schemes.
Figure 5.12: Reputation of the agency in short-term contracting
Compared to long-term contracting, short-term contracting results in higher conservation
payments, and thus in a smaller number of contracts. However, higher payments result in higher
incentives for compliance (figure 5.13). The share of land users not complying with the contract
requirements is similar under discriminatory auctions and fixed payment schemes. Although
uniform auctions result in conservation payments that are higher than the payments in the other
allocation mechanisms (see figure 5.9), the share of non-complying land users is the highest. The
reason for this is the fact that land users contracted in uniform auctions have higher opportunity
costs on average. Although auctions target the land users with the lowest opportunity costs
from crop production, after reforesting their land, these land users are not necessarily the ones
with the lowest opportunity costs regarding the foregone benefits from firewood.
Figure 5.13: Non-compliance in short-term contracts
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According to our results, discriminatory auctions provide the highest value of environmental
services and the highest additionality, if short-term contracts are offered. The environmental
value provided exceeds the one under fixed payments when long-term contracts are offered.
5.4 Discussion
In this study we investigated the potential of auctions to allocate contracts requiring specific
investments. We considered long and short-term contracts for reforestation and further con-
servation of the trees, and we considered the use of uniform and discriminatory auctions as an
alternative to fixed payments.
Our results show that land users with high time preferences are willing to enter into long-term
contracts, even though their opportunity costs of conservation exceed the conservation payments
implied in the contract, once the trees can be harvested. This leads to inefficiencies because
land users who benefit more from the use of the trees for firewood than from conservation won’t
have an incentive to comply with the contracts. Non-compliance results in lower environmental
services, and thus in a quasi-rent loss for the agency. Furthermore, these land users are not
willing to re-convert their land back to crop-production in the absence of the payments, implying
a low additionality. This might be especially true for non-complying land users in auctions,
because auctions target the land users with the lowest costs. The lower the foregone benefits
from crop-production, the lower the profitability of land-use re-conversion, and thus the lower
the additionality of the conservation of those trees.
If long-term contracts are offered, fixed payments offer the highest additionality and the
highest environmental value in the long-run. Auctions lead to conservation payments that are
lower than the fixed ones, and thus to a higher number of contracts. However, almost all land
users contracted under auctions have an incentive to cut off trees for firewood once the trees can
be harvested for that purpose. Higher conservation payments in fixed payment schemes ensure
a higher number of land users complying with the contract requirements in the long run. In
order to reduce non-compliance, reforestation payments should not overcompensate land users.
This would prevent land users with high time preferences from participating in the scheme,
unless their opportunity costs would be covered by the payments ex post.
In the short run, auctions have a higher potential for cost-effectiveness, compared to fixed
payments. Uniform auctions would be the most cost-effective mechanism to allocate contracts
for reforestation and conservation, as long as the contracts would be offered during the period
where land users do not have any benefits from reforestation. If however short-term contracts
are offered, discriminatory auctions ensure a higher environmental value in the long run, be-
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cause uniform auctions lead to high re-conversion rates and low compliance. Auctions allow
contracting the land users with low-opportunity costs for reforestation. These however, are
not necessarily the ones facing the lowest-opportunity costs of conservation once trees can be
harvested, because the benefits from crop-production are not correlated with the benefits from
firewood. Discriminatory auctions allow land users to adapt their bids over time, and to use
the information gathered in order to increase their rents. This ensures a higher compliance.
Our results are framed by the data we use, and thus by the context in the region in Malawi,
where the tree planting trial was implemented. Land users have very high time preferences,
such that they would ask for rather low compensation payments in order to secure reforestation
payments. High non-compliance rates result under long-term contracting. This would not be
the case in settings where land users have lower time preferences.
Moreover, in this particular context, it would be the agency and not the land users who
would face a quasi rent appropriation, because reforestation requires initial payments due to
liquidity constraints. We only observe land users suffering quasi rent losses in repeated discrim-
inatory auctions. The agency clearly suffers quasi rent losses from non-compliance and from
re-conversion, the latter being a result of the allocation dynamics and not of opportunism.
To prevent non compliance, contracts have to be monitored and have to include sanctions
that are high enough to make the expected net benefits from non-compliance become negative.
In practice it is difficult to ensure contract compliance in long-term contracts. It is not always
feasible to make land users reimburse payments in case of non-compliance. Moreover, payment
schemes can face the dilemma of making participation attractive through higher initial pay-
ments, but of reducing leverage for contract compliance. Compliance can be enhanced through
payments that are high enough to provide land users with the necessary incentives (Wunder &
Albán 2008, pp.692-693).
Our results are also framed by how we modeled the bidding strategies of land users. If
land users participating in repeated uniform auctions would be aware of the collective effect
that would result from their adapted expectations about future conservation benefits, uniform
auctions would not lead to a decrease of the level of the payments over time. However, in reality,
knowing that all other land users might reduce their bids to ensure participation, there might
not be any reason to risk participation by not lowering the own bid. Therefore, this problem
might not be overcome in reality.
We did not take into account, that land users are likely to face uncertainty about their future
opportunity costs. In this context trust would play an important role in their decision to invest
in reforestation. Thus, social interaction and its effect on the reputation of the agency would
play a relevant role as well. If crop prices are subject to volatility, so would opportunity costs
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of conservation be. The latter would have to be taken into account in the level of conservation
payments if long-term contracts would be offered.
From this study we conclude that discriminatory auctions could be a cost-effective mecha-
nism to allocate contracts in the presence of asset specificity if short-term contracts are offered.
Long-term contracting through auctions is only cost-effective during the time when land users
do not profit from reforestation. Long-term contracts should be allocated by means of fixed
payments if land users have high time preferences. Fixed conservation payments in long-term
contracts should be established at a level that does not compromise compliance. The latter
might however be challenging given the presence of asymmetric information.
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Appendix
Figures 5.14 and 5.15 show the number of contracts allocated, and the share of non-complying
land users, under different assumptions on the level of discount rates, respectively. The higher
the time preferences of land users, the more they discount future income, and thus the lower
their willingness to accept for conservation. Figure 5.14 shows the results of the simulations,
assuming the empirical values and assuming that all land users discount at rates equal to 10, 30
and 90 percent. As it can be appreciated in this figure, the higher the discount rates, the lower
the willingness to accept for conservation. This leads to a higher number of land users willing
to enter into a long-term contractual relationship for the offered fixed conservation payments.
In auctions, it leads to lower bids and thus to a higher number of contracts allocated. Figure
5.15 shows the share of non-complying land users. This number increases with the discount
rate. The higher the time preferences, the higher the likelihood of non compliance due to lower
payments.
Figure 5.14: Number of long-term contracts for different discount rates
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Figure 5.15: Share of contracted land users that do not comply under long-term contracting for
different discount rates
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6Conclusion
The purpose of this thesis was to study the use of auctions for the allocation of contracts
in schemes of payments for environmental services (PES). Although auctions are claimed to
increase the cost-effectiveness of payment schemes through the reduction of the rents paid to
land users (Ferraro 2008, p.813), their performance is claimed to deteriorate if they are repeated
over time. Bidders can learn and adapt their strategies in order to secure higher rents (Latacz-
Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005, p.29). This does not necessarily mean that repeated auctions are
less cost-effective than schemes with posted offers. Their rent-reducing potential is an empirical
issue, and it can be tested through laboratory and computational experiments (Ferraro 2008,
p.816).
Studies using laboratory experiments to investigate learning effects in repeated auctions
include Cason and Gangadharan (2004), and Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi (2007). In other
studies, repeated auctions are simulated by means of agent-based modeling, such as in Hailu
and Schilizzi (2004), Hailu and Thoyer (2006, 2010), Hailu et al. (2010) and Lundberg et al.
(2018). These models allow simulating interactions between bounded-rational heterogeneous
individuals, such that the dynamics of repeated auctions can be analyzed (Hailu & Schilizzi
2004, pp.153-154). Although land users are likely to gather information from the experiences of
their acquaintances in order to understand their possibilities to increase their own rents (Hailu
& Schilizzi 2004, p.165), so far, Lundberg et al. is the only study considering learning effects to
be a result of social interaction.
This thesis contributes to the literature by taking into account the role of social interaction
in the use of repeated auctions to allocate payments for environmental services. Two types
of environmental services were considered: biodiversity and carbon sequestration. The thesis
analyzes how learning effects are framed by the structure of the social network, and their effect
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on the cost-effectiveness of biodiversity conservation. Furthermore, it addresses the use of
repeated auctions in low-income countries, where payment schemes have the additional goal
of alleviating poverty. So far, the use of auctions in low-income countries is only limited to a
couple of trials with single-shot auctions (Jack et al. 2009; Jack 2010; Jindal et al. 2013; Narloch
et al. 2013; Andeltová et al. 2014; Khalumba et al. 2014).
A further contribution of this thesis is the assessment of the use of auctions to allocate
contracts requiring specific investments. Although many payment schemes require land users
to make investments that are specific to the provision of environmental services, to date, only a
couple of studies assessed the problem of asset specificity in this context. These studies include
Ducos and Dupraz (2007), and Vogt and Bizer (2013). This thesis provides an analysis of the
design possibilities that agencies have in order to overcome the problem of asset specificity,
considering schemes where land users are paid for reforestation and further conservation of the
forest. Moreover, it addressed the potential of auctions to allocate such contracts cost-effectively.
Three different agent-based models were built in order to simulate the allocation of contracts.
In all three models, we integrated a small world network through which land users were able
to interact with their neighbors and with land users they know from other neighborhoods.
We implemented the Watts-Beta-Small-World Generator by Jung Project and Nick Collier, a
graph generator using the beta-model, as proposed by Duncan Watts (1998). Social interaction
allowed land users to optimize their strategies. The first model simulated a payment scheme
for biodiversity conservation, through which the role of social interaction on the performance
of discriminatory auctions was analyzed. The second model simulated a payment scheme for
biodiversity conservation in a low-income country. Participants were assumed to be risk averse
land users facing uncertainty about their future opportunity costs of participation. This model
allowed us to analyze the use of repeated uniform and discriminatory auctions to allocate
conservation contracts and their potential to alleviate poverty. The third model simulated
a payment scheme for carbon sequestration, where participants were paid for planting trees on
their land, and for conserving them afterwards. In this model, long- and short-term contracts
were allocated by means of single-shot and repeated auctions with discriminatory and uniform
pricing. The reputation of the agency was assumed to be framed by social interaction. We
implemented the opinions model of Sun and Mueller (2012), through which land users exchanged
information about their trust in the agency. This model includes empirical data from the tree-
planting project implemented by Jack (2010).
Hailu and Schilizzi (2004) proposed that social interaction would increase the speed of
learning, compared to settings were land users can only learn from their own experiences. This
would imply that the performance of auctions would deteriorate faster (Hailu & Schilizzi 2004,
p.165). However, this thesis shows that the cost-effectiveness of auctions does not necessarily
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deteriorate faster when bidders learn through social interaction. According to our results,
social interaction can dampen the learning effects over time, as long as they remain conditioned
to winning bids. During the first rounds, land users exhaust their rent-gaining possibilities,
leading to an increase in the payments, and thus to a deterioration of the cost-effectiveness of
the scheme. However, bidders might not have an incentive to change their bidding strategies,
once their bids are close to their approximation of the bid cap, because this would imply risking
participation. As long as land users’ bids do not exceed their expected bid cap, payments will
reach a steady state, and the cost-effectiveness of discriminatory auctions won’t deteriorate
any further. This means that, even in the presence of learning effects, repeated discriminatory
auctions can outperform posted offers with fixed payments. The results confirmed that the
cost-effectiveness of auctions increases with the level of competition among land users.
Auctions could be particularly interesting in low-income countries lacking properly function-
ing land, labor and credit markets, because estimating the opportunity costs of land users might
imply additional challenges (Ajayi et al. 2012, p.3). However, there are concerns regarding the
implementation of auctions in low-income countries. These include the claim that poor land
users would receive lower payments, and that they might face highly uncertain opportunity
costs (Ajayi et al. 2012, p.3). This could result in non-profitable bids (Khalumba et al. 2014,
p.865), and thus in low compliance rates (Ajayi et al. 2012, p.9). Poor risk averse land users
might see in conservation contracts an option to insure themselves against low profits. There-
fore, they might be willing to accept low fixed conservation payments. This can lead to low
compliance rates once uncertainty is resolved. Land users would not comply with the contract
if their actual opportunity costs exceed the level of the payments. The results show that uncer-
tainty and risk aversion do not necessarily play a role in the bidding strategies of land users in
discriminatory auctions. Over time, bids become a function of the available information land
users have regarding the bid cap. Bidders increase their bids as long as this does not imply
risking participation. Thus, poor land users can secure higher rents over time, which has in
turn a positive effect on compliance. However, our results show that uniform auctions lead to a
higher compliance, and thus to a higher cost-effectiveness over time, compared to auctions with
discriminatory pricing. Uniform auctions allow the agency to contract only poor land users,
but at rather low rents.
Our results shows that repeated auctions can induce "pro-poor" effects, while providing
biodiversity conservation cost-effectively. Given a fixed budget, uniform and discriminatory
auctions can offer a higher level of biodiversity conservation than fixed payments even in the long
run. While uniform auctions allow only for the participation of poor land users, discriminatory
auctions promise higher rents for poor land users. These results are interesting for schemes in
low-income countries, where there is concern that the goal of maintaining biodiversity can be
in conflict with the goal of poverty alleviation (Adams et al. 2004, p.1146).
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The presence of asset specificity in the provision of environmental services can act as a
deterrent to participation in payment schemes. Asset specificity can imply a high risk for land
users. If the investment is non-redeployable in an alternative use without losses, they would face
the risk of losing their quasi-rents (Ducos & Dupraz 2007, p.7). Unless they are compensated
ex ante, they could fear being harmed by opportunism. However, paying land users ex ante can
imply losses in the agency’s quasi rents. Because these payments would not be conditional on
the provision of environmental services, they would not ensure their provision. In this context,
trust plays an important role. Land users would agree to make specific investments in the
absence of ex ante payments if they trusted the intentions of the agency to compensate them
after the investment is made (Ducos & Dupraz 2007, p.23).
A literature review shows that long term contracts can allow the agency to overcome the
problem of asset specificity. Long-term contracts provide land users with certainty about future
compensation for their investment, when promises are not credible. Long-term contracts have
to go hand in hand with incentives for compliance. Offering conditional long-term payments
ensures compliance. Two aspects have to be taken into account when designing the contracts:
whether land users face liquidity constraints, and whether they face uncertainty about the
relative profitability of participation. In the presence of liquidity constraints, ex ante payments
are necessary to finance the investment. However, monetary sanctions for non-compliance are
not feasible in the presence of liquidity constraints, such that compliance has to be ensured
through on-going result-oriented payments. The latter should compensate land users for their
opportunity costs, but also for their maintenance costs.
If participants have high time preferences, schemes with fixed payments offer a higher cost-
effectiveness and a higher additionality in the provision of carbon sequestration through long-
term contracts (where participation implies asset specificity). Land users with high time prefer-
ences might accept low future conservation payments, in order to secure high initial reforestation
payments. Whenever the payments for conservation do not exceed the benefits from non com-
pliance, land users will have an incentive to use trees for firewood. This means, moreover, that
non-complying land users’ conservation would not necessarily be additional. They might not
be necessarily willing to re-convert their land back to crop-production in the absence of pay-
ments. This is more likely in auctions targeting low-cost land users. Nevertheless, this thesis
provides evidence for gains in cost-effectiveness through discriminatory auctions in short-term
contracting. The results show that they allow land users to adapt their bids over time in order
to increase their rents, ensuring thereby a higher compliance.
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This thesis shows that learning effects, claimed to have a negative effect on the cost-
effectiveness of payments, might actually be advantageous. Learning effects can allow agen-
cies to provide biodiversity conservation cost-effectively, while alleviating poverty, whenever
risk averse land users with uncertain opportunity costs are the potential participants of the
scheme. The repetition of auctions allows them to secure rents that do not only improve their
well-being, but that can also ensure their compliance. Learning effects were also proved to be
beneficial in settings where land users with high time preferences are required to make specific
investments. The repetition of auctions allow bidders to learn and thus to increase their rents.
This leads to payments that exceed their opportunity costs once the trees are high enough to
be harvested, leading to a higher likelihood of compliance. This implies that, in the presence
of learning effects, repeated discriminatory auctions can still outperform uniform auctions and
fixed payments under certain conditions.
The results are sensitive to different levels of competition among land users. The higher
the level of competition among participants, the higher the cost-effectiveness of auctions but
the lower the rents paid to the poor. The rents paid to the poor under discriminatory auctions
increase with the level of uncertainty. Low initial bids allow many land users to win a contract.
This increases the information flow in the network, leading to a steeper learning curve, and
thus to higher rents for the poor. When contracts imply asset specificity, the results of repeated
auctions are sensitive to interactions between the number of participants, the level of budget
and the distribution of opportunity costs. The higher the heterogeneity among land users, the
higher the benefits from the use of discriminatory auctions. If participants are likely to face low
opportunity costs, uniform auctions allow contracting more land users, the lower the budget
is, and the higher the number of land users. Nevertheless, the resulting low uniform payments
could lead to non-compliance once trees can be harvested. If the opportunity costs of land users
follow a normal distribution, discriminatory auctions can lead to a higher number of land users
contracted the lower the smaller the budget. Compliance would not be compromised because
repeated discriminatory auctions would allow land users to increase their rents over time.
The results are framed by the assumptions made in the models. As already discussed in
previous chapters, the cost-effectiveness of auctions will always be dependent on the bidding
strategies of land users. If low-cost land users increase their bids despite of not having infor-
mation about higher accepted bids, the deterioration of the cost-effectiveness of auctions won’t
be dampened by social interaction. The implication for the implementation of repeated auc-
tions in low-income countries would be a trade-off between the goal of alleviating poverty and
the goal of biodiversity conservation. Increasing conservation payments would imply higher
"pro-poor" effects but a lower provision of biodiversity conservation. In our study we assume
that the provision of biodiversity conservation is homogeneous among participants. However,
if the value of biodiversity conservation correlates positively with the provision costs, agencies
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could also face a trade-off between both goals and a low additionality, especially if uniform
auctions are implemented. Our results show that discriminatory auctions can allow high-cost
land users to participate in the scheme for relatively lower rents. This means that the highest
rents would still be paid to the poorest land users, but also land users offering a higher ad-
ditionality would provide biodiversity conservation. Another crucial assumption in our study
is the positive correlation between wealth and provision costs, which allows for a "pro-poor"
biodiversity conservation through auctions.
The gains in cost-effectiveness through auctions could be diminished by their administrative
costs because they are more complex than fixed payment schemes (Ferraro 2008, p.814). So,
although these study provides evidence for potential gains in cost-effectiveness through auctions,
the transaction costs implied would have to be assessed. The differentiation of payments, rather
than the use of fixed uniform payments might involve higher transaction costs. This might be
especially the case in low-income countries where potential participants are not literate and
are dispersed in remote rural areas (Ferraro 2008, p.818). In a scheme where land users offer
different combinations of management options in their bids, contracts have to be heterogeneous.
Devising a multi-criteria bid scoring system to include all dimensions of a bid is likely to involve
high transaction costs (Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005, p.xv). Moreover, auctions might also
imply high transaction costs for land users. If these are fixed initial costs, they might prevent
the poor from participating in the scheme (Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005, p.10). The results
of an outcome-based payment scheme in Germany showed that the transaction costs implied
in formulating bidding strategies were relatively small in comparison to the payments (Latacz-
Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005, pp.54-55). However, this result cannot be generalized for low-income
countries, where payments are likely to be lower.
Despite the high transaction costs that auctions imply, the net gain could still be higher,
compared to fixed payment schemes. One example is the BushTender pilot in Victoria, Aus-
tralia, where transaction costs for the first auction round implied about 60 percent of the total
amount spent. Transaction costs comprised on-site research, ecological scoring and auction
administration costs (Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005, p.xiii). A study showed that fixed
payments would have been less efficient in that scheme than auctions, even allowing for some
savings in transaction costs (Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi 2005, p.6). Moreover, because of the
complexity of ecological systems, and thus all potential contingencies and eventualities, the
transaction costs of a fully specified contract might be very high (Latacz-Lohmann & Schilizzi
2005, p.15). In this respect, the results about the performance of repeated auctions in the pres-
ence of uncertainty and asset specificity suggest that repeated discriminatory auctions could
be more cost-effective than fixed payments. Repeated discriminatory auctions could not only
reduce the burden of transaction costs implied in the specification of long-term contracts, but
they could also ensure compliance and induce "pro-poor" effects in low income countries.
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Further studies are necessary in order to assess the implications of land heterogeneity in
terms of the value of environmental services, when schemes are implemented in low-income
countries. The relevance of social interaction should also be further assessed for settings where
participation implies asset specificity, and opportunity costs are uncertain. Even though more
studies are necessary in order to assess the cost-effectiveness of auctions, as well as their poten-
tial to alleviate poverty, including the assessment of the transaction costs implied, this thesis
provides evidence for potential gains through auctions. This thesis shows that learning effects
in repeated auctions can induce higher rents for the poor, without compromising the provision
of environmental services, especially if potential participants are risk averse land users facing
uncertainty, or whenever they face high time preferences and participation requires specific
investments.
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